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Dear Central Eurasian Studies Review Readers and Subscribers:

The present issue of CESR, 5-2, concludes Central Eurasian Studies Review’s fifth year of publication. The CESS Publications Committee has decided to make some changes, and these affect the form and content that CESR will take in the future. Issue 5-2 is CESR’s final hard copy (paper) publication. CESR will continue, but in on-line format only. CESR will be accessible freely to all through CESS’s website.

Our goal in establishing CESR was to create a medium for communication among scholars, so that we could be better informed about research, conferences, books, and education in Central Eurasian Studies. At the same time, CESS also has long intended to work toward some form of peer-reviewed publication. The CESS board, in consultation with the publications committee, and with Central Asian Survey editor Deniz Kandiyoti, is now committed to strengthening an existing journal, Central Asian Survey (CAS), by providing editorial input (with three CESS members on CAS’s commissioning editorial board, and two CESS members on CAS’s board of international advisors), participating in CAS’s peer review process, and by encouraging CESS members to submit their scholarly articles, based on completed research, to CAS. We will also encourage CESS members to contact CAS’s book review editor (currently Nick Megoran), about their interest in reviewing books, or having books reviewed. CESS is negotiating a special subscription rate to CAS for CESS members.

CESR will continue publication on-line, and will focus directly on publishing materials that enhance communication among scholars in our field. We will continue to publish reports of research in progress, conference reports, and reports on teaching about Central Eurasia. We will also publish occasional thought pieces (especially presidential addresses) and responses to those. We hope to expand publication of brief notices on research conditions. CESR will no longer publish book reviews; instead we will work toward expanding CAS’s reviews section.

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As CESR transitions to its new format, there will be further changes to content, as new interests emerge. CESR will also put out a call for volunteer editors to work on specific sections of the on-line publication.

Over the past five years, a rather small but dedicated group has volunteered countless hours toward establishing CESR, soliciting articles, interacting with authors, editing, polishing, formatting, producing, working with printers, and getting CESR into your hands both on paper and on-line. As editor of CESR, I want to thank all of you for your hard work, and for your belief that we can improve the quality of publication in Central Eurasian Studies. I also thank the many of you who have contributed your own written work to CESR, making your thoughts and your research available to CESR’s readership across the world.

Sincerely,

Marianne Kamp
Editor-in-Chief, Central Eurasian Studies Review
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Perspectives

What Jadidism Was, and What It Wasn’t: The Historiographical Adventures of a Term

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“Do Central Asians,” I am often asked (by specialists and non-specialists alike) in the West, “look back to the Jadids in their search for reconciling Islam to contemporary life?” An intellectual movement fascinated with progress and modernity, sensitive to “the needs of the age,” using aggressively modernist interpretations of Islam to harmonize it with modernity must represent a form of “liberal Islam,” that strand of Islamic thought that has come to be associated with the hope of saving Islam from its more radical or militant expressions. It seems completely intuitive to many that modern Central Asians should be turning to the Jadids for inspiration in matters pertaining to the present.

This enthusiasm for seeing the Jadids as the font of liberal Islam is not matched by Central Asians themselves. Jadidism is a hot enough topic in Uzbekistan, but current Uzbek historiography sees the Jadids as national heroes, as fighters for independence, as some of the greatest sons of the Uzbek people. But reading the official hagiographies of the Jadids and Jadidism, one could be forgiven for believing that the individuals or the movement never had anything to do with Islam! And in Uzbekistan’s Muslim circles, whether “official” or “independent,” i.e., illegal, the Jadids don’t loom very large either. The official establishment, the O‘zbekiston Musulmonlar Idorasi (Muslim Board of Uzbekistan), has staked out a position that is comfortable in the Hanafi traditions of Transoxiana (precisely what the Jadids criticized), while many of the “independent” Muslims today have a very different notion of Islam, reform, and modernity. In Tajikistan, Jadidism is practically synonymous with “pan-Turkism,” and seen, at best, as a tragic mistake made by some Tajik intellectuals in the early 20th century.

The comments that follow were occasioned by this disparity between Western expectation and post-Soviet reality. Thinking about this also brings into focus certain broad cultural and political trends that have defined (and redefined) Central Eurasia as a region over the last hundred years or so.

Jadidism has been made to bear many burdens. Anyone setting forth to study it during the Cold War (as I did) had available two remarkably different historiographical constructions of the phenomenon. In the West, one could read of Jadidism as a single movement of modernization and national awakening of the Muslims of the Russian empire. The basic structure of this notion emphasized two things: (1) a chronology composed of various periods succeeding one another, with religious reform serving primarily as the precursor to the later “full” development, via educational and cultural reform, of a political movement of national liberation; and (2) an assertion of the basic unity of the movement and of the community (millet, “nation”) in which it arose. Jadidism was a message of reform, a wake-up call, carried by the Crimean and Volga Tatars to the four corners of their community (and beyond — Ismail Bey Gasprinskii was supposed to have opened a new-method school in Bombay). This was basically the narrative of (mostly Tatar) émigrés writing in Turkish, but taken at face value and turned into a Western orthodoxy by scholars in France, Britain, and the United States.

In stark contrast stood the Soviet version. There, to the extent that anyone wrote about it, Jadidism was a bourgeois nationalist ideology, and the Jadids were the spokesmen of a nascent bourgeoisie operating in a pan-Russian economy, but were seeking to use nationalist rhetoric to isolate “their own” constituency from political mobilization by “progressive social forces.” The Jadids were starkly differentiated from “enlighteners” (prosvetiteli), who were also modernist intellectuals, but were supposedly not nationalist, and rather were
inclined to appreciate the “progressive meaning” and the “positive consequences” of Russian rule. Although individual authors could — and did — tweak the boundaries between “Jadids” and “enlighteners,” the basic paradigm remained unchanged until perestroika.

But if Jadidism dominated Western narratives of the modern history of the Muslims of the Russian empire, it seldom got more than a few column-centimeters in Soviet histories. Specialized works were out of the question. Practically no sources for the study of Jadidism were available in the West, despite heroic efforts by Alexandre Bennigsen in Paris and Edward Allworth in New York to gather what was available. A few individuals did seminal work, scrounging through private libraries in Turkey or the Slavic library in Helsinki, but the limits were always there. All the sources were in the Soviet Union, where the topic was off limits, and the linguistic and paleographic skills required to work with the sources were not in abundant supply.

The Soviet version was easier to see through than the narrative of nations awakening contained in émigré or Western accounts. The distinction between “Jadids” and “enlighteners” was entirely forced (the camp to which one was consigned depended on whether one was purged in the 1930s or not), and the vulgar-Marxist reading of Jadidism as class-based made little sense given the historical context in which it existed. This Soviet interpretation of Jadidism did not survive the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Western (or, rather, the non-Soviet) view has proven more resilient, for it is couched in terms of national awakening and liberation, which still retain their rhetorical force. Nevertheless, the hope entertained by many during the heady days of perestroika, that the end of Soviet ideological strictures would result in the creation of a single historiographical community in which scholars from all over the world will share common methodological postulates, has not come true either. Jadidism has taken on new meanings in the places where it existed. In Uzbekistan, it has become an Uzbek national liberation movement, doomed to extinction in the face of Stalinist repression and the “Soviet totalitarian order”; in Tajikistan, it is a synonymous with pan-Turkism, in Tatarstan a form of Tatar nationalism, and in Bashkortostan with the struggle against Tatar hegemony.

There are other ways, however, in which the collapse of the Soviet Union has had a wonderfully salubrious effect on the study of Jadidism. We may not have all arrived at the same address, but we certainly can communicate across the divides — political, methodological, ideological — that seemed so unbridgeable only (!) two decades ago. Such communication is the very raison d’être of CESS, of course, but it would have remained but a distant dream without the monumental changes set in motion by Mikhail Gorbachev. And the materials for the study of the subject — which, it turns out, are very rich indeed — are accessible to scholars in a way that could scarcely have been imagined two decades ago. We may not all agree on everything (and who needs full agreement anyway; it is the death of all discourse), but we can talk about the subject, and talk about it with new questions in mind.

Sources never tell the Truth about history, but they do allow us a closer acquaintance with the subject of our study. They also allow for a more analytically useful definition of Jadidism and the Jadids. The term “Jadid” is often used loosely to designate any and all Muslims with a modern education who were active in any area of public life in the Russian empire. A definition that pays attention to details and defines the Jadids as they might have themselves, would limit the label to those who participated in debates about the reform of Muslim cultural life, who established schools or newspapers, presented plays in the theater, and argued with other Muslims over the permissibility and the necessity of thorough-going reform. They appropriated many aspects of other discourses, but ultimately they were part of an Islamic discourse. In the absence of a rigorous definition, it is quite easy to conflate Jadidism with other modern discourses or actors among Muslims of the Russian empire: Tatar or Bashkir nobles or university-educated intellectuals active in politics were seldom directly involved with the cultural reform embodied in new-method schools, and cannot be considered Jadids in any sense of the word.

Jadidism so defined was a phenomenon largely of the urban Muslim societies of the Volga-Urals region, Crimea, Siberia, and Turkestan; it is questionable whether it even existed among the Kazaks or the Turkmens. The Alash Orda, for instance, was a movement of a fledgling Kazakh national intelligentsia (in the original Russian sense of the term), having little to do with Jadidism. The trajectories of Azerbaijani modernism are more fruitfully traced to local reform currents of the 1830s than to Gasprinskii’s Terjüman.
Jadidism was also a movement of Islamic reform. This religious context of the movement has always tended to be underplayed. This was as true of Cold War-era depictions of the movement, as it is of post-Soviet views, especially those in Uzbekistan. Cold War-era accounts outside the Soviet Union saw religious reform as merely a precursor to a rationalist, secular political movement that Jadidism was eventually to become. Thus Muslim scholars as varied as Abdunnsair Kursavi, Shihabeddin Marjani, and Ahmad Makhdumi Donish were pressed into service as precursors to a full blown national movement. Their life work was only a stepping stone to a larger goal; they provided the preconditions for later developments. This teleological argument is in need of revision. Several different currents of reform, of various origins and inspiration, coexisted among the Muslims of the Russian empire, sometimes in parallel, sometimes overlapping or intertwined, and achieved vastly different results.

The earliest currents of reform were articulated entirely within the Islamic tradition and concerned issues of belief (‘aqd) and ritual (‘ibadat). These theological debates bear no direct genealogical link to other modernist reform movements that arose late in the 19th century. The former revolved around dissatisfaction with the tradition of interpretation of texts as it had been practiced in Central Asia and in the Tatar lands since Mongol times, and a turn, under the influence of revivalist movements in the broader Islamic world, to the Quran and the hadith as the only authoritative sources of authority. The principle of creative reinterpretation through the examination of the original scriptural sources of Islam at the expense of the consensus of ulama was to be central to the project of theological reform that developed over the course of the 19th century and continued down to the revolution.

While Jadidism took many of these theological innovations, it also tied them to notions of progress (taraqqi) and its cognate, civilization (madaniyat). For the Jadids, these were universal human phenomena, accessible to all peoples who organized themselves to cultivate knowledge and to reap its benefits. In this, the Jadids were part of a phenomenon of Muslim modernism that was widespread in the Muslim world. They argued from a self-consciously Muslim position as reformers of Islam and Muslim societies first and foremost. They called for thoroughgoing reform of customs, using a new, modernist interpretation of “true Islam” as their yardstick.

Jadidism was neither the “logical” culmination as a political movement of earlier religious reform efforts, nor indistinguishable from them; least of all was it a rational secular discourse largely outside the Islamic tradition. The Jadids produced desacralized understandings of the world, but it is far too simplistic to see them simply as paragons of secular rationalism. They were harshly critical of many local customs and traditions (for some of them, everything needed to be reformed), but the yardstick was often a new conception of Islam, rather than a rejection of it. This view of the Jadids as secular nationalists is particularly tenacious, shared by nationalist émigrés during the Cold War, and by contemporary post-Soviet intellectuals and regimes today. Curiously, this evaluation of the Jadids is also affirmed, though with a different value judgment attached to it, by many scholars of Central Asia’s Islamic tradition. Irked by what they see as undue attention being paid to a small group of modernists, such scholars denigrate the Jadids for having repudiated their traditions. But surely this is to underestimate the internal diversity and suppleness of the Islamic tradition. Jadidism was an Islamic discourse, an example of the ways in which a religious and cultural tradition can evolve through history.

For it must be remembered that the Jadids were fiercely opposed by many groups in society, who found their criticism of local customs to be blasphemous and their claim to leadership in society insolent. At issue were basic questions: What was “Islam”? What did it mean to be a Muslim at that time and place? Who had the authority to decide these questions and to lead the community? All too often, historians have adopted the Jadids’ own view of themselves as the logical leaders of society, and lumped all their opponents as a single mass of qadimchi, unthinking reactionaries and champions of tradition. Such a view keeps us from discerning the dynamics of cultural politics within Muslim societies. Opposition to the Jadids came from many directions, for a number of different reasons, and it was clear in the electoral politics of 1917, when the Jadids routinely lost to established groups in society.

The experience of 1917 radicalized many Jadids. Fed up with exhortation and gradualism, they acquired a fascination with the idea of revolutionary change, and many of them joined the Bolsheviks from 1918 on. Over the next few years, they developed an understanding of Islam that could be
reconciled with radical social change, mass mobilization, and anticolonialism. This too was an Islamic discourse, and our understanding of Islam itself is the poorer if we excise this episode from its history.

But if Jadidism was an Islamic discourse of modernism, can it be resurrected today to serve as a model of “liberal Islam”? The answer, I’m afraid, is no, not because Jadidism was not liberal, but because it was much too rooted in its own time and space to be replicated eight decades later in a very different world.

The Time

Jadidism arose with the appearance of new groups in the Muslim societies of the Russian empire, groups that could articulate a message of reform when faced with new needs and with possibilities for various kinds of change. The pressing issue, glossed by the Jadids as the attainment of “progress” and “civilization,” was of reordering society so that it could cope with the challenges posed by new circumstances (as seen by the Jadids). Spreading functional literacy, disciplining members of society into new forms of sociability, inculcating new kinds of solidarity—these were goals to which the Jadids strived, using new means of organization and communication appropriated from contemporary Europe. Moreover, Jadidism arose during the high age of empire, which defined the political aspirations of the Muslims of the Russian empire. Down to 1917 (and indeed, into the revolutionary period), sovereignty was scarcely the issue for the Jadids, who sought to work for the reconstitution of Russia as a liberal, democratic, and tolerant state. In the process, Muslim societies had to be reformed, and Islam itself rethought in an innovative, at times iconoclastic, manner. The authority of custom and tradition, and traditional elites had to be called into question, and it was.

How does this compare with today? Many of the desiderata of the Jadids have been accomplished, although by the Soviet state, and not the Jadids. Functional literacy is universal, as are modern forms of sociability and national solidarity. (This is true for much of the rest of the Muslim world too, where such goals were attained by modernizing states that arose from the 1920s on.) The international context is also radically different. The normative form of political organization in today’s world is the nation-state, and national sovereignty has been achieved.

The situation with Islam is also vastly different today than in the early 20th century. For the Jadids, custom and tradition were the problem. Islam had to be renewed through iconoclasm directed at them and the systems of authority they sustained. The Soviet era saw plenty of iconoclasm, but of a far more radical and enduring kind. The Jadids’ iconoclasm fits ill with current needs. In the Soviet period, for the majority of Muslims, Islam became identified with tradition, and the most pressing question was one of preservation, not the uprooting of tradition, and so it remains for most. At the same time, fears of “political Islam,” of “radicalism,” and “extremism,” guide government policy and public debate throughout the post-Soviet space, which lead to certain evaluations of Jadidism. Let us examine this briefly with regard to Uzbekistan.

Jadidism was remembered first by intellectuals during the era of glasnost, but Jadids were remembered primarily as fathers of modern (and Soviet) Uzbek literature, and it was only in the mid-1990s that they became the subject of serious historical work. The regime in power, as well as much of the intelligentsia, is wary of the threat of “political Islam.” The Jadids’ Islamic pedigree puts them in an awkward position. They are therefore celebrated as martyrs for the cause of Uzbek statehood, as heroic servants of the people, and so forth, but there is little space for the celebration of their contribution to Islamic thought. Indeed, there is no entry for “Jadidism” in the new Uzbek encyclopedia of Islam (Husniddinov 2004). The Jadids’ critical attitude to custom and tradition sits ill with contemporary “official” Islam as well. The Muslim Board of Uzbekistan has situated itself firmly in the Hanafi tradition of Transoxiana, which it defends/celebrates against the oppositions of various parvenu sects. The directorate does have some overlap with the Jadids—for instance in its opposition to very expensive celebrations of life-cycle events (to‘y)—but ultimately, the directorate has little to say about the Jadids.

As for the “radical” Muslims in Uzbekistan, their vision of reform is very different from that of the Jadids, a product of a different time and place and circumstance. There is no place for fascination with early-20th century notions of progress and civilization. The point for the radical of today, in short, is to Islamize the modern world, rather than to modernize Islam, as the Jadids had sought. So, while there are glancing similarities to the Jadids—the call for purity of ritual, of grounding religious knowledge in the original texts, by-passing the
authority of interpreters, etc. — the social, political, and cultural contexts are so different that today’s radicals have little in common with the Jadids.

The Space

Jadidism arose in a certain geographic matrix that has been utterly transformed since then. Jadidism was embedded in imperial spaces and transregional networks of Muslim elites. The key constituencies for Jadidism were the Muslims of the Russian empire (although not all of them). Turkestan and the Volga were knit together by all sorts of links — Tatar students still went to Bukhara, Sufi chains of initiation extended throughout the space, as did commerce — but by the end of the 19th century already, the balance was shifting. For many Tatars, Bukhara had come to signify backwardness and sloth, and information and ideas, now often in the form of newspapers and printed books had begun flowing in the opposite direction as well. But the imperial space defined by Russian rule did not determine the scope of Jadidism. Imperial surveillance and censorship did not prevent Jadid figures from traveling abroad to other Muslim countries, primarily the central lands of the Ottoman empire, but also Iran, Egypt, India, and, of course, Arabia. Figures such as Musa Jarullah Bigiyev, Zaynullah Rasulev, and Abdurauf Fitrat, to take a random sample of important figures, all had spent time in other Muslim countries, and were linked to them and their intellectual milieus in fundamental ways. An important axis of intellectual influence, entirely reciprocal, connected Kazan with Istanbul. The Ottoman connection was absolutely crucial for the Jadids of Turkestan and Bukhara. Other spokes connected Turkestan to Chinese Turkestan (Xinjiang) and Afghanistan.

This space was radically reconfigured in the 20th century. Imperial boundaries gave way to national ones, with greater claims to the control of space and movement across it. But the Soviet Union was an extreme case, with a border that became impermeable already by the 1930s. The effect was to isolate Soviet Muslims from the rest of the world in a way that would have been incomprehensible to the Jadids. But the internal Soviet space was also divided up — it was effectively “nationalized” in the imagination of historians, so that today histories of Jadidism can only be written in the national mode. Thus the Jadids become Uzbek or Tatar national heroes, or perhaps Tajik antiheroes, but they remain imprisoned in these national categories. Connections between regions become difficult to discern or investigate.

As this division of space has become starkly real since the collapse of the Soviet Union, now marked with barbed wire, customs posts, and the presence of immigration police, the geographic matrix in which Jadidism existed becomes ever more distant and unrecognizable. It seems that the only way we can make sense of a movement whose members did not (could not have) recognized many of the boundaries (ethnic, cultural, political) that loom so large today is to employ unsatisfactory labels such as “pan-Islamism” or “pan-Turkism.” In today’s political climate, the Jadids might even be misrecognized as a transnational Islamist movement!

References


Theme Section: Knowledge-Making about Central Eurasia

Comparative Perspectives on Central Asia and the Middle East in Social Anthropology and the Social Sciences (Part 2 of 2)

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Editor’s Introduction

The first part of Gabriele Rasuly-Paleczek’s article, published in CESR 4 (2) 2-27, Fall 2005, focused on comparing social anthropology studies of the Middle East and Central Asia, with particular attention to examination of segmentary lineage organization as a basic feature of tribal societies. The first section
presented an overview of anthropological and ethnographic scholarship on Central Asia, exploring the ways that scholarship produced in the Soviet Union (and available to the author in European languages other than Russian) compared in emphases and explanations, with scholarship produced in Western Europe and America. The second section examined the development of anthropological analyses of lineage and tribe based societies in the Middle East, and compared those findings with studies of tribe and lineage societies in Afghanistan, by scholars like Barfield, Lindholm, and Barth. Studies of Afghanistan raise questions about the relationship between tribe and state that has been posited for Middle Eastern societies. While Middle Eastern tribal societies are regarded as egalitarian, tribal societies of Central Asia are hierarchical, and thus relate to the state in ways that differ strongly from the model proposed for Middle Eastern tribes. The final section of this article follows.

Part 2

How should we assess the study of tribe and state relations in social anthropology? Even more interesting, how should we assess the current attraction that those models and assumptions elicit among scholars in such other fields as political science? Finally, how should we assess their import for the new generation of scholars in Central Asia? The following answers are based partly on my own research concerning the Qataghan-Uzbeks of northeast Afghanistan (Rasuly-Paleczek 1993, 1998, 1999, 2001) but also upon others’ findings.

It seems clear that numerous studies on tribe and state relations in the Middle East as well as in Central Asia (including northern Afghanistan) provide evidence that the understanding of tribe and state relations developed in the anthropology of the Middle East is well founded. Tribes and states are correctly seen to be acting as within one single system, where they exert reciprocal influence upon one other. However, in the anthropology of the Middle East this interdependence of tribes and states has depended overwhelmingly upon an idealized model of the tribe conceived as an ensemble of egalitarian, segmentary and genealogically circumscribed socio-political structures. Through the assumption that such structures were characteristic of all Islamic tribal societies, that model came to be applied to the study of tribes in Central Asia. Barfield (1991) and Lindholm (1986) have emphasized the structural differences between the egalitarian cultural tradition proper to the Middle East and the hierarchical traditions characteristic of Central Asia. However, a tendency to abstract the differences between these traditions leads to the danger of simply creating two ideal-types that are posited as polar opposites: on the one hand, an egalitarian and lineage-based tribe associated with small regional states that prevail in Arabia and North Africa; and, on the other hand, the hierarchical Turko-Mongolian confederacies associated with the large empires that have predominated in Central Asia, Iran and Anatolia.

As a result, Barfield’s approach to these differences falls somewhat short in its accounting for the complexities of socio-political realities. Despite the undeniable advances over other anthropological approaches that have excluded the historical perspective in his analysis and downplayed the question of legitimacy of political power, which Barfield treats more comprehensively. The shortcoming in establishing a contrast between two ideal-typical models is evident, for example, with regard to the importance of marriage alliances in the political domain. When Barfield refers solely to the practice of close kin marriage (a son marries his father’s brother’s daughter, or FBD-marriage) in the Middle East, he fails to consider more recent findings that have demonstrated the one-sidedness of earlier assumptions governing anthropological studies of the Middle East: Cole (1984), Bruck (1989), and Gingrich (1989) have pointed out other forms of marriages that aim likewise to create political alliances. Consequently, the contrast between egalitarian and hierarchical models of tribe and state relations should be considered as only one possible analytical framework.

Indeed, any claim that existing anthropological models of tribe and state are universally applicable across all socio-political situations is dubious, because models are unavoidably reductionist insofar as they emphasize particular aspects of anthropological reality that their proponents assert to be important. Models often cannot reflect the complexity of tribe and state relations in sufficient detail, and they tend also to be ahistorical. Models frequently neglect the impact of ethnicity and nation-building on the tribe, and they equally frequently omit consideration of such other forms of socio-political organization as patron-client relations or religiously based networks like the Sufi tariqats (Canfield 1984, 1988).
A broader research focus in analyzing tribe-state relations is consequently desirable. The anthropologist should not focus solely on contrasting egalitarian and hierarchical tribal structures and their built-in capacity to create either small regional states or large empires (Barfield 1991); it is also important to analyze the prerequisites for creating states—in e.g., what Gellner calls the “Mamluk option” (1991: 113-16)—or to emphasize the importance of a permanent flow of resources as a payoff for political support (Barfield 1991: 167-70). Political entities in the Middle East and in Central Asia subsume not only state and tribal structures but also a variety of other social groups that are neither tribal nor dynastic. Rather, as in the example of Canfield’s work (1984), focus is also necessary on other mechanisms of group formation, including but not limited to: ethnicity, religious adherence, professional or regional attachments, patron-client relations, and political parties; and how these interact with one other. We should not restrict ourselves to state-tribe relations and their underlying conceptualizations; rather, we should ask more general questions about socio-political relations. The benefit is to gain a better perspective on the shaping of political processes that manifest themselves in forms we call “states” or other political entities.

Qawm: The Solidarity Group

In this connection the concept of the qawm, a term used in Afghanistan to denominate a large variety of different social groups, might prove useful (Canfield 1988; Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont 1988: 239-243; Roy 1988: 201-202). In view of the unfamiliarity of this term outside a rather restricted community of anthropologists, it is useful to juxtapose several brief discussions of the term by specialists.

The term qawm is both broader and narrower than “ethnic group” and “tribe”, extending “not merely to ‘nation’ but also to [to] descent groups and their subdivisions down to the family, and linguistic, regional and occupational, groups, sects, castes . . . [M]ost often [qawm] implies linguistic and/or tribal identity” (Tapper and Tapper 1988: 27). Canfield argues that the term is even broader, going beyond kinship and descent, to include persons who mutually assist each other, those who become associated with the group through marriage, and families that form kinship ties through reciprocal marriage. “The members of a qawm, in local usage, are qawmi to each other. Qawmi are in-group persons; non-qawmi are in some sense out-group persons. Qawmi should dwell in the same territory. They should cooperate in work when needed; they should be politically united, operating as wholes for political purposes; and they should be religiously united, celebrating the Muslim holidays together and gathering at appointed times to pray and listen to sermons or the reading of religious literature.” In its essence, then, the term qawm refers to a “solidarity unit” (Canfield 1973: 34-35). Roy concurs that next to a common ancestor that binds individuals together and a common shared territory, it is above all behaving as a solidarity unit that constitutes membership in the qawm (Roy 1992: 75-76)

This rather broad conceptualization of the qawm makes it possible to include individuals of diverse ethnic and linguistic origin as members of the same group. A qawm may involve a varying number of individuals, close kinsmen, a village, an ethnic group, a religious sect or a linguistic group, depending upon context and situation. Richard Tapper and Nancy Tapper affirm that qawm is thus “a highly ambiguous and flexible concept allowing scope for strategic manipulations of identity” (1988: 27) Canfield explains that the word qawm does not describe “an empirical social pattern” but is rather “a term for a locally conceived structural category [that] . . . may be adjusted to suit various actual social situations,” to be “invoked, when appropriate, for various ranges and degrees of kinship reality, and denied when not appropriate” (Canfield 1973: 34) It follows that the concept of qawm relations may be a useful candidate for describing, and might even embody a useful analytical framework for studying, the complex fabric of socio-political alignments in Central Asia.

Still, these definitions do not provide a direct approach to two vital, interrelated issues: questions of political succession and questions of the legitimacy of political power. The problems of the state as a political entity are most often seen as resulting from power struggle of state versus tribe. Yet it becomes clear through the analysis of dynastic histories, that it is not only tribes that may endanger a ruler’s position in a state or empire. On the contrary, most dynasties in the Middle East and in Central Asia came under pressure from their own close kinsmen, e.g., conflicts between brothers and half-brothers or rivalries between cousins. It emerges that the total kinship and marriage system has to become a focus of comprehensive research.

It is not enough to point out that a kinship structure permits the development of hierarchies or
prevents them (as the Central Asian kinship terminological system, for example, differentiates between older and younger brothers), and thus creates the basis for hierarchical structures within society (Krader 1955). Rather, there may be more complete ways to elaborate the cognitive concepts of “selfhood” in a given society. One possibility might be to examine such cultural products as oral epics. (Chadwick and Zhirmunsky 1969). In Central Asian oral epics, the batir [hero] not only passes through dangerous situations but is also a defender of social values. He seeks to fight evil, to subdue the group’s enemies, and to (re)establish justice. The batir as represented in the oral epics embodies the virtues that any male should exemplify, a role model for the socialization of boys and juveniles. The qualities of the batir/hero thus play an important role in forming the character of individual males. Lindholm (1986) and Barfield (1991) have focused on these concepts of personhood by distinguishing between the egalitarian and the hierarchical cultural traditions. My own studies of the Qataghan-Uzbeks illustrate how political and economic circumstances prevailing at a given time may alter the ideal concept of male personhood.

Challenges for the Social Anthropology of Central Asia

In contrast to social anthropologists focusing on areas such as the Middle East and Africa, social anthropologists currently working on Central Asia (whether based in the West or in the region) are in a difficult position. Actual research results are comparatively few, research institutions and research traditions are not well established, and the rejection of Soviet-era findings leads many social anthropologists interested in Central Asia to feel that they have to start from scratch. The breakdown of the Soviet Union did not just end a political regime. It also led to a critical evaluation, indeed a broad rejection, of the Soviet heritage, and to a search for new identities and social and economic models. It led further to a judgment that the former prevailing research methods and theoretical concepts were obsolete. There have been many recent studies, on the rewriting of history and cultures of Central Asian history and scholars from Central Asia often refer to Western research traditions in their search to replace Soviet ones.

A number of efforts are currently under way to acquaint scholars from Central Asia, including Mongolia, with Western social anthropological concepts and methodologies. The Open Society Institute (OSI) networks have in particular set up workshops and summer schools, sought to partner scholars from the region with Western colleagues in mentoring relationships, and aimed to disseminate the knowledge produced, all while training senior and junior scholars in the region. Also in Central Asia there is a growing interest in developing social anthropology as a discipline. However, many scholars in Central Asia, especially senior scholars, are still more entrenched in the research and methodological approaches to social anthropology that prevailed during the Soviet period. Topics such as “ethnicity” are currently very popular, but many scholars still use the “ethnos” concept from Soviet scholarship, or work on “ethnic history” in that tradition. Other examples are prevalence of such terms as “mentality” and “feudalism” still widely used in written and oral research presentations. Sometimes the Western social anthropologist has the impression that Western approaches are mentioned in publications to frame the question (e.g. in the introductory chapter) without, however, really being applied in the research itself.

Summary and Outlook

In my studies of the Qataghan-Uzbeks, I found that models developed in the anthropology of the Middle East were useful analytical reference points but could not be the only ones. Political analysis may find such concepts as ethnicity and nation-building useful, but these describe social relations and personal and group identities too imperfectly. In order to bridge the gap between ideal-types and social realities, it is necessary to adopt an approach based on a more bottom-up view of knowledge-creation. Such an approach should take into account a range of individual and collective cognitive phenomena, from cultural notions of personhood to the legitimacy of political power. It would build the analysis of political interactions through graduated levels of social organization, beginning with small entities such as families and kin groups, then ranging through tribes and confederacies, or other solidarity units, before finally reaching the higher levels of states and empires. In this connection, I may conclude on the following points:

• We need more in-depth social anthropological research in Central Asia, a greater exchange of research findings, and better networking of scholars working on the region. Social anthropology’s emphasis on qualitative data and a “bottom-up” approach could improve
our understanding of the complex present-day socio-economic and political realities in the region if the institutional standing of the social anthropology of Central Asia were also enhanced.

- A critical evaluation of Western scholarship on Central Asia, in particular on the social anthropology of Central Asia, is badly needed. Due to the difficulty of doing field research during the Soviet period, findings from that era are limited in number and often biased. Soviet-period perspectives of Western social anthropologists were rather one-sided and influenced by a certain anti-Soviet bias.

- A critical evaluation of research findings accumulated over generations of scholars from within Central Asia is also necessary. Soviet scholars of Central Asia produced a tremendous wealth of ethnographic data during the Soviet period, notwithstanding the influence of official Soviet ideology. These studies are often unknown to the wider Western scholarly community. Evaluation of these studies would possibly generate new insights into relatively unknown aspects of Central Asian culture.

- Close cooperation between Western social anthropologists and Central Asian social scientists, especially ethnographers and sociologists but not limited to them, should be promoted so as to enhance the quality and breadth of social-anthropological expertise on the region. Such a dialogue would be mutually fruitful. Western social anthropologists would get a better understanding of Central Asia under the Soviet period and of the research findings of Soviet scholars on the region. Also it would assist them in re-evaluating Western notions about Central Asia. Central Asian scholars would benefit from a deeper understanding of theoretical and methodological approaches in Western social anthropology.

- Even more important, the search for new identities in post-Soviet Central Asia has lead to increasing debates on ethnicity within Central Asia, in particular by historians and social scientists. Sometimes, especially among Uzbek and Tajik scholars, the nationalistic bias of the rhetoric employed in these debates is unmistakable. A dialogue between Western social anthropologists and Central Asian scholars could possibly help to neutralize dangerous developments in the socio-political sphere such as the promotion of nationalism. Western scholars could sensitize their Central Asian colleagues to the explosive character of particular nationalist approaches and attitudes that might infiltrate scholarly work. In this way, they could contribute to the preservation of social peace in the region.

- Finally, we need to deepen discussion with colleagues from other social science fields, especially political scientists, sociologists, and historians. This is crucial because they often use, either explicitly or implicitly, concepts from social anthropology (such as tribe or clan), but may be unaware that the concepts they borrow are contentious within the discipline of social anthropology, and may even have been discarded, before they appear outside the discipline (see Part 1 of this article).

Taking all this into consideration, social anthropological research in and on Central Asia could become more important both within social anthropology and for other disciplines studying the region. Within social anthropology in general, Central Asia could be a testing ground for the validity of social anthropological models and theories developed in such other areas as the Middle East. Field research could test existing theories and show where and how to strengthen or even change them, increasing the robustness of the models employed. The critical evaluation of existing models and the accumulation of new research findings could also catalyze new nomothetic efforts in social anthropology. For example, research on current survival strategies in Central Asia and elsewhere could provide an impetus for refocusing on economic anthropology.

The intrinsic strengths of social anthropology (long-term field research, a bottom-up approach, and a comparative perspective) could help to overcome the theoretical and methodological standstill resulting from deconstructionist and “postmodernist” frameworks. As Chylinski (1987: 18) argued nearly two decades ago, if “Western anthropological scholarship [were] to join forces ... with the Soviet scholars in qualitative investigations of Central Asia ... [then the result would be] a better understanding of the social processes in these societies where ancient traditions coexist with modern high technology.”
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Viewing Kyrgyz Politics through “Orientalist” Eyes

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In March 2005, anti-government demonstrators toppled the government of President Askar Akaev [Akayev] of the Kyrgyz Republic. Akaev had been in power since 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed and the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic became the independent Kyrgyz Republic. Whether it was a popular revolution or a coup, this sudden event forced the president to flee his country and seek refuge in Russia.¹ According to Western politicians and scholars, Akaev had been the most democratic and modernizing leader in Central Asia. Unlike most of his counterparts in the former Soviet Union, he was not a high ranking Communist Party leader, but a scientist who was to lead his people in the so-called “Switzerland of Central Asia” to a rapidly democratized, modern and free society. This was the politics of knowledge about Kyrgyzstan, both inside and outside of Kyrgyzstan.

This essay explores the nature of knowledge-making regarding the possibilities of democracy and modernity in Central Asian political life. The ways in which many thinkers, journalists and politicians talk and write about a so-called “failure” of modernity in Kyrgyz politics blends all the fears of our times. I argue that the suspicion and fear of the “Asiatic,” to employ the age-old Russian phrase, continues to color the discourse about political culture in Kyrgyzstan. The image of the Asiatic included the Islamic, the nomadic, and the “backward,” all provoking fear of the unknown “other.” I also argue that the construction of the image of the Asiatic was based on inconsistent knowledge of Kyrgyz ways of living.

Recent examples of this Asiatic image can be seen in events of March and April, 2005: after the ouster of President Akaev, and a few days of looting took place, media in neighboring countries, such as government-monitored Uzbek and Kazakh television stations and newspapers including Tashkent-based Narodnoye slovo, and Almaty-based Kazakhstanskaya pravda, Khabar and Gazeta Kz, inadequately reported the event and discounted its legitimacy. An important analysis by three Central Asian journalists, all using pseudonyms, summarized this reaction well in an article entitled, “The Kyrgyz Revolution: Neighboring Leaders Try to Make Best of Difficult Situation” (Alibekov, Kambarov and Islamov 2005). The Vienna-based on-line newsletter of the International Press Institute

¹ The former president has been teaching in the Mathematics Department of the Lomonosov Moscow State University (Aalyev 2006; Lenta.ru 2005).
reported that official Uzbek media omitted any reporting of the Kyrgyz event (IPI 2005). Central Asian leaders made their warning clear: toppling the government did not necessarily mean that this was a popular movement, let alone a revolution, and it would only bring chaos to Kyrgyzstan. Although Russian media provided a great deal of coverage, they presented the events as wild and unruly. Novoye Vremya declared: “Paradoxically, till the end of the 1990s, Kyrgyzstan had been considered a model of democracy in that part of Asia, a (visual) proof of the opinion that common human values may take root and sprout in a poor Muslim country.” The author, Yevgeny Trifonov, suggests here that “common human values” did not exist in Kyrgyzstan, and need to be introduced there (2005). The question, however, is how and why a development that changes the history of the people of Kyrgyzstan is shrugged off as a chaotic or wild incident.

The binaries of chaotic versus organized, modern versus backwards, European versus Asiatic have a long history in Russia and the Soviet Union. This essay discusses the history of knowledge-making about Central Asian Islam first, and then connects the influence of this history with the descriptions of Kyrgyz events in 2005. The essay focuses on Russian interpretations of Islam as something incompatible with modernity, representations that have influenced Western understandings of this region’s political culture.

**Binary Knowledge and the Kyrgyz House of Culture**

The binary of backward versus civilized, which can be found in the reports of Russian administrators, was not unique to discussion of the Kyrgyz. In the 19th century, imperial Russian administrators were concerned about the social and cultural differences between the rural and urban populations. Like their imperial predecessors, Soviet administrators complained about the “backward” culture of the peasants in Russia and Ukraine and often blamed it on Orthodox Christian influences. Since the 19th century, Westernizing Russian intellectuals struggled with self-identification, first in a debate between the Slavophiles and Westernizers over identity, and centering on Orthodoxy (Layton 1994; Riasanovsky 1960: 170-81). The successful colonial conquests in Muslim lands raised a Russian sense of cultural superiority over the non-Slavic, non-Orthodox peoples. The colonizers concluded that the “Asiatic” was more backwards than the Orthodox Christian peasant. Russian diplomats and intellectuals wrote about the Asiatic character as something they needed to purge in themselves if they were to modernize, Westernize, or both (Geraci 2001). These attempts at self-recognition are exemplified in a popular proverb: “when you scratch a Russian, you find a Tatar”: that is, “Asiatic” influences of the Mongol and Tatar yoke are deep in Russian character. Russians blamed their own “backwardness” on the Mongol and Tatar invasions.

Both imperial Russian and Soviet administrators viewed Muslim Central Asia, steeped in Turkic and Persian traditions, as more backwards than Orthodox Christian Russia. In other words, Russia’s fear of the “Asiatic” or in Edward Said’s terms, the “Oriental,” freed the Russians and other non-Central Asians from self-evaluation. The Soviet administrators found a more advanced character in themselves that permitted them to educate the less-advanced Muslim Central Asians. Administrators became modernizers, and, to use Talal Asad’s terms (2003), they asked the non-modern Central Asians to determine whether they were qualified to be part of progress.

My research on Kyrgyzstan’s Soviet Houses of Culture [Madaniyat Üi] in the 1920s and 1930s shows that Soviet administrators struggled to interpret the behavior of Kyrgyz populations in terms of backward versus civilized. The Houses of Culture in Kyrgyzstan were Soviet adult educational institutions that sought to introduce Western, Russian, and socialist ideas to Kyrgyz and Uzbek adults. These institutions, also called Clubs, Red Yurts, or Red Choikhonas, were places where participants learned to read, write (mostly in Russian), paint, play music, and act in plays. They also heard speeches on the virtues of Marxism-Leninism, and even learned about western ideas of hygiene. When the Russian or other non-regional administrators of these houses reported to their superiors, they often expressed their puzzlement with the responses of the ail [Kyrgyz village] populations.

The language of the administrators’ reports pointed to several problems: they argued that the “locals” were lazy, unruly, patriarchal, and superstitious. As Asad (1993) has pointed out, the usage of the term “local” alone set the subject people apart from their modernizers. Almost all of the so-called “local” characteristics were those that the Russians historically called “Asiatic.” The
administrators, like the imperial administrators before them, focused on “taming” the Asiatic. Thus, they concentrated on the modern doctrines of secularism and sedentarization: liberating women from their patriarchal male relatives, and enforcing policies that settled nomadic Kyrgyz families.

It was not only the Russian or other European Soviets who perpetuated the binaries of Asiatic versus European, or backwards versus advanced; the indigenous Soviet elites of the 1920s and 1930s in Kyrgyzstan also deployed this vocabulary in their reports. Once Kyrgyz and Uzbeks became the administrators of the Houses of Culture, they too used the language of difference. Given the official requirements and their Soviet education, the Central Asian administrators had little choice but to implement official cultural policies.

These policies shaped many Kyrgyz children and adults as dutiful Soviet citizens. For example, in the 1930s, a well-known beet grower by the name of Zuurakan Kainazarova received many awards for becoming a Soviet hero. At age seventy, reflecting upon those years, Kainazarova wrote: “I will be 70 soon. I know a thing or two about the deprived Kyrgyz woman’s civil rights before the revolution. I also know well what it means to serve the rich with physical work. I have gone through that humiliation. It was disgusting. When I was a 15-year-old girl, I was sold in marriage to a rich old man. However, my life has been changed. I have received the most supreme award on earth: Lenin’s Order, and a gold medal of the Hero of Socialist Labor. I have been serving my country as a Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for 17 years (Sovetskaia Kirgiziia 1969).” Kainazarova was one of the “glorious daughters of the Kyrgyz nation” according to the newspapers and official documents of the day, which sang her praises and entered her name into encyclopedias as a Soviet heroine (Sovetskaia Kirgiziia 1972).

What is most intriguing is that these administrators managed to tailor some of these cultural policies so that they appealed to their populations. Stephen Kotkin has effectively argued that Russian workers of this era learned to manipulate the system to fit their needs, a behavior Kotkin called “speaking Bolshevik” (1995). Elsewhere, Adrienne Edgar has pointed out that non-Russian nationalities mirrored such behavior with

2 Timothy Mitchell (1993) has shown a similar process among Egyptian elites.
For Soviet administrators, national pride was not so much a threat as Islam. To them, Islam represented untamable patriarchy. Soviet administrators’ reports point to a static image of Islam, indicating that the authors had, at best, a vague idea about how Kyrgyz practiced Islam. Documents from Kyrgyz Houses of Culture in the 1920s reflect the uncertainty of Soviet administrators who lacked meaningful understanding of Kyrgyz and Uzbek cultures. In particular, these officials did not understand the nuances of localized interpretations of Islam. Their first problem was understanding the position of women: the combination of nomadic Kyrgyz and sedentary Uzbek traditions confused the Soviet officials, and they did not comprehend everyday gender relations among Kyrgyz, in part because those relations seemed so dissimilar to those of Uzbeks. Assuming that gender relations and women’s positions in society were directly connected to religious behavior, administrators concluded that Kyrgyz were not as strict in Islamic practice as Uzbeks. Although gender relations were not the sole reason for this conclusion, they emerged as one of the first and most visible concerns of administrators.

The Soviet administrators viewed nomadic Central Asians, like Kyrgyz and Kazakhs, as “nominal Muslims,” because they found their Islamic practice deficient: in their words, nomads had “weak Islamic practice.” They saw that some pre-Islamic rituals, such as reverence of ancestors and natural forces, still had a place in Kyrgyz Islam. These administrators did not possess the knowledge to appreciate Sufism’s significant influence among Central Asian nomadic populations. These administrators’ limited knowledge of the deficiency of Islamic practices originated from the impressions of 19th century Tatar mullas, as well as of scholars and officials who observed the Kyrgyz. In other words, the administrators accepted accumulated judgments regarding the inadequate Islamic practices of the Kyrgyz as a well-established fact. Their own observations reflected lack of interest, and they did not recognize cultural practices indicating that Sufism allowed the coexistence of pre-Islamic and Islamic traditions. Soviet administrators, like their predecessors, the imperial ethnographers, concluded that Kyrgyz were not true Muslims (Bartol’d 1927).

Kyrgyz, like many others in the region, did not regard their own religious practices or identities as different from other Muslims. When nomadic populations accepted Islam through the Sufi tradition, there were not the sharp differences between Sufi practices and Orthodox Hanafi Islam. On the contrary, Sufi brotherhoods of Kyrgyz and Kazakh tribes and the Muslim scholars of Uzbek and Tajik urban madrasas influenced each other’s traditions and practices. For many, Islam was not so much an identity, but a community that included a variety of practices. And, most importantly, the division between Sufism and Orthodox Islam was not always consistent with ethnic lines.

During the late 1920s and early 1930s, anti-religious policies in the Houses of Culture were at their most active in Kyrgyzstan. In Uzbek and Tajik areas, unveiling was one of the most powerful symbols of anti-religious activism. As Partha Chatterjee has asserted, according to the dominant Western view, veiled Muslim women represented “the entire cultural tradition of a Muslim country,” a country that was “inherently oppressive and unfree” (1989: 622). Chatterjee’s assertion about representations of the women of the Indian subcontinent also reflects that of Uzbek and Tajik women. Not surprisingly, in Kyrgyz regions, where most women did not fully veil themselves, official speeches against veiling rang hollow. Such speeches accentuated the differences between settled and formerly-nomadic populations. The settled regions, where veiling was traditional, seemed more dangerous to the Soviet administrators. In ails, where veiling was not practiced, the nomadic populations viewed the others as less progressive. In other words, in the modern Soviet model, formerly-nomadic peoples were seen as more receptive to anti-religious activity, and as a result, the official categories of the “civilized” and “backward” shifted back and forth. It is difficult to pinpoint whether regional House administrators were manipulating the processes of anti-religious activity by focusing on the unveiling problem. Perhaps they were not willing to offend the indigenous populations by attacking their actual religious expressions. As a result, they simply satisfied the official requirement of giving speeches on the necessity of unveiling, in places where the veil was not a fundamental issue. It is worth noting, however, that after Stalin, Soviet policy in the Houses of Culture vacillated on Islam and its practices in Central Asia.

Because the “weak” Islam of the nomads seemed less threatening to Soviet administrators than nomadism itself, they focused the activities of the Houses of Culture on anti-nomadism. In what was a routine practice, the administrators of the Houses received directives to fight nomadism from
the central authorities in Alma-Ata and Pishpek (Frunze). As the central authorities condemned living in a nomadic bozüii [yurt] as uncivilized, they requested that local administrators continue to cleanse Kyrgyz villages of these dwellings. Yet, when the time came to celebrate Soviet achievements in Central Asia, all the nomadic regalia, including the bozüii, took the center stage (Petrone 2000). In other words, attempts at sedentarization contradicted the ethno-centric images the House administrators encouraged Kyrgyz to display.

*After the Soviet Union: Binary Knowledge and Threats*

The representation of binaries as knowledge did not change during the post-Soviet era. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia and the rest of the world have carefully watched Central Asia, fearing the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Since September 11, 2001, the fear of fundamentalism has turned into the fear of terrorist attacks. Analysts now suspect Islamic extremism when any unrest emerges in Central Asia. For example, at the 2004 conference of the Central Eurasia Studies Society, the most popular panel dealt with Islamic Fundamentalism in Central Asia. Some in the audience challenged the panel members, questioning whether or not they were overemphasizing the “Islamic threat” in the region. This fear, whether it is justifiable or unfounded, reflected official Russian discourse of confronting the “reemergence of Islamic identity and unity” among Central Asian populations. Especially after terrorist attacks in the Chechen region, Russian anti-terrorist policy may override any other Russian concern in Central Asia (Politkovskaya 2003; Tishkov 2004).

Both in the early Soviet period and in 2004, there appears to be an added layer of complexity in describing who Kyrgyz are, and how they behave. The language that both Soviet administrators and the reporters of the Kyrgyz Revolution employed depicts a static image of Kyrgyz and their everyday ways of living, including their religious practices. The complexity is that the creators of knowledge could not and cannot decide whether Islam was or is an important factor in Kyrgyz behavior. When reporting about the revolution in Kyrgyzstan, the authors of news reports inserted images of backwardness and questions of Islamic fundamentalism. In essence, the jumbled reporting of the event reflected the language of the reports of the administrators of the Kyrgyz Houses of Culture: what factors prevented Kyrgyz from participating in the modern and civilized way of initiating a revolution? Was it their “backward” nomadic background, or Islamic practices? The *Christian Science Monitor* presented a caption that read, “Lenin and sheep on main drag set tone for Kyrgyz revolution” (2005); while the *New York Times* described Kyrgyzstan as “a poor, mountainous land that for decades was a backwater of the Soviet Union” (2005). This type of static reporting and knowledge-making awakens the “Oriental Other.” Photographic images of Kyrgyz people herding sheep under Lenin’s statue in Bishkek, and an accompanying suggestion that outside fundamentalist movements influenced the revolution reveal that the age-old Asiatic designation of Kyrgyz is alive and well.

The Kyrgyz government, journalists, and urbanized elite, too, often perpetuate the image of the Asiatic, and the binaries between the modern and backward. In 2005 the response of both the former and the new Kyrgyz governments to the March Revolution was also to try to define Kyrgyzness. Since its independence, the Kyrgyz state viewed its southern population as susceptible to Islamic extremists who can cross the border from Tajikistan. In the Kyrgyz Republic, we have yet to see adequate evidence that the Islamic extremist groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir are successfully gathering followers (Ahmed 2006; Hoffman 2006; Karagiannis 2006; Khamidov 2003; Rashid 2002). There are reports, however, that the Kyrgyz revolution of March 2005 received a great deal of support in the south where the population is largely Uzbek. There is some evidence that exiled Islamist groups from Uzbekistan have made contacts in southern Kyrgyzstan. According to the journalist and analysts working in the area, however, we have little knowledge of their involvement in the Kyrgyz revolution. Such interpretations of the influence of religious fundamentalism in accordance with the ethnic boundaries reaffirm the binaries that have been powerfully established since the 19th century. These interpretations reflect a perspective that Islamism “is not Kyrgyz.”

Both Western and Russian media reports on the revolution revive all of the established, binary knowledge. The images prominent in Soviet knowledge of Kyrgyz in the 1920s and 1930s reemerged in the Russian response to the March 2005 revolution. Within the terms of this knowledge-making, the revolution cannot be viewed as democratic or truly popular because it took place
in a region where undemocratic forces, Islamic fundamentalists, are at work. The Russian knowledge of Kyrgyz Islam is still ambiguous: Kyrgyz are nominal Muslims, but now there is a possibility of the penetration of Islamic fundamentalism. In addition, the coverage in Western media contrasts the Kyrgyz revolution — emphasizing chaotic looting — with the revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine — praising peaceful demonstrations there. The East versus West dichotomies are still with us. Recent newspaper articles seem to reiterate and perpetuate these images: These reports ignore the possibility that the people of Kyrgyzstan may have invented their own post-Soviet, post 9-11 revolution. Even if extremist movements or drug money were originally involved in this revolution, these factors should not diminish the reality that the thousands of Kyrgyz in the streets wanted to end a corrupt era. In other words, Kyrgyz remade the modern revolution as their own, just as they asserted their own interpretation of Islam and just as they “spoke Bolshevik” with a Kyrgyz flair in the 1920s and 1930s.

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Reflections on a Central Eurasian Model: A Foucauldian Reply to Barfield on the Historiography of Ethno-Nationalisms

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Thomas Barfield’s (2005) observations on the role of ethnicity and nationalism in Central Eurasia raise issues about the significance of discourse and historiography in nation-building. His discussion centers on Afghanistan. “Some argued that any attempt to maintain a unified Afghanistan was doomed to failure because ethnic groups there would naturally use their bases of regional power to break up any unitary state.” Despite such pessimistic expectations, “it was striking that not a single Afghan political leader ever threatened to secede from Afghanistan to form an independent state or expressed any interest in joining with co-ethnic neighboring states.” Political action based on ethno-nationalist demands failed in Central Asia, because there “states had always been multiethnic and the belief that the rulers of the state must be drawn from its majority population was an alien idea” (Barfield 2005: 2-3). The coexistence of Turko-Mongol military-political elites, assisted by Persian-speaking bureaucrats, formed the basis for such a multiethnic state structure, which characterizes many Central Eurasian states in history, including Mughals in India, Safavids and Qajars in Iran, and the Timurids in Central Asia (Roy 2000). The court language was Persian in Delhi, Samarkand, and Isfahan alike, even though all three of these localities were under the military-political control of Turko-Mongol minorities. What does this picture tell us about the modern theories of nationalism?

Barfield suggests that the durable multiethnic state structure characteristic of many Central Eurasian societies explains in part the difference between the ethnonationalist fervor in the Balkans and the persistence of a multiethnic Afghanistan. This is certainly true. One might pose the same question concerning the discursive foundations of multiethnic statehood. To suggest that political legitimacy in Afghanistan is still tied to the historical dynastic state of “Afghanistan” may explain the continuing multiethnic allegiance to the Afghan state. One might add that there has been no popular discourse, as yet, that proved useful in legitimating an ethnically or racially defined collectivity’s action against that state. There is no such popular discourse because its preconditions are the dissociation of political legitimacy from the state and the formulation of an alternative history for an
oppressed people capable of challenging the state. Marxist movements advocating the dictatorship of the proletariat and nationalist movements advocating ethnic states both employ such a discursive shift from “state” to “people.” Both Marxism and ethno-nationalism require an alternative history of an oppressed people that is antithetical to statist discourse. Is the continuing legitimacy of historic states in the eyes of their peoples, then, the difference that marks Central Eurasian states of Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey from most of the post-Soviet states, each of which was designed by Stalin for a particular titular ethnic category?

An Unexplored Connection: Foucault’s “Race War” in the Transition from State-centric to Ethnocentric Historiography

Underlying both Marxist and ethno-nationalist history writing is the transition from “sovereignty” to “biopower” (Foucault’s terminology), a transition at the level of a master narrative. It means writing an alternative history that goes beyond the hagiography of kings and dynasties characterizing much of classical history, which fulfills the function of legitimating state sovereignty. This shift, from philosophico-juridical to historico-political discourse signals “the birth of the modern subject, ‘we,’ with a claim to a historical, extra-judicial right and a truth claim that is ‘relative’ because it can be deployed only from its combat position.” (Foucault 2003: 52) Both socialism and ethno-nationalism seek to capture the state in the name of this modern subject “we,” hence not only denying the dynasts’ divine right to rule, but also forcing any existing state to legitimize its existence through a popular discourse formulated in the name of the “people.”

It is in this context that the discourse of “race war”, which underpins both Marxist and ethno-nationalist history writing, emerged. A note of caution is necessary here: Foucault’s notion of “race war” does not refer to “races” as the term is understood in most scholarly and popular literature today. “Race” here simply denotes a collectivity conceptualized as having a common history and a common suffering vis-à-vis the state or other oppressive power structure. The proletariat struggling against the bourgeoisie and a Turkmen tribe rebelling against the Tsarist Empire both become examples of a “race” confronting authority in a historic war. Once the implicit identification of the people with the monarch is shattered, and with it that of the nation with the sovereign, the subjects of the state are then split into a “superrace” and a “subrace” (or into several competing races, of which some seek the preservation of the existing state and others not). In the European context, the narrative of race war emerged as a counter-hegemonic discursive challenge to the Roman history that permeated historiography. It was originally an anti-statist discourse, but was later appropriated by the newer dynasties to justify their claims to rule. Foucault notes that the new discourse of race war was “much closer to the mythico-religious discourse of the Jews than to the politico-legendary history of Romans” (Foucault 2003: 71). While historical discourse of the Roman type pacified society, the new discourse of race struggle sought to mobilize every individual in society in the name of people’s legitimate right to rule, and incite them to attack the state if the state in question was not seen as the legitimate representative of the mobilized ethnic group or class.

Ethnicity and the Proletariat: In Itself or For Itself?

I would argue that in Marxist history writing, the transition from proletariat as a class in itself (an sich) to a class for itself (für sich) corresponds to the discursive transformation from classical to modern history writing. In ethno-nationalist historiography, the “scientific” discovery of ethnic groups as anthropological entities is coupled with a call for capturing the state in the name of historical rights these ethnicities are claimed to have, and for using the state as a means to further the interests of an ethnic group. Much like Marxist historians’ claims about the working class, nationalist historiography depicts ancient nations that are “awakened” and “emerging.” Their rebellion is justified by structural discrimination and historical injustice. In retrospect, one can argue that ethnic communities were “made” into political communities through the efforts of ethno-nationalist historians and political activists, as much of the recent literature on nationalism has argued (Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm 1992). However, the crucial element of ethno-nationalist discourse that is often overlooked is the assumption of oppression and suffering perpetrated by the state and/or by other ethnic groups and collectivities. Political mobilization in the name of an ethnic group essentially relies on the perception of ethnically targeted discrimination by the state. Foucault found that in the case of Britain, the English were said to have suffered under Roman and Norman rule for centuries, which facilitated political mobilization in the name of English nation against alien and
illegitimate invaders. This provides the broad discursive template that most post-colonial Asian, African, American, Middle Eastern, and Balkan nationalisms borrowed from European thought in legitimizing their new nation-building projects, often heavily mixed with socialist themes of liberation (Fanon 1961). Delegitimation of state authority (dynasty/political elite) as an alien rule, in the past (Tajiks under Turkic khanates) or in the present (Croats under Serbian rule), is the sine qua non of ethno-nationalism. Similarly, state-sponsored Tajik nationalism today not only posits Samanids as the last and the quintessential Tajik state but also suggests that Tajiks as a nation suffered under Turkic elites ever since the fall of the Samanids (Hall 2003).

Marxist discourse on the proletariat posited a Communist stage in prehistory, and then depicted the workers’ struggle against the state and the bourgeoisie as a class war legitimated by their oppression and suffering. Marxism even more strictly fits Foucault’s mythico-religious “biblical-style” historical discourse that “tears society apart,” in this case into different classes instead of different ethnic groups, “and speaks of legitimate rights solely in order to declare war” on the state, in this case with reference to class-based exploitation instead of ethnic oppression or assimilation (Foucault 2003: 70, 73-74). Marxism, like ethno-nationalism, is a discourse that seeks to appropriate state power for the furthering of purportedly objective “group interests,” as opposed not only to the former discourse of legitimating state power with reference to God’s blessing of a dynasty, a religious legitimacy without reference to the masses, but also to the protection of individual liberties, a liberal individualist way of legitimating state power. It is their challenge against state power with reference to a popular will described as an objective collectivity (class or ethnicity) that distinguishes ethno-nationalism and Marxism, for example, from dynastic-statist, theocratic, and liberal discourses about the state.

Historical Memory and Nation-Building in the Present: Dynastic vs. Ethno-Nationalist Historiography in Central Eurasia

The heritage of the great empires of Central Eurasia sits uneasily and in conflict with attempts at composing an ethno-nationalist discourse. What happened to dynastic historiography in Central Eurasia? Who claims the multiethnic heritage of the Seljuks, Ghaznavids, Safavids, Timurids, Mughals, and the Golden Horde? These are basic questions for investigating what Foucault calls the transition from sovereignty to biopower. On the one hand, since ethno-nationalist myth-makers would like to claim a glorious past for their chosen nation, they would like to appropriate the heritage of such great dynasties as the Timurids and the Mughals. On the other hand, the memory of the multiethnic character of these dynastic states threatens any particular ethno-nationalist project. Timurids are too Turkic for the Persian-oriented Tajik nationalists, but they are also too Persian for the Turkic-oriented Uzbek nationalists. Some ethno-nationalists nonetheless appropriate such imperial legacies, such as Uzbek nationalists’ appropriation of Timurids, at the expense of creating controversies that highlight the very multiethnic past that they seek to erase, as the joint appropriation of Alexander the Great by Greeks and Macedonians, or of Rumi by Turks and Persians, reminds them of ethnic connections that they tried hard to forget and suppress.

The situation is similar for all Turko-Mongol dynasties who ruled over predominantly non-Turkic peoples, but also relied on those peoples, with whom they intermingled culturally and linguistically, and into whom they intermarried. One can choose either to claim a multiethnic imperial heritage (incurring the cost of diluting ethno-nationalist exclusivity) or to denounce these prior legacies as foreign influences and alien “yokes” under which the nation suffered (and incur the cost of composing a narrower and exclusivist ethno-nationalism lacking any glorious imperial past). Claiming anyone who lived on their territory as a member of the modern ethnic group comes too close to having a non-ethnic, territorial definition of the nation. It also conjures up images of an Islamic (i.e. non-ethnic) space that facilitated artistic and scholarly exchanges from Morocco to Central Asia. In all but the most totalitarian states where history and other social sciences can be suppressed enough to prevent people from learning even the most basic facts, for example, about the lives of Ahmet Yesevi, Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, Timur, and Rumi, such territorial and religious interpretations of a multiethnic past can contest the ethnic definitions of the present.

In the Balkans, Christian ethno-nationalists chose the narrower and more exclusionist path by renouncing the Ottoman heritage and instead invoking long-vanished kingdoms that had passed from living memory. The 14th-century reign of Stephen Dushan (Urosh IV) thus became the
reclaimed heritage of Serbian nationalism, while Bulgarians invented a new idea of the Second Greater Bulgaria Empire during the reign of the Ivan Asen II (14th century). The alternative to these invocations would be to claim an Ottoman heritage in which southern Slavs participated as soldiers, bureaucrats, and members of the dynasty (since the mothers of most Sultans were Slavic). Ethno-nationalist thinking in 19th-century Europe prevented such ideas from taking root.

While some of the present-day successor states of the Romanov, Ottoman, Safavid, Mughal and Timurid Empires seek to overcome a multiethnic past to construct an ethno-nationalist future, Central Eurasia also provides exceptions to the pursuit of ethnic statehood. Iran managed to preserve its unity in ethnic diversity mostly by the ideological glue of Shia Islam, despite the attempt to define a mono-ethnic Persian state by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, before he was swept aside by the Islamic Revolution (Roy 2000). Post-colonial Pakistan, ostensible heir to the Mughals, achieved a similar feat by fashioning itself as a Sunni Muslim state embracing Punjabi and Pashtun, Sindhi and Baluchi alike. Finally, Russia’s attempt to revamp its multiethnic imperial structure through the secular religion of Communism appeared successful for most of the 20th century, but the contradiction among various discourses of sovereignty (Soviet people vs. sovereignty of ethnic republics) that constituted the Soviet solution ultimately helped to undermine it, since the Soviet Union went farther than any state in history in institutionalizing ethnic differences within its citizenry (Brubaker 1996; Slezkine 1994). By preventing the politicization of ethnicity among Afghanistan’s neighbors, the survival of multiethnic creeds in Iran, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union made it easier for Afghanistan to maintain the original “Central Eurasian view that decoupled ethnicity and nationalism” over the past century (Barfield 2005).

Despite its nominally supra-ethnic ideology, the Soviet Union was discursively and administratively the most “ethnic” of Afghanistan’s neighbors. It also provided the primary military challenge to Afghanistan’s multiethnic character. Beginning with Stalin’s national delimitation of Central Asia, the two major biopolitical discourses identified by Foucault were introduced into Central Asian politics: ethno-nationalism and socialism. National delimitation of Central Asia created a full-fledged political-administrative structure for ethnic nationalism (Roy 2000). This Stalinist legacy is evident today in the ethnic discourses created by Central Asian leaders in order to justify the ethnic border-drawing in Central Asia.

Paradoxically, the Central Eurasian model, which takes the historical state as a given (what Barfield characterizes as the Afghan leaders’ choice “to divide the pot but not the table in which they sit”), may reinforce the seemingly ethnic division of Central Asia. The status quo in (non-Sovietized) Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, or Pakistan translates into the preservation of multiethnic states, but in post-Soviet Central Asia the status quo translates into the perpetuation of ethnic divisions created by the Soviets.

Post-Soviet Tajik ethno-nationalism attracted scholarly attention for that very reason. Despite the long history of Persian-Turkic coexistence in Central Asia, the Tajik leadership decided to differentiate an essentially “ethnic” Tajik nation from its neighbors by stigmatizing the Turkic elements of Central Asian history as oppressive forces that systematically hindered the full development and expression of Tajik nationhood. The choice of the temporally remote and relatively obscure Samanids as the last Tajik state, of which the present-day Tajikistan is a resurrection, testifies to the narrowness of the ethno-nationalism that it promotes (Hall 2003).

Foucault notes that ethno-nationalist discourse has anti-state origins and preserves its anti-state potential even when, as is the case in some Central Eurasian states today, the official state discourse incorporates it. The reason is that it is impossible to encounter an ethno-nationalism that includes every subject/citizen of a particular state and no one else beyond its borders. Invariably, ethno-nationalism either excludes some collectivities within the state’s borders (ethnic minorities) or includes some collectivities beyond its borders (ethnic diasporas), or both. Hence, by seeking legitimacy in an exclusive ethno-nationalism, the Rakhmanovs, Karimovs, and Nazarbaevs of Central Asia are undermining the social bases of their respective states even as they attempt to shore up the status quo. The choice of historical narrative serves as a litmus test of future possibilities in the trajectory of new nationalities.
Russia and Turkey are the heirs to two great imperial traditions that politically and discursively inspire Central Asian states seeking to frame an understanding of their new sovereignty by reconciling their multiethnic past and present. The Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the present-day Russian Federation incorporated vast spaces inhabited by diverse ethnolinguistic and confessional collectivities. Periodic upsurges of Russian Orthodox messianic fervor notwithstanding, the diversity of the Russian Empire provided a contrast with the homogenizing proclivity of Western European absolutisms. However, Russian historiography, influenced by its Western European counterparts, exemplified by Karamzin (1766-1826) and Platonov (1860-1933), traced the story of the Russian state and its people from a point of origin in Kievan Rus' (Karamzin 1959; Platonov 1925). The Russian people and state were depicted as expanding eastward by supplanting the political-administrative and socio-cultural heritage of newly acquired territories.

Russian émigré scholars known as “Eurasianists” challenged this ethnocentric historiography in the early 20th century. Taking the Russian Empire’s multiethnic subject populations as its point of departure, Eurasianists posited that Russia is the heir not to Kievan Rus but to Genghis Khan and the Golden Horde. Trubetzkoy (1890-1938) argued that ethnicity, race, and religion did not motivate the foundation and the administration of the Russian state; rather, the Russian empire inherited from Genghis Khan and the Golden Horde, as a political-administrative and socio-cultural legacy, neutrality towards ethnic, racial, and religious differences (Trubetzkoy 1991). Eurasianism is an example of reviving, in the 20th century, the dynastic, state-centric historical narratives that preceded the shift to the “race war” narrative that began with the Enlightenment.

Eurasianism experienced a major resurgence in contemporary Russia through the writings of Aleksandr Dugin, but his neo-Eurasianism is authoritarian and chauvinistic (Billington 2004). Barfield’s point, that a Central Eurasian model dissociates the state and ethnic identity, is thus at the core of the current debate over Russia’s past and present identity to the extent that one views Eurasianism as a revival of state-centric, supra-ethnic historiography.

Turkey, on the other hand, is often presented as a “successful” example of modern ethno-nationalism that purged its Ottoman imperial past through the Kemalist reformulation of identity; however, the real picture of Turkish historiography is quite different at both the official and the popular level. The multiethnic Ottoman Empire with its highly cosmopolitan official language, capital city, and bureaucracy resembles the past and present state of Afghanistan: or rather of its Timurid, Safavid, and Mughal contemporaries, which were founded, like the Ottomans, by once nomadic military elites from Central Asia, who relied on a multiethnic stock of artists, scholars, soldiers, and administrators in running their Empire, stuck together by a dynastic state ideology.

The Kemalist project sought to replace the Ottoman heritage by rewriting history from the vantage point of a Turkish people that emerged in pre-Islamic Central Asia. Hostile to all Arab, Persian, and Christian influences on Turkish history, Kemalist scholars turned to the nomadic Turkmen tribes in Anatolia as the pristine, unadulterated representatives of a Turkish nation that spoke pure Turkish uncontaminated by Arabic, Persian, and other foreign elements.

With the transition to multiparty democracy, however, the Ottoman and Islamic elements gradually reentered official historiography. In the span of less than five decades, Ottoman and Islamic history became constituent parts of Turkish history textbooks. In 1980, a “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” was declared as the official discourse of Turkey’s identity. The presidential seal of Turkey today, inaugurated in 1985, includes 16 “Great Turkish Empires” in history, to which Turkey is said to be the heir.

Appropriation of the Ottoman Empire as part of Turkish historiography is highly threatening to an exclusively ethnic definition of Turkish nationhood. Because of the temporal and spatial closeness of the Ottoman experience to modern Turkey, the return to Ottomanism creates tensions between the ethnic reformulation of Turkish identity on the one hand and the multiethnic and multi-confessional nature of the Ottoman civilization on the other.

The controversy surrounding the publication of Padişah Anaları (The Mothers of the Sultans) is illustrative here. The author, Ali Meram, dedicates
his book to the memory of Atatürk. He adopts a virulently anti-Ottoman stance by denouncing the “capture” of the Ottoman state by Christian-Slavic devşirmes (Christian children raised as Muslims for bureaucratic and military service) and wives who he thinks enslaved the Turkish people of Anatolia via Ottoman administration for five centuries. He notes that not a single person of Turkish descent was allowed into the administration as a Grand Vizier for 477 years, and blames Mehmet II (the 15th century conqueror of Constantinople) for initiating the discrimination against the Turks. Meram attacks the Ottoman dynasty for being of an un-Turkish, Slavic-Christian anthropological stock due to the choice of exclusively non-Turkish wives for the Sultans.

This is but one of the many examples of the controversies over historical memory and identity that arise from appropriating a multiethnic empire along with an ethno-nationalist discourse. Turkish ethno-nationalists seek to create a rupture between dynastic, state-centric history and an alternative history of peoples, in this case between the Turkish people and the Ottoman Empire. As Foucault argued in the case of the English nationalists’ rejection of Roman and Norman history, this is a rupture that is divisive and capable of mobilizing a rebellious potential against the state whenever the state is perceived as not working exclusively to advance the interests of one ethnic group only. Ethno-nationalism is bound to create similar ruptures in the national historiographies of many Central Eurasian states.

Conclusion: Central Eurasia in the Maelstrom of Competing Historical Narratives

Ethnic nationalism as a theoretical construct does severe injustice to the historical and present-day experience of Central Asian peoples. Retrospectively appropriating past dynasties and states according to ethnic criteria does not stand up to scholarly scrutiny, but it may succeed in widening cleavages and conflicts in a multiethnic geography. Barfield warns us against transporting ethno-nationalist paradigms arising from the study of the Balkans into the scholarship on Central Eurasia. I have tried here to introduce an alternative approach to the analytical study of ethnic identity and ethno-nationalism: Foucault’s distinction between state-centric/dynastic and ethnic historiography. The penetration of ethno-nationalist discourse into the politics of Central Eurasian states such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran, may not only rupture memory and identity at the popular level, as it has already done to a considerable extent in Soviet Central Asia since Stalin’s ethnic delimitation, but also obscure the scholarly study of present-day socio-political processes. At issue is whether official and popular history books of the region narrate the stories of the Safavids, Timurids, Mughals, and Ottomans, or those of the ethnic Persians, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Pashtuns. This issue is of vital importance both for social sciences and for the everyday politics of the peoples in the region.

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The conference, “Anthropology of the State — the State of Anthropology,” addressed an ever-growing concern in recent years within anthropological studies as to what constitutes, shapes and represents ideas of the state. Understanding this shift in anthropological emphasis, the graduate students of the Department of Cultural and Social Anthropology at Stanford University organized this conference to engage with this theme. Current debates in this productive field of study call into question common assumptions about the nature of the state that need to be considered within scholarship on Central Eurasia. With the dramatic social and political changes that have taken place in Central Asia, themes from this conference can inform our work and suggest directions for study of the independent republics.

In this report, I will highlight three themes from the conference: (1) representation and framing of local and state identities (including reified notions of the “State”, which attribute it with some form of agency), (2) Security and the state of exception, which is a recurring discourse in Central Asia, and (3) “gendered states.” In this report I will discuss several papers in summary, which demonstrate these themes, and then suggest how ideas they raise can be applied to the study of Central Asia. This report is also a commentary on ways to enrich our study of the region.

**Representing the State**

How are states represented in discourse and how do those who speak with, or on behalf of, a reified notion of the “state” manipulate that representation? This was one of the most prevalent themes of the conference, presented through such topics as language, belonging, memory and writing.

Thet Shein Win (Stanford University) delivered a paper, “Rappers and Refugees: Traps and Tropes of Cultural Production,” focusing on issues surrounding “identity politics.” By looking at the visual, literary and performing arts of a Hmong performer named Tou Ger Xiong in America, she examined his attempts to overcome ethnic barriers. The tropes that Xiong employs to bridge ethnic diversity can also turn into traps, underlining and reinforcing notions of difference. In another paper examining the politics of integration, entitled “Belonging to Imbros: Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Turkish Republic,” Elif Babül (Stanford University) discussed belonging in Turkey. She focused on the island of Imbros and the contestation of notions of belonging between the Turkish state and the indigenous Rum. She noted that the Turkification of the island in the 1920s signified citizenship, a different form of belonging, which entailed a process of cultural assimilation to the Turkish state; it was the only form of belonging...
legitimated within state borders. The Rums, a Greek speaking Orthodox Christian people, who were indigenous to Imbros, had their lands confiscated and quickly became a minority after Turkish settlement on the island. Rum understandings of belonging, based on being the primordial inhabitants of the island, were now invalidated. The contestation of accepting a particular form of belonging had become a politically sensitive issue.

In Central Asia, language and belonging — and the ways they are employed by governments to include and exclude ethnic groups — are important issues. In the 1990s, former President Askar Akaev ran an inclusive campaign inviting all ethnic groups to participate in the development of the Kyrgyz Republic, under the slogan “Kyrgyzstan — Our Common Home.” “Ethnic harmony” was even written into the seven precepts Akaev derived from the epic poem Manas, which formed the core concepts of his vision of statehood. In 2003 a new slogan, “Kyrgyzstan — A Country of Human Rights,” Akaev attempted to highlight Western values of inclusion, and to address the grievances of the families of victims who died in the Aksy tragedy (when on March 17, 2002, Kyrgyz troops shot on a crowd of demonstrators, killing six). Although the slogans tell of attempts at greater integration in the construction and presentation of Kyrgyz history, other ethnic groups, e.g. Uzbeks and Uyghurs, are absent or are presented as enemies. The simultaneous and contradictory messages of ethnic harmony and exclusion have led many Uzbeks and Uyghurs in Kyrgyzstan to feel alienated. In our research, we need to be aware of the differences between local and national representations and how, when and why these images are expressed through narratives and tropes. Additionally, we need to explore representations of Central Asian states outside the region, and the effects these have on international politics.

A complementary set of papers examined how ethnic communities remember their past and incorporate it into their present. Zhanara Nauruzbayeva (Stanford University) raised questions about the politics of memory, and rupture, in her paper: “‘What Was Socialism About?’: The Politics of Remembering and Representing the Communist Past.” Through a comprehensive literature review, Nauruzbayeva highlighted three forms of memory (dis)engagement, the analysis of which helps to reveal “actually-lived socialism” as opposed to official representations. These are counter-memory (resistance), forgetting (amnesia), and nostalgia. In some recollections of the socialist era, people locate resistance within their memories, a subtle distinction from conceiving memories as resistance. Other accounts underline how memories are suppressed or actively forgotten, due to official pressure or as a form of therapy. Finally, some post-Socialist memories are nostalgic. Nauruzbayeva divides nostalgia into three categories: consumption, contrast with the difficulties of the present, and desire for the “imaginary.”

In the post-Soviet era, memories are constantly engaged, sometimes as a way of directing the present and future. In her ethnography of Swedish communities in Estonia, Sigrid Rausing (2004) notes that Estonian Swedes have attempted to forget or suppress the gaps left by the sudden change from Soviet society to independence, changing the past in order to structure a new present. Increased interaction between Estonian Swedes and mainstream Swedish society has caused those communities to re-examine their history and identity, for example, through Swedish cultural exhibitions in small Estonian communities. The sudden absence of Soviet ideology and the Estonian Swedes’ contact with other forms of identity caused them to reformulate their pasts, to focus on memories that support this new historical narrative. This amnesia and the kinds of memory that Nauruzbayeva investigates should become a vital area of investigation for those studying post-Soviet societies.

In his keynote address “If Nothing Else, Make the Train Run on Paper,” Prof. Akhil Gupta (Stanford University) focused on the role of writing in the construction of local and state identities in India. He argued that bureaucracies are “machines for inscriptions,” whose forms, files and registers are central to the state and have a framing effect on the world. Furthermore, writing equals action, Gupta commented: people file written complaints and the bureaucratic wheels are set into motion. But if nothing is written, nothing happens.

Scholars studying Central Asia might also analyze the role of documentation and inscription. Files and forms dealing with personal lives are found in many Soviet archives. They are written by the government, for the government. In some official archive documents people’s answers were often limited and were not wholly representative of their views. In fact, Francine Hirsh (1997) notes that in Soviet censuses establishing ethnicity in the 1920s and 1930s only a small range of answers were
acceptable. These documents were secret and meant for internal use only, involving a particular form and style of language, and, moreover, were not to be referred to by the public. However, other archive materials demonstrate the way in which the language of the state was used to express alternative and seemingly subversive views (Yurchak 2006).

What about writing today? In addition to archive materials, newspapers, and increasingly websites, provide interesting insights into local conceptions of the state. Government newspapers, or those such as Slovo Kyrgyzstana, which operate as mouthpieces for the government, help to constitute distinct images of state formation. How are these representations understood and interpreted by people? Researchers need to ask what other forms of writing help to frame understandings of the state.

Several of the papers listed above highlight the fact that government constructions usually present a reified notion of the state. However, under what conditions is the state is reified? The work of Johan Rasanayagam (2002) and Morgan Liu (2002) both present particular reifications of the state in Uzbekistan: both authors identify the mahalla (neighborhood) as the locus where the state has inscribed itself in daily practices, and the state presents itself as a sort of mahalla writ large.

More important is to question exactly how people conceptualize their relationship with the “state.” Some answers are suggested by the works of such theorists as Slavoj Žižek (1998 [1989]), Begoña Aretxaga (1999) and Yael Navaro-Yashin (2002) with their exploration of notions of fantasies—or even fetishes (Taussig 1992) — and the role they play in the everyday experience of the state. Fantasies employed by individuals who see themselves operating on behalf of the “state,” and fantasies of the state conceived of by people in their everyday lives, play a vital role. By examining such situations we need to consider the implicit power relations involved in these constructions. Psychoanalysis as a methodological tool may grant insights into events and discourses that have developed since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Security and State of Exception

Another theme of the conference was security and the “state of exception.” In “9/11, Abu Ghraib and the Political Anthropology of Postmodernity,” Patrick Hayden (University of Oregon) argued that there is a distinct reluctance to historicize the events leading up to September 11, and a silence about laws that have now been replaced by a security conscious government. Reference to the necessity to secure the nation against ever-present threats provides justification for the government’s actions.

This is an especially relevant issue for Central Asia, where the region is constantly presented as a strategic geopolitical centre for the “War on Terror” and a barometer for the growth of radical forms of Islam. Groups regarded as extremist are claimed to harbor a threat for democracy and security against such nations as the United States.

The absence of historical perspective on America’s policy against terrorism before September 11, assists the implementation of a state of exception, where the rights of the citizens are diminished for the sake of security. In America, this “state of exception” has now become the rule, instead of an emergency provision (Agamben 2005). Should we also ask whether America’s approach contributes to creating a state of exception as a normative form of governance in Central Asia?

Certainly, Central Asian governments have been influenced by external standards of governance from other parts of the world before September 11. Russia has often been used as a model, but the increasing interaction of Western governments in the region has led to a renegotiation of some political models or in some cases an uneven coexistence between remaining Soviet models and Western forms of governance. In examining the different styles of governance in Central Asia we need consider the influence that other governments have on existing models. A genealogy of political organization would provide an interesting examination of the ways that Central Asian leaders incorporate and limit change to current models, and modify policies to maintain international relations.

Gendered States

A third theme was the notion of “gendered states,” which described situations where women are enmeshed in the production of social life, but often within a patriarchal state. The construction of an image of the state, and the place of women in that representation, is a vital area of research. Alejandra Letelier Kramer (UC Santa Cruz) delivered her paper, “I Do Not Know How Much a Kilo of Bread Costs: A Right-Wing Woman Politician Redefines Gender and Power,” which presented the life of a female politician in Chile. An interesting intersection appears between the roles she sees
herself performing and the gendered roles that are assumed of her. When asked about the price of bread by one villager, she replied: “I do not know how much a kilo of bread costs.” Her answer simultaneously speaks to two discourses: it shows that she is unaware of the daily realities that poor and rural people face; but it also is also a critical remark, directed at the assumption that a woman’s place is in the house, feeding her family.

Turning toward Central Asia, we might ask, to what extent did women’s lives change during the Soviet Union? Are those advances made during the Soviet era slowly ebbing away? What are their feelings about the overwhelming patriarchy that has established itself in government and in the development of a national history since independence? How are women represented in the concept and construction of the state? Katherine Verdery (1996), Mary Buckley (1997), Deniz Kandiyoti (1998) and Douglas Northrop (2003), among others, have described aspects of gendered states, and have provided very illustrative cases for the ways in which women struggle in patriarchal domains. Other authors, such as by Kathleen Kuehnast (1997), explore how the identity of women is a strategic collaboration of both independent (“traditional”) and Soviet forms.

Conclusion

By examining these three themes of the many that were explored during the conference, we can see a number of directions that future research can take. Post-Soviet studies of the state in Central Asia have often been dominated by views establishing continuities with Soviet policies in order to locate areas for reforms and areas of democratization. Research into the administrative policies of the Soviet era will continue to reveal glimpses into life under communist rule and its legacies, however, these need to be countered and challenged with other theories and methodologies that aim to find the changes from that era. The Central Asian republics often appear to be hanging on to Soviet practices, but they are also reinterpreting their past and forging their future today.

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This essay deals with a potential trans-Caspian oil pipeline from Kazakhstan and a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan. The essay examines some risks and obstacles involved in the construction of trans-Caspian pipelines and assesses the geopolitical impact of these pipelines on the balance of power in the Caspian region.\(^1\)

It is still unclear whether or not these pipelines will ever be built. If they are built, the United States is likely to support the construction. As a result, the US influence in the region will increase. The paper examines the possibility of increased American influence in the region and how the change in the balance of power would affect other regional players such as Russia, Turkey, China, and Iran, and what would be their subsequent reactions.

**Aktau-Baku Trans-Caspian Oil Pipeline**

One of the two potential projects to link the eastern and western shores of the Caspian Sea is the Aktau-Baku trans-Caspian oil pipeline. This project aims to transport Kazakh oil from Aktau in Kazakhstan to Dibendi port of Azerbaijan, where the new pipeline will be connected to the existing Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) system.

The main source of the crude oil for BTC is the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli (ACG) offshore field, located in the Azerbaijani section of the Caspian Sea and estimated to hold some 4.3 billion barrels of crude oil. Although the full capacity of the BTC pipeline is 1 million barrels a day (mbl/d) or 50 million tons per year, it will take another two years before Azerbaijan could produce 1 mbl/d. Azerbaijan’s oil exports are expected to reach 23.7 million tons in 2006, 40.2 million tons in 2007, and 54.8 million tons in 2008 (Interfax 2004). Azerbaijan’s oil production is expected to decline after 2012.

In the initial stage of BTC’s operation, additional crude oil from Kazakhstan will be shipped by oil tankers. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have recently finalized an agreement on the transportation of the Kazakh oil through the BTC. According to the agreement, Kazakhstan could export as much as 25 million tons of oil annually through the BTC pipeline (Itar-Tass 2006). Before 2010, Astana plans to ship 7.5 million tons of oil annually using tankers. Only after beginning production at Kashagan oil field — newly discovered oil fields in Kazakhstan that may hold up to 13 billion barrels of oil — could the volume of shipments increase and trans-Caspian pipeline’s construction begin (Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2005).

The Kashagan field will be developed in three stages, the first of which will last until 2010, with an estimated 21 million tons of oil production per year. In the second stage (2010-2013), the AGIP consortium will produce 42 million tons of oil per year, while in the third stage (by 2016) the output will peak at about 56 million tons of oil annually (Zerkalo Daily 2004). Among the international energy companies involved in the construction of the BTC pipeline, at least four — Eni (16.67%), Conoco Philips (8.33%), INPEX (8.33%), and TotalFinaElf (16.67%) — are also stakeholders in the AGIP Consortium that is developing the Kashagan oil field in Kazakhstan (Zerkalo Daily 2004).

The decision on building the sub-sea pipeline from Aktau to Baku may come in the second stage of the development of Kashagan field (2011-2013), when oil production in Azerbaijan’s ACG field slowly starts to decline. The trans-Caspian pipeline will also resolve the long-term capacity problem for...
the BTC pipeline. In the long, it will allow Kazakhstan to export as much as 50 million tons of oil per year through the BTC pipeline, which could carry mostly Kazakh oil by around 2020, when the ACG’s oil reserves will draw to a close (Zerkalo Daily 2004).

**Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan Natural Gas Pipeline**

The second trans-Caspian project is a potential sub-sea natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan. So far, among the Caspian republics Azerbaijan has been the main potential supplier of natural gas to Turkey and further to Southern Europe. In the long run, however, there are several other projects on the table, including the transfer of Turkmen gas via a trans-Caspian pipeline and the soon-to-be-operational Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) natural gas pipeline. Turkey may use part of this gas domestically and sell the rest to Greece and other European countries.

The major source of gas in Azerbaijan is the Shah-Deniz offshore field with the huge reserves confirmed in 1999. The Shah-Deniz field holds 600 billion cubic meters (bcm), or 25-39 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas (EIA 2002), in addition to some 101 million tons of condensate. Some experts even suggest that the field may hold as much as 1 trillion cubic meters of gas and 400 million tons of condensate (Interfax 2003).

In 2001, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a sale agreement by which Turkey committed to buy 6.6 bcm (roughly 233 billion cubic feet, or bcf) of Azeri natural gas per year. The agreement was later renegotiated, setting the exports of Azeri natural gas to Turkey in 2006 at around 71 bcf, slowly increasing to an average rate of 222 bcf per year by 2009 (Interfax 2003).

Azerbaijan and Turkey also affirmed the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) route, which is also known as the South Caucasus Pipeline. It starts in Baku and goes to the Turkish city of Erzurum via Georgia. It will cost roughly $4 billion. A 680-km long BTE pipeline is scheduled for completion in 2006 and will have an annual transfer capacity of 233 bcf, which could be expanded (EIA 2003a). This is the first pipeline project to carry Caspian gas to Europe bypassing Russia and Iran.

In the project’s early stages, Turkey and Greece could consume most of the exported Caspian gas (IEA 2002a). Turkey’s gas demand was 14.8 bcm in 2000, which is expected to triple by 2010. The Turkish Petroleum Pipeline Corporation BOTAŞ estimates the total demand by 2020 at 43.9 bcm and the total supplies at about 41 bcm (BOTAŞ 2006; IEA 2001). As in Turkey, the demand for natural gas in Greece has been growing with remarkable speed, jumping from 1 bcf in 1996 to 76 bcf in 2001 (EIA 2003b). Turkey, Greece, and Italy have already agreed on the construction of a several sub-sea natural gas pipelines² that will connect the three states and allow Azerbaijan, and potentially Turkmenistan, to sell their natural gas to Europe.

As early as 1999, Turkey and Turkmenistan signed an agreement to build a trans-Caspian pipeline via the Caspian Sea, across Azerbaijan and Georgia. Its construction has been delayed for several reasons. The undetermined legal status of the Caspian Sea and dispute between the governments of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan over the ownership rights of the oil field in the middle of the Caspian Sea, which Baku refers to as “Kapaz,” and Ashgabat calls “Sardar,” have contributed to this delay. Yet, the recent Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis that forced many European states to reconsider their energy policies has revived the possibility of building the Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan sub-sea natural gas pipeline in the near future.

**Geopolitics and Security Implications**

The future geopolitical scene of the Caspian region envisions several players. While the regional powers such as Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and India will continually try to advance their interests in the region, it will be China, Russia, and the United States who will shape the region’s geopolitical destiny. Each state has different agendas and priorities with respect to the Caspian region, and disagreements will surface once they clash.

The trans-Caspian pipelines are likely to result in conflicts of interest between the regional powers, particularly between Russia and the United States. The trans-Caspian routes bypassing Russia would inevitably lead to Russia’s disapproval. Russia has already expressed its concern with the sub-sea

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² On March 28, 2002, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Greek Public Gas Corporation (DEPA) and Turkish Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAŞ), laying a foundation for the interconnection of the Turkish and Greek gas networks. Another Memorandum of Cooperation was signed on 31 July, 2002, between Greek DEPA and Italian EDISON. For more information, see DEPA (2005).
pipeline from Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan saying it would block any attempt to build such a pipeline. In June 2003, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Kalyuzhny stated that Russia views “the construction of pipelines through the Caspian [Sea] negatively, first of all because of this sea’s uniqueness, and second because of the geodynamic situation [in the region]” (Sultanova 2003).

Yet, the United States will continue to promote the construction of these pipelines, which will advance and strengthen the US geostrategic position in the Caspian region. To achieve this goal, among many other scenarios, the United States will seek the cooperation of Russia, China, or both, or pursue its interests alone. In all cases, some political disagreements are inescapable.

The tension between the United States and Russia will become more visible as the parties decide to move forward with the construction of the sub-sea pipeline from Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan. The United States could cooperate with Russia, but would probably want to be a dominant player. America’s bid for dominance, however, will make conservative circles in the Kremlin anxious. Russia still identifies itself as a “great power”—a sentiment widely popular within the Russian military and security structure (Fairbanks 2002: 39). Therefore, the US-Russian energy cooperation could work effectively only if both the US and Russia’s interests are taken into account—an assumption which is highly ambiguous, but not impossible.

On the other hand, the tension between the United States and China over the energy interests in the Caspian region is likely to surface in the long run. China’s growing dependency on foreign oil and gas is an important factor in its drive to diversify its energy supply routes. Due to its proximity to the region, China views the Caspian republics as potential suppliers of oil and gas to its domestic market, especially to its eastern Xinjiang province. China’s net oil imports will surge from 1.7 mbl/d in 2001 to 9.8 mbl/d in 2030 (IEA 2002b).3 China has proposed to build two long distance pipelines from Kazakhstan and Turkménistan (Cole 2003)—a commitment that requires time and investment. Astana and Beijing have already inaugurated the completion of the first small capacity oil pipeline (10 million tons per year) from Kazakhstan to China in December 2005.

With respect to the trans-Caspian pipelines the potential US-Chinese disagreements will not seriously affect the construction of both pipelines. China will try to promote eastern energy routes to transport Kazakh oil and Turkmen gas, while the United States will promote western routes, including the trans-Caspian projects. Both eastern and western pipelines are feasible and not mutually exclusive.

As for Iranian involvement, it will be limited to the potential Turkménistan-Azerbaijan sub-sea pipeline. Iran may oppose the construction of such a pipeline on the basis that the legal status of the Caspian Sea has yet to be agreed between all states. Thus, Iran is likely to delay the agreement on the legal status, since an undetermined status of the Caspian Sea allows Iran to exercise continuous influence in the region.

In the case of the Caucasus region, the increased American presence as a result of the westward going pipelines will facilitate rearrangements in regional security and military structures. Particularly, it will increase the likelihood of the Caucasus states situated on the route of oil and gas pipelines—Azerbaijan and Georgia—to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Alliance has already approved Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP), which will follow with Membership Action Plan after they fulfill their IPAP goals.

During this process, in addition to the United States, Turkey will be a primary country that will help to promote NATO’s interests in the region. Turkey has been a traditional military ally of both Azerbaijan and Georgia, and has recently boosted its military relations with Kazakhstan. In 2001, Turkey opened its military representative office in Astana and since 1998 it has supplied Kazakhstan with $6.5 million in military-technical assistance (McDermott 2005).

Lastly, the unsettled conflicts in the South Caucasus will be an indirect, but important security issue. Assumptions that pipelines have a stabilizing effect and prevent wars may be a misunderstanding in the case of the South Caucasus. Recent trends indicate that the majority of populations in both Azerbaijan and Georgia support the use of force in retaking their breakaway regions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Both countries have been upgrading their military forces to accord

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3 This information is based on data from the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2002. For more information on China’s energy sector, see IEA (2002b).
with NATO standards and have aspirations to join the Alliance in the near future. In addition, the promising oil revenues from the BTC pipeline are already reflected in Azerbaijan’s increase in military spending. Azerbaijan’s military budget rose from $175 million in 2004 to $300 million in 2005 and is expected to reach $600 million in 2006 (Ziyadov and Mir-Ismail 2005). Thus, the prolonged conflicts in the South Caucasus may result in some sort of a military standoff in the mid-term, as Azerbaijan and Georgia consolidate their economies and build up their military strength.

Conclusion

Several major powers, including China, Russia, and the United States, have vital energy interests in the Caspian region, which they define as strategically important. The trans-Caspian pipelines from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan are two major projects likely to instigate geopolitical competition among these powers in the Caspian region. The United States has been the major promoter of both pipelines, as their realization is closely linked to increased American influence in the region. The European Union, alarmed by the recent Russia-Ukraine gas crisis, has been also active in promoting the trans-Caspian natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan.

If both trans-Caspian pipelines are successfully constructed, they would boost Western influence in the Caspian region and guarantee the westward flow of Caspian oil and gas. These pipelines will connect the energy networks of Central Asia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and Europe and will make the Caspian states an alternative energy source for South-Eastern Europe.

The Aktau-Baku oil pipeline will allow Kazakhstan to transfer its oil using the existing Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Initially, Kazakh oil will be carried to Baku by oil tankers in limited amount. Later, the amount of Kazakh oil in the BTC project will increase, thanks to the Kashagan oil field, which will be one of the major oil production fields in Kazakhstan starting in 2007. The need for the Aktau-Baku oil pipeline, however, will emerge only around 2011-2013, when Azerbaijan’s oil production slowly reaches its peak level.

While construction of the Aktau-Baku oil pipeline is more feasible, a possibility of building a Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan natural gas pipeline remains unclear. Nonetheless, if the pipeline is built, it will be linked to the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline system or may require a new natural gas pipeline with larger capacity. The project’s successful realization depends on the settlement of political disputes between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, availability of foreign direct investment, and to a lesser extent, the agreement between all five littoral states on the legal status of the Caspian Sea.

Iran will be a primary challenge with respect to the Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan natural gas pipeline. Russia’s attitude will be critical while constructing the Aktau-Baku sub-sea oil pipeline. During the construction of the Aktau-Baku pipeline, the United States is likely to confront Russia. Unless Russian interests in the region are satisfied, Moscow will continue to object any potential sub-sea pipeline in the Caspian Sea. China too would want any potential pipelines to go eastward, not westward.

Nonetheless, the United States will probably cooperate with China and Russia over regional interests as long as this partnership does not undermine the US long-term strategic interests in the Caspian region. Hence, the trans-Caspian pipelines would not only enhance the US and European strategic interests in the region, but also move the Caspian republics towards the Western sphere of influence in the future.

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Internationalization of Higher Education in Kyrgyzstan: Three Potential Problems

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While many aspects of the internationalization of higher education in Kyrgyzstan are positive, including the exchange of ideas and the requirements for transparency demanded by international credit transfer, internationalization nevertheless has negative characteristics as well. Three of those characteristics have potential to cause problems for Kyrgyzstan: first, the push for inclusion into the Bologna Process; second, the internationalization of accreditation and quality assessment standards that accompanies the Bologna Process; and third, the acceptance of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), to which Kyrgyzstan is a party de facto and de jure, because of its membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). These three factors all present troubling considerations that, in a worst-case scenario, could prevent higher education in Kyrgyzstan from focusing on meeting needs that are specific to Kyrgyzstan’s development.

The Bologna Declaration, which was signed initially by 23 Western European countries in 1999, now has 45 signatories, including Russia, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.1 The main goals of the Declaration

1 Readers not familiar with the Declaration may consult the homepage of the Bologna Secretariat (http://www.dfes.gov.uk/bologna/). The Bologna Declaration and other relevant documents are also
Adoption of a system of easily readable and comparable degrees, [...] to promote European citizens’ employability and the international competitiveness of the European higher education system.

Adoption of a system based on two main cycles, undergraduate and graduate. [...] The degree awarded after the first cycle shall [...] be relevant to the European labor market [...] 

Establishment of a system of credits — such as in the ECTS system — as a proper means of promoting the most widespread student mobility.

Promotion of mobility by overcoming obstacles to the effective exercise of free movement [...] 

• for students [...] 
• for teachers, researchers and administrative staff, recognition and valorization of periods spent in a European context [...].

Promotion of European co-operation in quality assurance.

Promotion of the necessary European dimensions in higher education, particularly with regards to curricular development, inter-institutional co-operation, mobility schemes and integrated programs of study, training and research.2

A reader hearing these goals might be forgiven for asking why Kyrgyzstan would be interested in joining into such a European-focused process. However, on April 26, 2003, at a republic-wide meeting, “Higher Education: Problems and Perspectives,” called by the Ministry of Education and Culture of Kyrgyzstan, the then-president of Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akaev, named joining the Bologna Process as one of the three main goals of higher education in the Republic, the others being improving the training of engineers and increasing the “computerization” of higher education (Aidaraliev 2005; Smanaliev 2005).3 A working group on the Bologna Process was appointed, chaired by the President of the International University of Kyrgyzstan, Asylbek Aidaraliev. Despite Akaev’s overthrow during the “March events,” momentum toward Bologna has not decreased. Indeed, Elmira Mursuralieva, the Registrar of the American University of Central Asia, finds that her knowledge of credit hour systems is much sought after by her colleagues at Bishkek universities, and in August 2005, an Association of Central Asian Registrars was founded at a regional conference of registrars in Almaty (Mursuralieva 2005).4 Moreover, 11 higher education institutions in Kyrgyzstan and the Ministry of Education have partnered with the University of Pisa (Italy) and the University of Ghent (Belgium) on a Tempus grant titled “Creating National Information Centres about the Bologna Process in the Kyrgyz Republic” (http://www.bolognakg.net). As the web site notes, the grant’s “activities go far beyond the organization of the Centres. The aim is to support in the best way possible the desire of the Kyrgyz Republic to reform its higher education system in line with the Bologna Process.” Included is reforming economics curricula in Kyrgyzstan to meet the competency standards of the “Tuning of Educational Structures in Europe Project,” an initiative of 150 European universities to synchronize the learning outcomes of their academic programs in nine disciplines, again to ease the educational and labor mobility of students and graduates (http://tuning.unideusto.org/tuningeu/). As will be discussed below, whether or not the learning outcomes in economics that meet the needs of students and employers in France or Germany are the same as the learning outcomes in economics that

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2 Three more goals were added at the Prague Summit in 2001 (http://www.bologna-bergen2005.no/Docs/00-Main_doc/010519PRAGUE_COMMUNIQUE.PDF) and a tenth was added at the Berlin Summit in 2003 (http://www.bologna-bergen2005.no/Docs/00-Main_doc/030919Berlin_Communique.PDF).

3 See also the website of the National Tempus Office in Kyrgyzstan (http://www.tempus.kg/). Tempus is a European Community initiative that “focuses on the development of higher education systems in [the Mediterranean, Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia] through co-operation with institutions from the Member States of the European Community” (ibid.).

4 Soviet-era universities did not have registrars, as students across the Soviet Union in a particular specialty took the same courses, without electives, so a record of what courses each individual took was not needed. Transfer outside of the system, for example, to a Western European university, was not possible, so “easily readable and comparable degrees” were not necessary.
are most needed for Kyrgyzstan’s development is an issue that may be debated.

Coming back to the question posed earlier, why should Kyrgyzstan be interested in a system that aims to “promote European citizens’ employability and the international competitiveness of the European higher education system,” among other goals? One answer is that the switch from a contact hour system to a credit hour system permits students to enter more easily any system that uses credit hours—the US system as well as the European, for example. A second is the hoped-for access to student and faculty mobility that is one of the main goals of the Bologna Process. A third is what Knight (2005: 2) calls “the race for accreditation stars.” Although acceptance into the Bologna Process is not “accreditation” per se, being allowed to join the process can connote quality. A nation has to apply to be accepted into the Process (Bologna Secretariat 2004), and acceptance may be seen as leaving behind the Soviet era and joining “the West.”

So what could be the problems with joining the Bologna Process? One problem is that mobility should be incoming as well as outgoing. To attract incoming students, countries with less commonly spoken languages, such as the Netherlands, Finland, Lithuania, and Romania, have begun to offer programs in languages that incoming students can speak, primarily English. The International University in Kyrgyzstan, the first university in Kyrgyzstan to try to meet ECTS (European Credit Transfer System) requirements, did so by working on offering its Business and Economics degree in English. Neither Russian nor, certainly, Kyrgyz, was considered an “ECTS language.” The issue penetrates more deeply into the curriculum than this. If a university is to attract international students, it must have curricula that are relevant to those students. Relevant often means what Trofymenko (2002) calls “imitation education”—the more the education abroad “imitates” what is available on the home campus, the more likely the home institution is to accept it. That is, what many home institutions want is education that takes place abroad but that is not really different from that on the home campus. The education received abroad, from this perspective, should focus on the same paradigms, periods and personalities the student would find at home. An international student taking economics in Kyrgyzstan, for example, might need the same general content as he or she would have in Amsterdam or Berlin, so he or she will not have to “make up” the class at home. To the extent to which a university in Kyrgyzstan changes curricula to be the same as the curricula of universities in Europe, it risks losing the ability to address the particular needs of its own. However, what Kyrgyzstani students need to know about economics or law or agriculture or politics or journalism to operate effectively in Kyrgyzstan and to help Kyrgyzstan develop, even if one believes the goal of development is for Kyrgyzstan to become more “westernized,” defined as “democratic” and having a market economy, is not the same as what a French or Czech or Lithuanian student needs for active participation in the development of his or her country. To the extent that Kyrgyzstan changes university curricula to meet generalized Bologna Process goals and competencies, Kyrgyzstan-specific needs will suffer. Sojourning students may have courses they can transfer back, and Kyrgyzstani students may be

5 During the Soviet era, universities in the Kyrgyz SSR, as elsewhere in the Soviet Union, marked student progress toward a degree by the accumulation of contact hours, or time spent in contact with a professor, in class. Participation in the Bologna Process requires the use of credit hours for the transfer of academic work from one institution to another, and European Credit Transfer Requirements (ECTS) hours are increasingly being used to record credit accumulation within institutions as well.

6 However, as Reichert and Tauch (2005) point out, the goal of two-degree cycles appears to be in opposition to the goal of mobility. With the implementation of the BA/MA profile leading to shorter first degrees in many countries, a number of universities are cutting back on the number of electives offered, and are trying to compress the courses formerly required in a longer degree into a shorter degree. Therefore, professors are less likely to want students to go abroad to courses that may or may not be equivalent to those at the home institution.

7 The underlying assumption of the “Tuning Educational Structures in Europe Project” is that what it takes to be “competent” in a field in Paris is the same as what it takes to be competent in that field in Prague. While in some of the fields that are included—chemistry, math, and physics—one might make that argument, in others—business, education, history, and, one might argue, for a mountainous country like Kyrgyzstan, geology—the competencies needed seem much more nation-specific. Tomusk (2004: 91) makes some rather biting comments in this regard. In Phase One of the project, the competencies, even the subject-specific ones, are very broadly stated. Nevertheless, focusing on an international set of competencies, may take time and potentially funding away from analyzing and addressing Kyrgyzstan’s own needs.
better prepared to work in the EU, but resources may be directed away from solving Kyrgyzstan’s problems.

The idea of changing curricula to meet the needs of mobile students (and perhaps mobile faculty as well) is exacerbated by the second characteristic of internationalization that may be problematic for a small nation like Kyrgyzstan, that of the internationalization of quality assessment standards. This movement takes two forms. On the one hand, procedures and policies of quality assessment agencies are becoming standardized; the accreditors are becoming accredited. On the other hand, through mechanisms such as the Tuning Project and potentially by what is known as “outcomes assessment,” the knowledge and skills students graduate with may become standardized. Both movements, the standardization of assessment processes and the impending standardization of student results, have the potential to affect the autonomy of educational choices and goals within a country, although the latter, the standardization of student results, is likely to more intensely affect smaller countries with distinctive needs, such as Kyrgyzstan, than the former.

As was noted above, the Bologna Declaration was designed to facilitate labor mobility within Europe by creating equivalent qualifications among professional workers within the European Higher Education Area. The “Tuning Educational Structures in Europe” project, as mentioned, takes this idea one step further by focusing on the competencies graduates in nine different disciplines ought to have, with plans to extend both the number of disciplines and the number of countries involved. Latin American universities and Russia already are investigating the project’s requirements. In a sense, both the Bologna Declaration and the Tuning Project contradict one of the traditional rationales for international educational exchange, which is the experience of difference. Rather than asking the student to engage with differences and to learn from them, both the Bologna Process and the Tuning Project seek to minimize difference, primarily in the service of labor mobility.

The third element of internationalization that has a possibility of impacting on Kyrgyzstan-specific development needs, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), takes this idea of minimizing difference one step further. Under the auspices of the WTO, GATS negotiations have as their goal the reduction of barriers to trade in services, including the reduction of practices which privilege an in-country provider over an external one, in all service fields, including education. The American Council on Education, in an August 2002 document posted to its web site, notes that:

Once a nation becomes a member of GATS, it is subject to the general obligations of GATS […] and makes specific commitments regarding market access and national treatment in specific sectors (such as education). There are costs to not signing GATS; a country outside the agreement risks not having equal access to those markets and losing favorable or unfettered access to markets in critical export areas. At the present time, 144 nations have agreed to participate in GATS; 44 have agreed to include at least one sector of education under GATS (American Council 2005). Sorensen (2005a: 7) summarizes the process as follows:

After setting out their initial positions, countries negotiate in the GATS setting by requesting from one another improved market access in sectors of interest. Remember that any concession given to one country must apply as well to any other country wishing to trade — national preferences toward
individual trading partners are outlawed by the Most-Favored Nation rule, one of the cornerstones of GATS.

As the possibility of trade in educational services under GATS suggests, and as a number of authors have noted (Altbach 2001; Bassett 2005; Foster 2002; IAU et al. 2005; Knight 2002, 2003; Sorensen, 2005a, 2005b; Robinson 2005; Wooldridge 2005), market values rather than academic values are gaining prominence in higher education worldwide. Altbach (2001) cogently outlines four of the dangers of this shift, two of which are particularly relevant here. First, a market economy will lead to the dominance of the center over the periphery, both in terms of nations and in terms of multi-national corporations involved in the “knowledge industry,” including the computer, publishing, and biotechnology fields. Second, if education is commercialized and labor becomes mobile, then education becomes more of a private good, benefiting the individual, than a public good, benefiting society as a whole. If this is the case — if there is no assumption that those educated in Country A will stay and work in and otherwise contribute to Country A — then why should the government of Country A provide any support to its educational institutions? Altbach (2001: 4) underlines the dangers of GATS for smaller, less powerful countries:

The greatest negative impact of WTO control over higher education would occur in the developing countries. These countries have the greatest need for academic institutions that can contribute to national development, produce research relevant to local needs, and participate in the strengthening of civil society. Once universities in developing countries are subject to an international academic marketplace regulated by the WTO, they would be swamped by overseas institutions and programs intent on earning a profit but not in contributing to national development. It is not clear that accrediting and quality control mechanisms that now exist in many countries would be permitted, at least as they relate to transnational educational providers.

Bassett (2005) outlines a worst-case scenario, using a US context, but three of her points have relevance beyond the United States. First, the implementation of GATS could mean the end to public financing of higher education. Second, policies that favor local students, such as in-state tuition, could be eliminated. Third, in a market model, disciplines that do not generate income could be eliminated and/or reserved only for wealthy students.

Although Bassett focused on the United States, her analysis has implications for Kyrgyzstan. For example, if public financing of education is deemed a trade infringement, advantaging local providers, then no state stipends for students will be allowed. Additionally, if all WTO members may compete in Kyrgyzstan, local educational providers with less financial wherewithal may be unable to survive — a kind of “Walmart-ization” of education may take place, with the strong forcing smaller, locally-focused universities out of business. In Kyrgyzstan as in the United States, disciplines that are not profitable may be eliminated. Kassymbekova (2005) notes that agricultural education in Kyrgyzstan already is suffering from not being one of the disciplines that has received funding through the Soros Foundation, as it is not a discipline which is considered to contribute to the formation of an “open society.” Carrying the analysis further, one can imagine that Kyrgyzstan-specific subjects — Kyrgyz ethnography, Kyrgyz history, and journalism courses preparing students to work for Kyrgyz-language media, for example — might “lose” in the broader marketplace, since Kyrgyzstan’s population is under five million. International textbook companies may consider it not cost-effective to produce books in Kyrgyz, and the status of the Kyrgyz language overall is called into question when higher education needs to respond to global market forces.

Although many aspects of international education are positive, small countries with specific development needs, such as Kyrgyzstan, need to be wary of the implications of the Bologna Process, the internationalization of quality assessment standards and the resulting standardization of educational competencies, and, most of all, of GATS. Each has the potential to create a uniform higher education that does not meet the needs of Kyrgyzstan, either now or in the future.

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External Labor Migration of Kyrgyzstan’s Indigenous Population and Its Socio-Economic Consequences

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Research Question

The departure of the Russian-speaking population (Kosmarskaia 1999; Piadukhov 1998; Savoskul 2001; Vitkovskaia 1996, 1997), and external labor migration of the indigenous population are among the most significant phenomena in the contemporary migration processes in Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian countries. Hundreds of thousands of people joining the two migration streams are bound primarily to Russia.

This report presents preliminary findings of recently completed research examining external labor migration of Kyrgyzstan’s indigenous population, and its social-economic consequences. The project was funded by the MacArthur Foundation. The findings of this project will be part of my book on contemporary migration processes in Kyrgyzstan. I also plan publications in Kyrgyzstan’s newspapers to publicize the project’s results in a form accessible to non-academic readers.

In Kyrgyzstan labor migration typically bypasses official registration by both countries of origin and destination. Kuznetsova (2000) characterizes it as “uncontrolled, informal, and illegal.” In view of that, the statistical agencies of Kyrgyzstan and the recipient countries cannot measure labor migration between the countries accurately. External labor migration from Kyrgyzstan remains understudied. Local scholars do not pay attention to the issue of external migration, resulting in a dearth of scientific research on the subject. Government agencies lack clear understanding of the scale, composition, and problems of external labor migration.

This research project’s novelty lies in its goal to identify the real size, trends, and peculiarities of external labor migration among the Kyrgyzstan’s indigenous population. This project is the first broad study of the social and economic consequences of the modern external labor migration among the ethnic Kyrgyz. The study includes all types of labor migration: individual commercial migration, individual migration for construction and renovation work, hired labor under contract, and others.

The research has produced a database containing data on the size, trends and details of external labor migration by Kyrgyzstan’s indigenous population. It demonstrates the influence of external labor migration on Kyrgyzstan’s socioeconomic development, and offers recommendations on optimization of the government’s migration policy.

In many countries, the processes of integration, transnationalization, and globalization require migration of labor resources, urging formation of a new migration policy towards the incoming labor migrants. Illegal migration and illegal employment have become a part of the problem. The significance of this research lies in the urgent need to develop a methodology to evaluate the socioeconomic consequences of migration for countries and labor migrants. The key theoretical finding of this research shows that it is difficult to identify winners and losers among the recipient and donor countries of labor migration. In each specific case the degree of negative consequences depends on various conditions, including the effectiveness of migration policy.
Methodology

For this research I gathered data from Kyrgyzstan’s annual reports on registration of population migration during the last ten years, Kyrgyzstan’s Census reports for 1989 and 1999 years, the National Human Development Report for 2000-2001, presidential and governmental decrees, and international agreements signed on labor migration. I also analyzed surveys conducted by statistical institutions. Among them are a pilot focus group study on labor migration conducted in 2001 by the Center of Social Research of the Kyrgyz Republic’s National Academy of Science; a focus group survey on labor migration conducted in 2002 by the Bishkek office of the International Organization for Migration; a survey conducted in 2004 by the Bishkek-based Institute of Economic Policy to measure remittances of the external labor migrants; and a survey of labor migrants conducted at state border posts by the National Statistics Committee in 2003.

For the study I also conducted face-to-face interviews with 249 respondents in urban households, and 230 respondents in rural households of the Osh region. Households with one or several migrant workers were targeted. In this project, the term “labor migrant” refers to “migrant worker.” According to the International Labor Organization, “Migrant workers are people who are permitted to be engaged in economic activity in a country other than the country of their origin.” (Bilsborrow 1999: 35)

The applied qualitative methodology was influenced by the international research on external migration from Ukraine (Pirozhkov 1998). The experience of similar research studies conducted in Russia and other CIS countries was also considered (Zaionchkovskaya 2001). The methodological approach examined the consequences of labor migration on the individual, household, familial, and societal levels. A comprehensive questionnaire provided data on socioeconomic factors in labor migration, its effect on the lifestyle of migrants and their families, and insight into the history of the organization of migrant labor business.

The respondents were selected based on their migrational, demographic, economic, and ethnic background. The majority of the indigenous population of Kyrgyzstan resides in the south — Osh, Jalal-Abad, and Batken oblasts. Osh is the second biggest city in the country. The country’s northern regions enjoy a better performing economy and more employment opportunities. The south of the republic has the highest number of unemployed who often turn to the underground labor market or labor migration. Due to these reasons, I selected Osh city and Osh oblast as the macro-objects of my study. Following that, I selected the micro-objects — city and oblast rayons. Next, I selected city micro-regions and villages. Finally, I selected specific households for the survey.

The survey had two stages. The first stage was a short survey among households on selected streets and buildings. The aim of the first stage was to identify migrant households and the general social characteristics of the urban and rural populations. The questionnaire contained questions on the household members’ age, socioeconomic factors, employment status, education level, number of dependents, and other factors.

In the second stage, migrants were asked to respond to a detailed questionnaire, which included three sections: (1) questionnaire about household characteristics; (2) individual questionnaire focused on the household member-migrant; (3) questionnaire detailing the type and peculiarities of the migrant’s employment. To analyze data I used grouping methodology¹.

Gaining access to respondents and convincing them to participate in the interview was a problem. In urban areas, members of selected households were often away from their apartments (apartments were either locked or rented out). Many respondents, particularly the well-off ones, evaded answering questions about their income.

Findings

Analysis of this research led to the following findings:

• The real scale of external migration from Kyrgyzstan exceeds by many times the data reported by state statistics agencies. Currently, labor migration is the largest and most notable migrational trend in Kyrgyzstan. For a great number of Kyrgyzstan’s unemployed, external labor migration provides a widely accessible employment alternative.

• Russia and Kazakhstan are the main destinations for the labor migration from Kyrgyzstan. The research findings show that about 75% of the labor migrants find

¹ A technique to sort respondents step by step into groups based on meaningful categories.
employment in Russia and about 12% in Kazakhstan.

- Labor migration from Kyrgyzstan is mostly unorganized and illegal. The working-age population is the most active when it comes to external labor migration. However, persons from all age groups, professions, social status, and regions participate in labor migration. Labor migrants are predominantly rural.

- Most labor migrants from Kyrgyzstan are low skilled. They find employment in areas requiring strong physical strength and few skills (construction, shuttle trade, restaurants, retail, agriculture, cattle breeding).

- Migrants’ remittances play an important role in improving their families’ standards of living. Labor migration is an effective method to fight poverty. This research shows that labor migration has improved the livelihood of more than two thirds of migrant households.

- Labor migration has numerous positive and negative consequences. En masse external labor migration reduces the strain on the national labor market, and improves living conditions for many population groups. At the same time, insufficient information, lack of legal counseling, and inadequate social protection makes labor migrants extremely vulnerable. Labor migrants face most problems when dealing with the legal system of the receiving country, i.e. issues such as registration, ID checks, regular detentions, arrests, fines, corruption, and abuse of power.

- Labor migrants, particularly the ones engaged in shuttle trade, have created far-reaching partnership networks connecting suppliers and customers. Almost all types of labor migrants note that they have gained valuable business experience and professional skills. Migrants are also acquiring new qualifications (this holds particularly true among construction workers, engineers, factory workers, agricultural workers, doctors and other workers hired under a contract). They are obtaining knowledge about innovative technologies, and higher standards of working ethics. Thanks to the newly accumulated experience, knowledge and capital, 12% of the households succeed in starting their own businesses (small hotels, cafés, repair workshops, gas stations, retail stores, tailoring businesses, and others).

- Migrants work in the labor markets of different CIS regions—urban and rural markets, in the European part of CIS, in Siberia, in Russia’s far north, and in northern and southern Kazakhstan.

- This export of its labor force brings Kyrgyzstan a significant inflow of foreign exchange. The research shows that the foreign exchange inflow from labor migrants considerably exceeds the volume of foreign financial assistance. The income earned by labor migrants is an important contributor in Kyrgyzstan’s socioeconomic situation. My research estimates the labor migrants’ remittances at approximately $320 million.²

- External labor migration from Kyrgyzstan is the latest long-term external economic trend. It will continue to affect the financial, labor and social spheres of Kyrgyzstan.

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² For comparison, Kyrgyzstan’s annual budget is $430 million.


International Broadcasting to Central Asia: The Voice of Reason or Opposition?

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The 20th century gave the world its first true mass medium.1 Within a few years of its birth, radio had emerged as a weapon that both powerful and weak governments could use to spread their national ideologies, promote their geopolitical objectives, improve their political and cultural images, gain social influence, and in some cases, cast light into the darkness for those deprived of freedom of speech and expression. Some governments have traditionally used international broadcasting to convince a foreign audience of the superiority of their political system (Puddington 2003: ix-x). The Soviets, for example, maintained a global network to spread the seeds of communism. The United States established the Voice of America to convey the American perspective on international events and familiarize foreign audiences with its political system as well as its culture. Little has changed between the two former superpowers since the end of the Cold War. While the language may be more temperate, the war of words continues and recently Vladimir Putin’s government announced it would launch an around-the-clock English-language satellite television channel to further its ideologies.

As the totalitarian governments in Central Asia continue to tighten their control over citizens, international broadcasters are struggling to keep their presence in this very turbulent, oppressed and geopolitically important region. Whereas Western officials view these broadcasts as an attempt to reach oppressed audiences in order to deliver objective information and news, opposition groups see Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Voice of America (VOA), and the British Broadcasting

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1 The views expressed in this document are solely of the author and not necessarily of the Voice of America.
Corporation (BBC) as stages on which to express their views and, thus, not surprisingly, since independence, Central Asian governments have detested the foreign broadcasts that target their people.

While audience surveys have been conducted to provide assessments and measurements of the effectiveness of the international broadcasters, this is done at the request of the broadcaster and not necessarily subject to the rigors inherent in an academic review. This article serves as a source of scholarly information to evaluate the achievements of international broadcasting to Central Asia and to judge the overall impact of this outreach.

**Analysis**

Three leading international broadcasters, the BBC from London, US-funded RFE/RL from Prague, and VOA from Washington, deliver Uzbek-language programming. I focused on these three broadcasters to conduct two studies — qualitative and quantitative — to examine listeners’ perceptions of the stations, and the programs’ content.

In an email survey conducted in 2005, I sent ten questions to 56 people, aged 21 to 59, most of them currently living in Uzbekistan, selected on the basis that I had some reason to believe they listen to foreign broadcasts. Thirty-three people, or 60% of the recipients, responded, including 17 women. The respondent pool consisted of students, managers, engineers, construction workers, housewives, doctors, professors, and local journalists. None of the respondents had any affiliation to BBC, RFE/RL, or VOA.

Forty-two percent of the respondents reported that they had no access to any of the surveyed stations due to jamming, lack of time, and radio sets not equipped to receive shortwave. Most of the respondents were, however, listening to international radio stations online.

Almost half the respondents considered the BBC’s daily one-hour program the most objective and liked its analysis. Nearly 20% of the respondents had the same evaluation of RFE/RL. Ten percent of the respondents thought VOA was the most accurate, objective, and timely of the three stations.

Despite the popularity of the BBC programs, respondents highly criticized the quality of the Uzbek in which BBC broadcasts. Some praised the RFE/RL Uzbek Service for improving its presentation and language quality. Other respondents suggested that VOA Uzbek broadcasters should slow down the speed of their presentations and diversify the content of the half-hour daily program.

Most respondents considered RFE/RL’s four hours daily broadcast an open platform for the Uzbek opposition. They likewise believed that the objectivity of all three services was compromised by the fact that their funding comes from their respective governments, but nonetheless valued the broadcasts within this context.

In late 2004, InterMedia Survey Inc., which handles audience and market research for the US’s international broadcasting, estimated that annual listening to RFE/RL Uzbek among the adult population was at 6.6%, and BBC at 1.3%. Among educated people who listen to international radio, annually 11.4% listen to RFE/RL and 1.6% to BBC (InterMedia Survey 2005: 2).

Several factors lie behind the RFE/RL’s broadcasting lead in Central Asia, especially in Uzbekistan. The service has the largest staff (nine Prague-based staff members) and more air time than any other international radio service broadcasting to Uzbekistan. Its listeners say that RFE/RL is the easiest to access and repeat broadcasts provide an alternative, should the live broadcast be missed.

Table 1. One week coverage of the BBC, RFE/RL and VOA Uzbek Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENT</th>
<th>BBC 1 hour daily</th>
<th>RFE/RL 4 hours daily</th>
<th>VOA 1.5 hours daily</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International*</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional**</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local***</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Stories about events occurring outside of Central Asia; **Stories about Central Asia; ***Stories specific to Uzbekistan, including opposition in exile even though those stories might be originating from outside the region.

Table 1 presents some of the results of content analysis which focused on the broadcasts from September 6 – September 13, 2005. In this study I reviewed the Uzbek broadcasts of BBC, RFE/RL and VOA. I categorized the stories by their scope — international, regional, or local. As expected, the study shows that VOA, with the shortest broadcast time, delivered the least number of stories during its broadcast; RFE/RL, with the longest daily air time, provided the greatest amount of coverage.
VOA and BBC had five stories each discussing media freedom, human rights, and political opposition, whereas RFE/RL had 23 stories focusing on the same topics. Uzbekistan’s court-ordered shutdown of Internews Network, an international NGO that worked for ten years to improve the capacity of the local Uzbek media to report the news, was the most popular story on all the stations. Another dominant regional story during the survey week concerned refugees from the Andijon massacre. Hurricane Katrina was the most widely covered international story.

The RFE/RL Uzbek Service’s local coverage is another factor that sets the service apart from VOA and BBC. The service allocates 80% of its air time to local and Central Asian issues. Generally, most of the programming of the RFE/RL Uzbek Service, a surrogate broadcaster (meaning that RFE/RL acts as a surrogate for local media which are restricted), focuses on political events, social problems, regional issues, activities of new parties, and the opposition in exile. For many of its listeners RFE/RL fills the gap that is created by the absence of freedom for local media sources.

The email survey revealed that there are mixed feelings about Russian media. Many loyal BBC, RFE/RL, and VOA listeners regard the Russian-language media with a great degree of suspicion. For them, it is Russian propaganda. However, younger audience members seem to value presentation over content. A 25-year old listener from Bukhara and a 30-year old non-listener from Surxon Daryo, both university graduates, married, and each working two jobs, say they would love to listen to any international broadcasts as long as the reception is good and the programs are entertaining.

Good language skills are also a way to retain an audience and attract new listeners, said a philology professor at the Nizami University of Pedagogy in Tashkent during a follow-up interview. Some respondents say the international broadcasters have been improving their “Uzbek and thus their broadcast style.” But others are not so sure. “Some still sound as if they are reading the straight translations from English,” says a journalism student in Tashkent, who also works for a local FM station, specifically referring to BBC broadcasters. For many, VOA has represented a tired voice from Washington for many years. “It was an outdated as well as unintelligible voice that had to be replaced by native speakers. But now, the new ones speak too fast and I am struggling to follow what they say,” says a senior listener from Tashkent region.

In a 2004 InterMedia survey a majority of Uzbekistan respondents found the VOA Uzbek Service’s program content too political, too foreign, and irrelevant to their lives (InterMedia Survey 2005). Listeners wanted more stories on economics, society, culture, and science, especially scientific and medical advances in America. They also requested stories about the lives of Uzbeks and Uzbekistanis living in the United States. Among many recommendations, listeners suggested VOA Uzbek shift its emphasis from US news to information about Uzbekistan and Central Asia. Some participants thought VOA should be on the air for a longer period of time, pointing out that it would be more convenient for listeners to tune in at various times rather than solely during one 30-minute time frame. In December 2003, VOA introduced the first-ever international Uzbek TV programming. Currently, VOA Uzbek produces “Exploring America,” a 30-minute weekly television magazine.

VOA’s reputation in Uzbekistan as a timely, dependable and accessible source of information has been affected by the Uzbek service’s shutdowns and resumptions of broadcasting in recent years. The problem, says its former director Sanford J. Ungar, is that it has virtually no constituency inside the United States and very few US lawmakers know about this veteran organization that sits a few blocks away from Congress. Unger notes that, of the various ironies besetting US foreign policy at the moment, one is both particularly acute and little recognized: even as the realization grows that the international image of the United States is in steep decline, the country’s best instrument of public diplomacy, the Voice of America, is being systematically diminished. Ungar, also a former host of National Public Radio’s All Things Considered, says that even though some might argue that a government-funded network should be expected to portray American policies as righteous and successful, and might even claim that, in the right hands, such propaganda could help defuse anti-Americanism abroad, experience demonstrates the VOA is most appreciated and effective when it functions as a model US style news organization. By presenting a balanced view of domestic and international events, VOA exemplifies how

2 All direct comments come from telephone and email interviews with international radio listeners, June-August 2005.
independent journalism can strengthen democracy (Ungar 2005).

Young professionals and sophisticated news consumers express deep, yet equal, interest in both serious and entertainment news. While they like BBC for projecting itself “as a young station for a younger generation,” they regard RFE/RL and VOA as old propaganda machines of American foreign policy. Despite this criticism, several interviewees said that they depended on international broadcasters to find out about what happened in Andijon on May 13, 2005.

Young people represent the highest percentage of audience members accessing the international stations through the Internet. All three international stations are available over the Internet in the RealAudio and Windows Media format and are browsed by thousands of Uzbek language speakers worldwide. BBC’s site was the most popular among the respondents and praised as the most informative and appealing. The InterMedia survey in Uzbekistan concluded that nearly all Internet access was public but only one percent of general population used it weekly. It is unclear to what extent Central Asian governments control Internet content, but it is rarely possible to access uncensored news from Internet cafés which exist under tight state regulations. Most email respondents said that they accessed BBC, RFE/RL and VOA webpages mostly from home or office. Some of them defined Internet cafés as electronic entertainment centers, where young people try to make personal connections with the outside world, mostly for online dating or emailing.

In Uzbekistan, people live in an information vacuum. International reporters stationed in the country can barely move around to report on events, and since Andijon, the government has further tightened its grip. The local media have been cowed into submission. The role international broadcasting plays in the development of civil society should not be underestimated. BBC, RFE/RL and VOA are venues from which civil society groups and those in the political opposition can have their voices amplified. But it is also equally important for the development of civil society that international broadcasters not become mouthpieces for these groups.

The same standard applies to political opposition groups, which tend to be prickly about not receiving news coverage. This is partly due to their lack of cultural references with regard to independent media outlets. Unlike the international NGOs that promote civil society and are populated with Western specialists, the opposition groups at times bear a curious resemblance to the governments they wish to overthrow. When their press releases containing yet another gratuitous slap at the power-elite are ignored because they contain no news value, oppositionists bellow about compromised ethics and pro-government bias in the international broadcasters’ reporting.

Anti-Western campaigns in Uzbekistan are having negative consequences for reporters and stringers working for international broadcasters. According to RFE/RL, there were nearly 30 cases of harassment against its reporters within three months after the Andijon massacre, including beatings, armed attacks, and arrests (Winter and Najimova 2005). While the closing of Internews Network in Uzbekistan drew attention from international broadcasters, the content analysis of the week of programming, from September 7 through September 13, 2005, by BBC, RFE/RL and VOA Uzbek services showed that none of these stations gave more than 15% of their overall airtime to covering oppositional and international NGO community news.

Local media depict stringers as enemies of the nation. In a report published in Ishonch [trust] newspaper in Uzbekistan, journalist Yunus Buranov alleged that some Western media organizations were aware of the Andijon “disturbances” of May 13th and were preparing an “information attack” against Uzbekistan before the massacre. Buranov (2005) wrote that some Western media reporters arrived at the scene before local journalists did. He speculated that these journalists were serving certain forces’ interests and acted in line with the instructions handed out by the “sponsors.”

Within an environment that is increasingly hostile to international broadcasting and other media, VOA, BBC and RFE/RL are attempting to improve their curb appeal and entice younger audiences to listen with programming and presenters more in line with their tastes and attitudes. Younger staffs, many with bona fide journalism credentials and study abroad, are replacing the aging Cold War warriors of international broadcasting. A younger and more hip approach to international broadcasting is appearing in programming content, which is expanding beyond the purely political to report on society and culture, specifically pop culture, youth problems, educational opportunities, employment, school life, and sports. There is no question that
these changes bode well for the future of international broadcasting, but a nagging reality threatens to reduce progress to incremental gains, at best. All three broadcasters are relevant to their audiences because, as part of their overall programming, they provide a certain number of local stories. These stories are an important reality check for listeners who otherwise would have to rely on state radio or the highly controlled local media sector for news and information. Loss of access to these broadcasts would further limit their understanding of the events occurring around them. In order for the international broadcasters to fill this void, they must have access to raw facts and data as well as to reporters and stringers operating in the field. The Uzbek government’s further tightening of the noose around the flow of information in and out of the country could reduce the role and the effectiveness of the international broadcasters. A vicious circle emerges for these broadcasters, who then have a harder time justifying their existence to their respective funders just as the listeners have more need for the information provided by international broadcasters. More research should be done in order to deepen our understanding of the role international broadcasting plays in transitional environments, examining content, impact, and local responses and reactions.

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Winter, Sonia, and Adolat Najimova

Methodological Problems in the Studies of Varnish Miniatures of Uzbekistan

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Today the art of varnished miniatures is one of the most distinguished forms of decorative applied art in Uzbekistan. Lack of research on the origins of varnished miniatures in Uzbekistan and its inaccurate identification as a form of folk art (Akilova 2000: 219) encouraged me to undertake this study. Currently, the varnished miniature in Uzbekistan is promoted as a form of folk art, although historically it used to be an art of professional court miniaturists. The revival of the varnished miniature in Uzbekistan started in the early 20th century. After independence, Uzbekistan launched a series of studies on Uzbekistan’s culture. As part of this series, I decided to research the varnished miniatures. First, the current approach to the art of varnished miniatures might lead to methodological errors. Second, within the study of varnished miniatures remain a number of unresolved questions, such as: (1) Is the modern varnished miniature an art or a craft? (2) What techniques should be employed to train miniaturists? (3) What is the role of the varnished miniature in the modern art market? In 2002-2004 the topical nature of this research ensured its inclusion in a project entitled “The Role of Urban Culture in the Development of Decorative Applied Art of Uzbekistan in the 20th century.” The project was developed by the staff of the Decorative Applied Art Department at the Fine

1 The Institute of Oriental Studies at the Academy of Science of Uzbekistan retains the earliest existing samples of Uzbek varnished miniatures — varnished papier-mâché book covers dated as early as the 19th century.
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To study the origins of the varnished miniature in Uzbekistan I apply the comparative and successive methods. The first method compares art pieces from different historical periods to identify their development paths and peculiarities. Those interested in tracking the evolution of traditions in technology, storyline, and creativity usually apply the successive method. For example, the varnished miniature has been developing throughout many centuries in different countries, turning into a distinct art form. Artists in different countries followed a certain set of traditions formed independently of each other to reflect the taste and passions of their time.

Most of my data comes from published manuscripts, photograph albums of art collections and expositions stored in libraries, private collections, and museums of Uzbekistan, as well as materials of seminars and trade fairs. My data also comes from interviews with contemporary lacquer miniaturists representing different generations. Interviews with artists of the older generation yielded the most information. Among them are Niyazali Khalmatov, Shomakhmud Mukhamedjanov, Bakhadyr Yuldashev, Shorasul Shoakmedov, Khurshid Nazirov, and others. All of them are Tashkent-based artists. The artistic quality of the pieces by masters working in the viloyats (provinces) of Uzbekistan is not up to the level of the Tashkent artists. This fact also sways me to conclude that the Uzbekistani varnished miniature should not be categorized as a form of folk art. Otherwise, the viloyats of Uzbekistan would have had local schools and hubs that are typical for other types of applied art of Uzbekistan (e.g., ceramics, embroideries and engravings). Due to the lack of specialized training in varnished miniature, my interviews with the younger artists did not yield much useful information on the subject. Many of them are not aware of the philosophical meaning behind the drawings. The quality of their work is also inferior to the works by the above listed artists.

China is the homeland of varnished miniature. This form of art came from China to the Far East, Middle Asia, and Iran. Europe acquired the art of varnished miniature from China as well, while Russia acquired it from Europe. In each of these countries, Chinese techniques were combined with the local traditional styles to create new art expressions. Europe acquired the art of varnished miniature from medieval China. Chinese lacquer (Vinogradova 1988: 15) became a model for the varnished miniature in medieval Japan and also influenced the development of the varnished miniature in Iran (Maslenitsyna 1975: 151). In China, Japan, and Korea priests and monks working at monasteries and courts developed the art of varnished miniature. In Middle Asia and Iran, professional artists working at palaces developed this form of art. Europe and Russia set up the first industrial facilities to produce the varnished miniatures. In the above mentioned countries, including Uzbekistan, the varnished miniature was a purely professional form of decorative applied art.

The foundation of the varnished miniature in Uzbekistan was built upon the miniature paintings of the court arts of the 15th and 16th century Middle and Near East. By the early 19th century, the significance of the miniature paintings, and manuscript production in general, declined. In the nineteenth century printing machines imported into Turkestan from Western Europe replaced manuscript production.

In the Near East, the art of creating book covers with lacquer painting on papier-mâché [tosh-qogoz] coexisted with the art of book miniature painting (Shayakubov 1987: 76). Unfortunately, due to the materials’ fragility, very few of these covers have been preserved in their original form. The question of the tosh-qogoz’s place of production — whether they were imported or produced locally — is a subject of future research. Varnished miniatures penetrated into Uzbekistan from Russia in the early 20th century. In Russia the artwork of varnished miniatures was founded in the village Danilovka in the late 18th century by a famous Russian merchant and businessman, Pavel Korobov.
familiarized himself with the operations of the Stobwasser factory in Germany before starting his own business in Russia (Suprun 1987: 14). In Uzbekistan this form of art expression appeared in the 1930s, only to be interrupted by the Great Patriotic War in 1941. It reappeared at the end of the 1970s.

Due to the lack of a local basis for establishing the production of varnished miniatures in Uzbekistan, in the 1930s the State Museum of Uzbekistan invited Igor Chepurin, an artist from Palekh, to teach young Uzbekistan’s artists the secrets of lacquer painting. The trained students from Uzbekistan traveled to Fedoskino to resume professional ties initiated in 1937. During that trip the sides agreed on artistic and logistical cooperation. Meanwhile, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan issued a decree “On Creation of an Experimental Scientific-Manufacturing Workshop of Artistic Painting in Tashkent.” Before long, a few artists went on a business trip to Palekh to get acquainted with production technology, and to arrange potential practical-logistical forms of assistance (Shayakubov 1987: 80).


To revive the art of varnished miniature, Uzbekistan’s artists started by selecting the style of medieval book artist-miniaturists. Unlike their Western European peers, they used a decorative technique (i.e. no color mixing) with no perspective and no shading, giving an oriental flavor to the finished products. This painting technique also points to the innate connection between the varnished miniatures and the medieval manuscripts of the Middle East. The choice of this painting technique is also merited since miniaturists borrowed their themes from medieval poetry.

For further development, Uzbekistan’s artists had to think about the choice of material. The medieval manuscripts used paper of the highest quality of manual production. In the Soviet period, factory printed books replaced hand-made books, while graphics replaced miniature paintings. In view of such changes, the revival of lacquered papier-mâché book covers and manual decoration of manuscript pages would not have stood to reason. Moving away from manuscripts, Uzbekistan’s artists decided to use papier-mâché to make small cases, penholders, and other souvenirs. They also started to paint the special grade small gourds, which were used in daily life as non-decorative kitchen utensils. Small pear-shaped gourds were used as snuffboxes [nosvoi]. In the Middle Ages, snuffboxes were decorated, but in a style different from the miniature style. Later on, the lacquer miniaturists included the decoration of snuffboxes in their repertoire. Uzbekistani artists mostly produce cases of various shapes — rectangular, square, and oval. The case production adheres to the rules of a specific technology.

From 1970 until today, Uzbekistan’s miniaturists form two groups. The first group includes professionally trained artists who follow the medieval canons. At the initial stage they primarily produced cases and penholders. Later, their collections broadened to include easel paintings on paper, leather, and monumental paintings. As in the works of medieval poets and philosophers, they strive to present compositions where the main characters call upon their rulers to be fair, kind, and wise.

The second group includes novice artists duplicating the works of famous medieval masters from published photograph albums, not originals. They copy a drawing from a book by using tracing paper, and pricking the drawing’s outline with a needle at a distance of 1-2 mm. The drawing is transferred to the lid of a box using coal to create an outline of the basic composition. The dotted drawing outline is traced by a pencil, colors are applied, the painting is covered with lacquer, and so on. Vanished miniatures produced in this manner are inexpensive, requiring minimal resources, and they are produced mainly for the tourist market. To minimize the production cost, some masters use copy machines to copy drawings from albums and reduce them to the size of box lids. The final copy is
glued on top of the box lid, colored with water or tempera paint; the outline is traced by a fine brush with black paint. The final steps include polishing and lacquering.

The technological process shows that unlike the Russian masters, Uzbek masters do not use an assembly line technique to produce the varnished miniatures. Instead, they work individually. In Uzbekistan, the varnished miniature has not been industrialized, as in Braunschweig, Palekh, Mstera, and Kholui. From the very beginning, the artists got together at the newly opened “Usto” association in Tashkent. “Musavvir,” “Xunarmand,” “Ustazoda,” and other associations followed the opening of the “Usto” association. As members of these associations, the miniaturists prefer to work on their own at their studios or homes. They turn to the above mentioned associations to sell their final products.

Not too long ago, only members of the tsarist family could afford such forms of Turkistan’s decorative applied art as gold embroidery, wood painting, and ganch carving. Starting with the Soviet period, Uzbekistan’s applied decorative arts gradually transformed into folk art since all of them have a utilitarian purpose. As for the varnished miniature, it has lost its utilitarian nature. Today it is mostly produced by professionally trained artists as a souvenir. I hold that this form of art is a professional form of decorative applied art of Uzbekistan.

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Discourse on Ethnicity in Post-Soviet Buryatia

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This report presents the findings of research that is part of a larger project (2001-2006) entitled “Buryat Ethnicity in the Context of Sociocultural Modernization” and conducted by a group of researchers from the Department of Philosophy, Anthropology, and Religious Studies at the Institute for Mongolian, Buddhist, and Tibetan Studies of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of
Sciences. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time scholars studying Buryatia have undertaken such comprehensive research on the question of the relationship between the Buryat ethnicity and sociocultural modernization. The project’s first two stages — “Buryat Ethnicity in Late 19th to Early 20th Centuries” (2000-2001) and “Buryat Ethnicity in the Soviet Period” (2002-2003) resulted in the publication of monographs (Skrynnikova et al. 2003; Skrynnikova et al. 2004) and a number of articles. The current stage (2004-2006) focuses on Buryat ethnicity in the post-Soviet period.

In the last two decades sociopolitical changes in Russia have produced new social practices and identity construction efforts by members of the Buryat intellectual elite. Today, the preservation of Buryat national culture has become a key political issue in the agenda of de-ethnicization of the state structure, introduced by President Putin. In light of the unification of the Ust’-Orda Buryat Autonomous District (UOBAD) and the Irkutsk Region scheduled for 2006, recent discourse on ethnicity has articulated the most pessimistic expectations about the Buryats’ future. For example, the ethnic elite expects inevitable assimilation and a loss of cultural values. To address the pessimistic expectations they are formulating a new appeal for ethnic mobilization, which might lead to the growth of aggressive xenophobia. Our goal is to identify the forms in which Buryat ethnic elites are constructing ideologems/mythologems to manipulate public opinion. Finally, we also examine how elites maintain the boundaries between Buryatia’s coexisting and overlapping cultural and geographical affiliations with Russia and Mongolia.

In our work we employ materials from relevant scientific and public discussions, such as the proceedings of the All-Buryat Congresses (1991, 1996, 2003), roundtables on the problems of Buryat statehood (UOBAD 2003; Ulan-Ude 2005), pronouncements made at conferences, including one called “The Tragic Date in Buryat History” (Ulan-Ude 2005); editorials and letters published in the newspapers Buryatia (1992-2005), Molodezh Buryatti (1993-2005), Ugaim zam (2003-2005), and materials from the Archive of the All-Buryat Association for Culture Development.

The research applies the methodology of the constructivist paradigm (Anderson 1991; Barth 1969; Cohen 2000; Gellner 1983; Smith 1986) of contemporary social and political anthropology in combination with the system principle with reference to social processes. According to the constructivist paradigm, we understand ethnicity as “a continuing ascription which classifies a person in terms of their most general and inclusive identity, presumptively determined by origin and background as well as a form of social organization maintained by inter-group boundary mechanisms, based not on possession of a cultural inventory but on manipulation of identities and their situational character” (Barnard and Spencer 2003: 192). This approach focuses on the situational and contextual character of ethnicity to understand more clearly its political dimensions, such as the formation of inter-group relations, political mobilization, and social stratification. While constructivism satisfies the needs of our research on contemporary Buryat ethno-ideology more than any other theoretical frame, we still cannot accept completely its concept of “an imagined community” with reference to the historically developed ethnons. At present, ethnos, even of a speculative and “imagined” form, exists due to cultural and political circumstances. Therefore, we place ourselves in the position of moderate constructivism. These methodological principles introduce new ground for scientific discourse to analyze the processes of national-cultural revival and counterbalance the primordial views of the Buryat nationalist elite.

Our research analyzes three aspects of ethnopolitical processes in Russia. First, we analyze

1 A mythologem is an element or motif within myth, the core of its narrative. A single mythologem can be the central motif in various myths. The mythologem, structurally, is the smallest constitute unit of myth, and is historically and semantically invariant. A mythologem corresponds to a more archaic layer of public mentality. An ideologem is an idea paradigm which might estimate, sanction, organize and direct a system of principal ideas. An ideologem is also a separate ideological unit. In modern ethnosocial practices politicized mythologems easy transform into ideologems possessing characteristics of steady phraseological units or verbal stereotypes, such as “the great past,” “ancient origin,” “subject to reprisal,” “divided people,” “right to patrimonial territory,” “oppression of national culture,” etc.

2 By this we mean anthropology’s principle that seemingly unrelated elements and levels of social activity are systemically related and can be researched together. These elements might include revitalization of traditional culture, images of a glorious past, activities of political parties and leaders, inquiry into economic conditions and social status, interethnic tension, modernization, etc.
the elites’ activities directed at re-ethnicization. Second, we study the coexistence and opposition of national (ethnic) and Russian (civil) identities by placing ethnicity in the first place within a hierarchy of ideological, public, and individual identities. We look at the construction of a boundary identity that implies a separation from Russia and an affinity for other historical and cultural groups. This departure might go as far as denying Russian identity, while maintaining economic ties with Russia. Third, we identify distinct stages in discourses on ethnicity. In our work we identify sociopolitical discourses in Buryatia as ethnoregional and nationalist rather than nationalistic and thus emphasize the special characteristics of political processes occurring among those ethnic minorities for whom identification within Russia is still important.

At present, Buryat sociocultural modernization includes active reconstruction of the Buryat community according to principles based on ethnic kinship. This reconstruction is marked by materials and instruments of ideological discourse on the subject of history (especially the historical commonalities existing among Mongolian peoples); the territory corresponding to those historical commonalities (and legitimizing indigenous ethnic rights); traditional culture (mainly, Buryat language as the principal condition for re-ethnicization); ethnic consolidation; and preservation and strengthening of the political status of Buryat federal subjects within the Russian Federation.

Though these subjects of discourse are common among Buryats for the entire post-Soviet period, we argue that the discourse on Buryat national revival over the past 20 years has not been a homogeneous one. We identify three stages in this discourse. The first stage of “ethnic outburst” (late 1980s – early 1990s) is marked by the “outburst of political memory of ethnos” and discussions around the issue of repressed people, referring to the events of 1937 and 1958. In 1937 the USSR Supreme Council approved the creation of the Irkutsk and Chita regions that included the districts inhabited by the Buryats (UOBAD and Aga Autonomous District, respectively). In 1958, the Supreme Council decided to drop the second component in the politynom Buryat-Mongol by renaming the republic as the Buryat ASSR. Both decisions traumatized the nation, and became impetuses for political mobilization during perestroika and the post-Soviet period. This stage is also characterized by an interest in Pan-Mongolism, including political construction of all-Mongolian commonness, revival of the mythologem “the land of Mongolia is waiting for Buryats,” and restoration of the Buryat-Mongol politynom.

During the first stage practically all key participants in the Buryat national-cultural revival assigned the Buryat language an important role in re-ethnicization, by viewing language as a condition for cultural revival, and as sine qua non for ethnicity. Despite the highest interest in the language issue at the beginning of this national revival period, the problem of language has remained no more than an element of ideological rhetoric. Although the “Law on Language” (1992) and the “Constitution of the Republic” (1994) state as their goal the strengthening the status of the Buryat language, its functional use remains rather limited. For example, while the Buryat language has been included into the curricula of secondary and higher education, it continues to occupy a back seat in social practices. Buryat language maintains a stable position in rural households, where the most fluent speakers of the Buryat language are often concentrated. Yet, Russian-speaking Buryats (city-dwellers, mainly) identify with the Buryat people. The Buryat elite used this fact in their nationalist discourse. The failure to promote Buryat language resulted in some Buryat youth thinking that learning Buryat is unnecessary and disapproving of the status it holds as a state language (Dyrkheyeva 2003: 25). The development of such perceptions marks the third stage of the national-cultural revival, discussed later in this report.

The second stage of Buryat national revival is marked by ethnopolitical stabilization and attempts by members of the intellectual elite to create a scientific discourse on Buryat national revival. The ideology of Pan-Mongolism was reduced to the idea of national-cultural revival and commonality among Mongolian peoples. The ethnocultural revival project reached its most intense moment with

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3 The framework of the Buryat-Mongol Autonomous Republic (1923-1937) marks the territorial limits of the Buryat ethnos.

4 In Buryat millenarian writings there is reference to the idea that in the Great Imperial (i.e., Mongol) History, there is a land within Mongolia that is preserved for the Buryats, with the implication that Buryats should migrate to the “promised land.” However, post-Communist Mongolian policies regard Buryats as “not pure Mongols,” with whom Mongols should have cultural but not political ties.
discussions about the status of the Buryat language, the need to recognize Buryats as a repressed people, the readoption of the ethnonym Buryat-Mongols, and the formulation of ideologems legitimizing the eternal rights of Buryats to territory and their own state. Pseudo-historical evidence was often manipulated during the discussions of these matters. For example, in the context of the historical and cultural commonalities between Buryats and Mongols, the new ideology manipulated the history of the Mongolian Empire in order to create a new politicized historical memory. Through manipulations of ethnic space Buryat territories were proposed as the most probable ancient fatherland of Mongols and as the motherland of Chinggis Khan, whose image appeared to be very important for ethnoidentification and ethnodifferentiation. Besides this, Buryat ethnic territory came to be viewed as a part of both Buddhist and Central Asian civilizations.

The idea of Buryat-Mongol commonness also promotes sociocultural practices such as regular meetings of Buryat, Mongol and Inner-Mongol leaders, and conferences and festivals aimed at the construction of a common cultural space. Such sociocultural practices do not involve irredentist ends. That is why we characterize the second period of the Buryat national revival by a decline in nationalist passion to a level of ethnoregionalist/ethnicist/nationist agitation.

The changing administrative and political structure of Russia (revisions of Russian federalism) induced the current, i.e., the third stage, of ethnopolitical revival. Buryatia’s intellectual elite is now activating the accumulated “resources of ethnicity” as a protest against the de-ethnicization of Russian politics. The irredentism of All-Mongolian unity now centers on the preservation of the Buryat Republic and Buryat national districts as independent entities within the Russian Federation. The irredentist plan also calls for the reunification of two Buryat autonomous districts with the republic, reestablishing the boundaries of the 1923-1937 period. The secessionist leaning among the intellectual elites is becoming more obvious as it affects real political boundaries inside of Russia. Notably, the plan proposed by Russia’s central authorities contains such secessionist elements. Even though the federal reform to enlarge administrative districts redraws only domestic boundaries, the ethnic federal subjects view such actions as secessionist attempts, i.e., as a territorial transfer and violation of legitimate domestic boundaries. According to the Constitution, each ethnopolitical entity in Russia (for example, Buryatia) is a sovereign state within Russia.

The leaders of Buryat revival emphasize the possible results of state reforms. Khamutaev’s speech (2002) illustrates this point well: “Unitarian, authoritarian, and strict centralized governorship implies a division into the representatives of the ‘great and mighty’ [Russians] and non-Russians without kith or kin. We will disappear as the great Buryat-Mongol nation. We will be Russians, citizens of the Russian Federation, but in what form and regard? This is the tendency, the desire, and ideology of chauvinist forces.”

Poorly designed enlargement of Russia’s regions may result in unintended heterogeneous “products.” There is no doubt that the revision of the ethnopolitical status of the national entities agitates the horizontal-territorial identity, i.e., ethnic identity. One can see serious changes in use of the ideological set that has been borrowed from the previous stages. In particular, the ideologem patria en danger embodies the discourses on the national language and traditional culture. The possibility of losing state status causes uneasy tension. “The question of language is the question of Buryats’ existence, the problem of the Buryat-Mongols’ survival. We remind you that culture ceases to exist without a [national] language […]. This means that Buryat-Mongols will cease to exist as well” (Bayartuyev 2002). Such a statement has a strong political implication.

The planned reorganization resonated in the following publications. Open letters from young people, one of which is addressed to the Russian President (over 1600 signatures collected in Buryatia, Moscow, Ust'-Orda and Aga autonomous districts, Ol’khon district of the Irkutsk region, and other locations), and an open letter addressed to all Russian citizens (about 500 signatures collected in Moscow) about “the possibility of uniting three federal entities — Ust'-Orda and Aga Buryat districts, and the Republic of Buryatia, as well as the Ol’khon district of the Irkutsk region into a single subject of the Russian Federation” (Ugai zam 2005: 9). Though we have no official data on the question, many non-Buryats residing in the Buryat subjects also hold negative opinions of the central authority’s plans.

5 Deethnicization refers to the weakening of political/ethnocratic elites and ethnic attributes within the power structure of federalism.
6 Currently, two Buryat autonomous districts are located outside the boundaries of the Republic.
One can assert that it is impossible to design a program for reforming the political-administrative structure of the Russian Federation that would take into consideration the interests of the state, the polities comprising the Russian Federation, and the inhabitants of those polities.

Our study of the key factors in the construction of the Buryat ethnic boundaries highlights some problems of ethnic integration, particularly in connection to the national language. The growing opposition of native speakers of the Buryat literary language (eastern Buryats) to the non-speakers of such (western Buryats); and of urban Russian-speaking Buryats to the rural Buryat-speaking dwellers, as well as the revival of clan-territorial ties, is a direct, although unintended, consequence of the ethno-ideological construction.

Our field study on ethno-ideology shows that leaders of Buryat revival have made some gains in the Buryat nation-building and ethnic consolidation processes. At the same time, however, they have promoted destructive processes with regard to ethnic identification.

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Francine Hirsch’s *Empire of Nations* is an important study of early Soviet nation-building that focuses on the interaction of Soviet state imperatives and former Imperial ethnographers’ position as the formulators of scientific truth concerning the Soviet peoples. Grounded in detailed archival research, Hirsch’s book agrees with other recent treatments of Soviet nationalities policy to argue that the Soviet regime had deliberately made territorial nations. Moreover, Hirsch is interested in placing Soviet nationalities policy in comparative context with other contemporary states, not only by her examination of the European roots of both Marxist and Russian ethnographic notions of the nation and empire, but also by her exploration of the cultural technologies of rule common to both the Soviet Union and European empires. Hirsch focuses on the centrality of professional ethnographers, who were mostly agnostic, at best, on the grand claims of Communism, in the creation of a socialist “empire of nations.”

The book is divided into three interlocking sections, and the first two strongly support this claim. In the first section, “Empire, Nation and the Scientific State,” Hirsch covers the evolution of the alliance between the Bolshevik Party and Russian Imperial ethnographers in the wake of revolution and war, as well as a marriage of ethnographic and economic principles in the formulation of an explicitly Soviet development program for Tsarist former colonies. While the association of Imperial ethnographers with Lenin’s new regime may come as a surprise to some, the pattern of bourgeois specialists collaborating with the Bolsheviks in hopes of modernizing Russia has been well established for other disciplines. Hirsch makes it clear that the ethnographers sought to maintain their autonomy in this relationship, but were concerned to make themselves relevant to the country’s new masters. Her second chapter, on the regionalization debate, largely proves this point by showing how the ethnographers conceived of a program of state-sponsored evolutionism that would have a fundamental impact on the construction of socialism in non-Russian areas. This state-sponsored evolutionism, Hirsch argues, came to structure the Soviet civilizing mission towards its minorities: “its ultimate goal was . . . to speed all peoples, minorities and majorities alike, through the imagined stages on the Marxist historical timeline from feudalism and capitalism to socialism, and on to communism” (p. 103).

Working out the implications of this program of national development is covered by the heart of the book, her second section called “Cultural Technologies of Rule and the Nature of Soviet Power.” This portion of the book examines the operation of the by now well-established Andersonian trilogy of census, map and museum (Anderson 1991), in the Soviet context. Hirsch agrees with European colonial historians that these three are important cultural technologies of rule, but disagrees with Benedict Anderson that they present a totalizing classificatory grid, especially one imposed from above. In each of three chapters focusing on the 1926 census (ch. 3), the creation of national territories (ch. 4) and the exhibits of the Soviet Ethnographic Museum (ch. 5), Hirsch abundantly proves the contested nature of these classifications, which had pervasive implications not only for political elites but for everyday citizens. Surprisingly, ethnography was often the trump card in these contests, especially in protean areas such as Central Asia and Belarus. That the center could and did intervene in the deployment of these classifications, however, is evident from Hirsch’s account, and somewhat undercuts her argument against Moscow’s use of them to divide and rule.
Ethnographic criteria, rather than self-identification, were used to strengthen weak nations such as Belarus or to weaken the “chauvinism” of “dominant nationalities” such as Georgia and Uzbekistan (pp. 96, 165), but they could just as easily be ignored in the case of a strong republic such as the Ukraine or populations inconvenient for national consolidation, such as urban Tajiks in Uzbekistan. Still, Hirsch’s argument that these cultural technologies forced citizens to accommodate to Soviet criteria, to speak Bolshevik by adopting often new national identities if only instrumentally, is inarguable.

What is arguable is her assertion in the book’s third section, “The Nazi Threat and the Bolshevik Revolution,” that such national identifications remained immune to essentialization. This primordialism, the seeing of ethnic difference as rooted in nature and enduring despite social and economic conditions, was equated with Nazi racial anthropology and, as Hirsch shows, was anathema to the regime’s ideology. However, the ethnographers’ very attempts to shift the terms of debate from enduring national traits to survivals of previous, now surpassed, historical periods, led to greater persecution of ethnic “former people,” [byvshie liudi] especially priests and shamans, as class enemies, and to the forced migration of Tajik mountaineers to malaria-invested lowlands to prove them biologically fit to work as evolutionarily more progressive cotton-farmers than sheep herders. Moreover, Hirsch’s discussion of the secret police’s insistence on denoting national descent, not self-determination, on passports indicates powerful state organs certainly acted as if national identity was primordial. While the secret police did not share the Nazis’ racist assumptions about ethnicity, they were certainly willing to share their practices of social hygiene targeted at essentialized populations. More troubling is Hirsch’s failure to indicate the consequences of the ethnographers’ solution to the problem of the homogenization of social identity, their reliance on folklore performances. As other scholars have pointed out, such folklorization and pseudo-folklorization of identity can reinforce, rather than reduce, primordialist stereotypes.

It is important to note that Hirsch has also written a very rich history of Soviet ethnographic science. And while she refuses to embrace Slezkin’s “fall of Soviet ethnography” trope (Slezkine 1991), her description of the ideological front in ethnography, the decimation of ethnographers following the suppressed 1937 census and the slavish farce of ethnographers radically reducing their recently composed list of Soviet nationalities in response to an off-hand comment by Stalin is damning, indeed, on the possibility of collaboration between ethnography and the state in the 1930s. Any reader interested in early Soviet state formation, Communism and science or comparative European colonial history, not simply those interested in Soviet nation-building, will want to examine this book.

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Slezkin, Yuri


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The texts associated with the journey of the Chinese monk Xuanzang (602-664) across Central Asia to obtain Buddhist texts from India rank among the most important in Central Eurasian Studies. From about 150 CE, when the Han dynasty lost direct control over the Tarim Basin, until Xuanzang’s journey, Chinese relations with and information about Xinjiang and Central Asia were greatly attenuated. Two texts, Xuanzang’s report to the Tang court, *Da Tang Xiyuji*, written 646, and the
biography *Da Ci’ensi sanzang fashi zhuan*, written in two parts, 664 and 688, compiled soon after his death by his disciple Huili and the monk Yancong, represent a renaissance of direct Chinese knowledge about the “western regions” after several centuries’ hiatus. They formed the foundation of Chinese knowledge about Central Asia until the Qing period, and remain today a key primary source for studies of pre-Islamic Central Asian and Indian political geography and, of course, Buddhism. In modern times, these texts inspired Aurel Stein to conduct archaeological explorations of the Tarim Basin in search of the flourishing kingdoms Xuanzang visited and described.

Much of the richness — and also the difficulty — of the Xuanzang texts lies in their use of terms and personal and placenames transliterated into Chinese from Sanskrit, Soghdian, Khotanese and other languages. Chinese ideographic characters are an awkward vehicle for non-Chinese onomastics and linguistics, especially since the sounds of Middle Chinese have themselves had to be painfully reconstructed. The existence of a Uygur [Uyghur] translation of Xuanzang’s autobiography, written in the alphabetic Old Uygur script (derived from Soghdian), is thus of considerable importance. Moreover, this Uygur version, though not complete, survives in a version from the late tenth century, and predates the earliest extant Chinese texts of the biography by about a century. It is thus an important resource for resolving remaining textual problems in the Chinese text itself as well as for studies of Middle Chinese phonetics. Finally, as a substantial early Turkic text paralleling a Chinese text, the Uygur translation of Xuanzang’s biography is of great Turkological interest.

Regrettably, the manuscript Uygur version was divided up after its discovery near Turfan and sold to several buyers by a dealer around 1930. Portions of its 411 folios ended up in Beijing, Paris and St. Petersburg. Working with these various collections, scholars have translated sections of the work into German and Russian. Barat provides a full account of available texts and the scholarly work done on them to date; he also suggests corrections to some previous identifications of text fragments, and proposes changes in the ordering of those fragments, many of which were badly shuffled. Ironically, though he was able to gain full access to the full Beijing, Paris and St. Petersburg collections either in microfilm or published versions, he could read the Beijing collection only in a facsimile version that omits 16 folios and 40 fragments and for which the facsimile process failed to reproduce the colophons and headings, which were in red ink in the original. The Beijing Library, which houses the text, apparently did not respond to Barat’s requests to view the original manuscript. One wishes this institution would appreciate the need for and advantages of international cooperation in research of this kind.

In his edition, Kahar Barat transliterates, transcribes and translates extent sections of chapters IX and X of the ten-chapter autobiography. (Barat hopes in future to complete two more volumes, covering chapters VI-VIII and II-V.) These two chapters contain, respectively, a collection of letters from Xuanzang to the Tang emperor and an account of Xuanzang’s translation activities in the last few years of his life. In his introduction, Barat also proposes a new approach to handling Chinese loan words, one of the main elements of linguistic interest in the Uygur version. Whereas earlier scholars have transcribed the old Uygur orthography of Chinese loans as if they were Turkic words, Barat maintains that they should be transcribed in a different manner, better reflecting the contemporary Uygur pronunciation of the Middle Chinese. He justifies this with textual examples showing that a word such as WYN, which Turkologically might be transcribed *yn*, was in fact pronounced back-vocalic when representing the Chinese character *yuan*. Barat’s systematic reworking of the rules governing the sound relationships between Chinese and Old Uygur (which are more complex than I can outline here) should permit easier comparative linguistic work between Chinese and old Uygur texts, as well as more accurate phonetic reconstructions.

The strongest aspect of this edition is perhaps its layout. Barat fits parallel transliteration and transcription, Chinese glosses of keywords, original Chinese text, English translation and Uygur facsimile of each section of the text all on two facing pages. Even a non-specialist can readily compare across these, and with a passing familiarity with the old Uygur script even follow along in the facsimile text. This should be a model for future such editions.
In this book, Valery Tishkov, anthropologist and one-time Russian government adviser on nationality issues, draws upon interviews of Chechens to provide a much needed insight into the diverse worldviews, thoughts, experiences, hopes, and fears of Chechens inside and outside of Chechnya in the 1990s. Tishkov, in the words of Mikhail Gorbachev, the ostensible author of the foreword, argues "that the past, especially that which has not been personally experienced, cannot be adduced as the reason for the Chechen conflict.” Although Tishkov’s insistence on the irrelevance of Chechen historical memory fails to persuade this reader, his refusal to reduce the Chechens to cardboard cutouts in a potted nationalist drama permits an unusually nuanced portrayal of Chechens as human beings to emerge. Tishkov’s book highlights the oft forgotten reality that the lives wrecked and dreams destroyed in the Chechen conflict have been those of flesh and blood beings.

Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society is an abridged English translation of Tishkov’s 2001 Obschestvo v vooruzhennom konflikte: etnografiia chechenskoi voiny. It is divided into 14 chapters covering topics such as memories of the deportation of 1944, the image and role of Dzhokhar Dudaev, motivations of Chechen fighters, family life, and religion. Although not arranged in a strict chronological order, the chapters loosely reconstruct the history of Chechnya from the late Soviet period through the first Chechen war of 1994-1996 until the beginning of the second major war in 1999. In the first chapter, “Ethnography and Theory,” Tishkov explains that to write the book he had to rely upon the method of the “delegated interview” in order to overcome the manifold obstacles impeding research into one side in a conflict by an ostensible representative of the other side. Thus he had four Chechens, two men and two women, conduct extensive interviews with fifty-four Chechens, mostly in Chechnya and mainly in the years 1996-1997. The book therefore may disappoint readers looking for a more up to date study of life in Chechnya, but students of the Chechen conflict should still find the book valuable. The book’s unique, and perhaps greatest, contribution is its presentation of the voices of ordinary Chechens.

Tishkov assigns great blame for the Russo-Chechen war of 1994-1996 on the stale but poisonous rhetoric of ethno-nationalism that pushed the Russian Federation and the Chechens under Dzhokhar Dudaev into a nonsensical war. He calls the Russian fear of a Chechen threat to the Russian Federation’s territorial integrity a “myth that went hand in glove with the myth of Chechen independence” (p. 74). Tishkov acidly notes, and with some justice, that the primary motive of many advocates of Chechen independence and ethno-nationalism has often been not the welfare of the Chechen people but rather the bashing of Russia (pp. 111-112, 131). Pre-war Chechnya was a slowly imploding disaster under Dudaev and victorious post-war Chechnya became a hell hole for the Chechens themselves. Yet outside observers and even human rights workers often chose to ignore these facts, and instead clung to the ethno-national perspective that the truly authentic Chechen was the one who fought Russians. The at best credulous, and at worst pernicious, foreign cheerleaders for Chechen resistance succeeded only in helping the worst elements of Chechen society such as Movladi Udugov, a self-described master propagandist and a poster-child for Samuel Johnson’s dictum that patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel, goad their society to war.

Tishkov nonetheless fails to persuade on his central point, namely that the reification of Chechenness arose almost entirely out of the social transformations and conflicts of the Gorbachev-Yeltsin period. While he is correct that cookie cutter ethnographic depictions of Chechens as eternal rebels are false, his argument that prior to the war neither ethnicity nor historical experience of things such as deportation constituted central elements of Chechen identity does not convince. Tishkov contends that the Chechens of the Soviet Union were essentially indistinguishable from the other peoples of the Soviet Union, including the Russians, with whom they shared a common commitment to Soviet values and practices.

This is quite an assertion, and to make it Tishkov must repeatedly interpret his data naively and selectively. He cites, for example, a letter
written in the 1950s by a Chechen imprisoned in the Gulag professing loyalty to the USSR as if a letter to the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet asking for clemency could express anything but fidelity to the USSR and communism (pp. 24-25). Similarly, although Tishkov’s claim that most Chechens were not devout practitioners of Islam may well be true, the fact that only 13 mosques and one medrese existed in Soviet Chechnya in the 1980s cannot be taken as a reliable indicator of popular sentiment toward Islam (p. 166).

Throughout the book Tishkov’s own evidence consistently undermines his denial of a distinct Chechen identity. He notes, for example, the extraordinarily high rates of mono-ethnic marriage among Chechens, a phenomenon he himself labels “an undeniable cultural trend.” He explains the revival of Chechen interest in the 1944 deportations as a function of the liberalization of politics in the late 1980s and 1990s rather than of the experience of deportation itself, but then presents individual testimonies of intense curiosity prior to perestroika about the deportations and describes the great impatience of Chechens in the 1960s to return home to Chechnya (pp. 29-30, 33). In order to explain the much larger average size of Chechen families (a fact that in itself belies Tishkov’s claim of Soviet norms for Chechens), Tishkov cites testimony that the 1944 deportation made large families imperative (p. 151). Similarly, the Chechens’ establishment of a Chechen language newspaper and radio while in exile in Kazakhstan and their return to their homeland — despite having found jobs and learning Russian — all point to a powerful underlying cultural identity. Indeed, at one point Tishkov himself openly acknowledges that the Chechens were “one of the least assimilated into Russian culture and felt a historical sense of injured collective identity” (pp. 72-73).

The incoherence of Tishkov’s argument hits a nadir in his musings about the nature of violence and it sources, a section that the book could have done without (pp. 146-150). It would have been enough for Tishkov to have argued simply that not all Chechens inveterately loathed Russia and the Soviet Union and that some even identified with it positively. His compulsive desire to dismiss the importance of Chechen memory and identity should not be allowed to cloud this basic insight.

Despite the flaws of this book, Tishkov and his assistants have succeeded in making an important contribution to the literature on Chechnya. Chechnya: Life in a War Torn Society gives a far more nuanced and realistic portrayal of the Chechens as human beings and reveals that the war in Chechnya, far from being a glorious exercise in national liberation was, like all wars, a sordid affair.

References
Tishkov, Valerii


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Bourdieu’s Secret Admirer in the Caucasus, Georgi Derluguian’s recent contribution to the vast literature on the recent wars of the Caucasus, is hardly the typical academic socio-political treatise. Derluguian has long been enlightening readers of the New Left Review on issues related to the Caucasus, and now his iconoclastic rendition of politics and identity in the Caucasus assumes book form. It is a long-awaited achievement. Derluguian’s book undertakes to account for the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the causes of the ethnic wars that followed in Chechnya, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the “war that never happened” in Kabardino-Balkaria. Why did war happen in some places, while a tenuous peace was achieved elsewhere, in similar cultural and political landscapes? This is one of Derluguian’s most important questions. Yet what is most
revolutionary about Derluguian’s work is not so much the questions he asks as the way he poses them. Rather than taking us through a tour of academic literature on the subject of ethnic tension in the Caucasus, Derluguian opens his book with an account of himself traveling through Chechnya and Nalchik in 1996, soon after the ceasefire of the first Chechen war. At the same time, it is the academic Derluguian who raises this book above the standard journalistic account of the war, and provides historical and cultural depth of analysis.

Derluguian is himself a Caucasian native; perhaps this contributes to the abundance of his local knowledge. Rather than offer us mere citations, Derluguian offers us experience, both his and that of others. His very method of approaching his subject matter is what makes his book so unusual. In contrast to the author Valery Tishkov, in the most recent major anthropological work on the Caucasus, Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society (2004), Derluguian does not stand apart from and judge those whom he writes about. He presents himself as an insider to the world he narrates and attempts to present this world in the perspective of his informants.

One of the most original elements of the book (unfortunately not rendered in as much detail as promised) is its project of documenting the influence the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu on Musa Shanibov, the Kabardin intellectual and fighter on the Abkhaz side during the Abkhaz war. Musa Shanibov is living testimony to the fact that the ethnic tensions in the Caucasus are not a matter of “tribal hostility” or “primordial nationalism” but are rather the result of a very modern set of political and social configurations. Throughout his book, Derluguian frequently reminds us of the high level of culture attained by the minority groups of the Soviet Union, so it should come at no surprise that Caucasian nationalism was propelled by an eclectic variety of sources, few of which had anything to do with ethnic fundamentalism.

In the context of a subject in which a dizzying amount has been written, it is the visionary aspect of Derluguian’s book which will remain with the reader long after he or she has finished reading. The large quantity of recent political science scholarship on the Caucasus conveys the mistaken impression that this region is interesting only for its rebel leaders and death tolls. In some ways, Derluguian’s nuanced account suggests that obscurity is better for a culture than being thrust to the center of the world’s attention, if such attention can only be won through war. In fact, there is much more to the Caucasus than war, and Derluguian knows it. That is why he spends so many pages revealing his personal relation to his material, his childhood in Krasnodar and his experiences in Nalchik and Chechnya, and why he includes so many personal interviews and anecdotes from the lives of his Caucasian friends.

Derluguian is extraordinarily sensitive to images of the Caucasus that media and print journalism have created, and their artificial presentation of “the Caucasian mentality” to the rest of the world. He tells us of a six-year-old boy whom he saw at a political rally in Grozny in 1996, soon after the ceasefire of the First Chechen War. The child was sporting a toy gun and warrior attire. Although the rally was peaceful, Derluguian later saw this boy’s face pasted on American newspapers, whose headlines — We Shall Never Give In! The Nation Lives! or Bandits from the Youngest Age, or Preparing for the Jihad — suggested a very different version of the rally he attended.

Perhaps Derluguian’s vision is inspired by the writing of Anna Politkovskaya, a Russian journalist who reported extensively from Chechnya for the past several years and who wrote the most provocative books about the Chechen war published in Russian. Derluguian supplied the English language introduction for the most recent translation of Politkovskaya’s work into English, A Small Corner from Hell: Dispatches from Chechnya (Politkovskaya 2003). Both writers are rare among contemporary analysts of the Caucasus for relying on more than Russian-filtered textual sources and for delving into the lived experience of the Caucasian people.

Derluguian’s ethnographically rich accounts of living and researching in the Caucasus are enthralling but frustratingly short, and in the end, Bourdieu’s Secret Admirer in the Caucasus does not achieve a perfect synthesis between raw material and abstract analysis. However, Derluguian’s very attempt to see beyond the canons of scholarly representation of the Caucasus breaks new ground. This book will continue to be read and remembered even when the wars that now pollute the Caucasus have ceased, because it approaches the Caucasus from an angle of vision whose time has not yet come, but which will soon arrive, if the voices of scholars possessed of Derluguian’s creative vision are able to enter the public sphere.
Building upon the groundbreaking research of Ronald Suny, this fascinating and well-researched book investigates the connections of Georgian social democracy with its Russian and European counterparts while drawing special attention to those unique attributes that reflected Georgia’s contemporary socio-cultural realities. Stephen Jones elegantly sums up the importance of this project in the conclusion: “Georgian social democracy presaged much of the 20th century’s experience of socialist experimentation. It drew much of its inspiration from European socialist parties, but contributed in turn, through its practice and polemics, to international debates on the national question, the peasantry, and the war. It represented one of the first socialist national liberation struggles by a mass-based class coalition against imperial domination and challenged the Eurocentric view of an industrially based socialism… [It] was a movement which sought to wed socialism with European values of pluralism, individual rights, and private property. It sought a ‘third way’ before the term was invented” (pp. 282-283).

*Socialism in Georgian Colors* is a critical narrative organized chronologically. The initial chapter provides historical context which extends back to the Russian encroachments of the 18th century. While this chapter tackles some essential issues, e.g., Georgian “feudalism” (*patronqmoba*), regionalism, and the cosmopolitan condition of the Georgian lands, like the remainder of the book it does not always give a good sense of the state of Georgian culture, elite or otherwise, at the turn of the 20th century. Throughout the book Jones draws upon his knowledge of Georgian to make reference to certain literary developments, and this is most welcome. But while the reader is rewarded with a clear picture of contemporary Georgian politics and society, as seen on its own terms and from the imperial perspective, one is left with a rather murky impression of Georgian culture, though the author repeatedly reminds us of its importance and distinctiveness.

At the heart of this issue are the Georgians’ self-identity and the image of the Georgians shaped by external forces in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Part of the problem has to do with Georgian, Russian, and English/Western terminology, as the author himself acknowledges on several occasions (e.g., 291-292, n. 3). On this count, one wonders why Jones insists on placing the designation “Azerbaijani” in quotation marks (the reasons why are not fully explained so far as I can tell), yet he uses “Georgian” quite freely, without such markings, despite the fact a Georgian nationality was in formation in the period under review. There can be no doubt that Azerbaijani and Georgian self-identities were at rather different places at the time, and perhaps this is what Jones has in mind. Yet Georgian patriots were extending the regional label *k’art’veli* (strictly speaking, an inhabitant of the eastern Georgian district of K’art’li) over all “Georgians” in a manner which in some ways parallels the similar attempt of the Bagratid monarchs of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. In other words, the self-definition of the various Georgian peoples and the very concept of “the Georgian nation” was still in flux at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and this circumstance might have been specially considered early on.

This having been said, the role of Georgian patriots, especially social democrats, in the making
of a Georgian national identity comes through loud and clear. Especially intriguing in light of today’s situation was the attempt on the part of Noe Zhordania and others not only to take advantage of European intellectual ideas, but to associate Georgia directly with Europe. At the same time, Zhordania and his fellow Georgian social democrats generally steered clear of calling for Georgian political independence before 1917. Rather, as Jones demonstrates, they advocated for cultural autonomy within a remade Russian polity. But when the opportunity for independence presented itself, the Georgians aligned themselves with other powers in the southern Caucasus. Unfortunately, this multiethnic coalition was not to last, and in 1918 the first Republic of Georgia was founded. 

Jones is at his best when he explores the peasantry’s support of the Georgian Marxists — the first such coalition in world history — and the fusion of socialism and cultural nationalism. The discussion of the influential T’bilisi (Tiflis) Seminary is most welcome. Another strong point of the book is its location of Georgian social democracy within larger historical currents, within the Caucasian region, the Russian Empire, and western Eurasia. 

Jones is right to assert that “Georgian social democracy has not received its due” (p. 286). He points to the difficulty of the Georgian language, the lack of a Georgian diaspora in Western Europe and North America, and the inaccessibility of archival materials as the underlying causes. And he laments the fact that Georgian social democracy has “failed to gain its proper place in Georgian historiography” (ibid.). Anyone with a basic acquaintance with Georgian historiography produced over the past century knows that Jones is absolutely correct. Yet part of the answer lies in the long-term success of the social democrats’ emphasis upon cultural rather than political nationalism. Though the first Georgian Republic succumbed to the Bolsheviks in 1921, the Georgians’ peculiar attachment to cultural nationalism survived throughout the Soviet period and remains a keystone of Georgian self-identity in our own day. This cultural nationalism emphasizes pre-modern history, e.g., the alleged ancient roots of the Georgian nation and the glorious medieval kingdoms of Vaxtang Gorgasali and David “the Builder.” Thus, an unforeseen outcome of the cultural nationalism advocated by men like Zhordania a century ago has been the extreme emphasis of pre-modern studies in the Georgian academy, a circumstance which has persisted to this day. 

In short, Socialism in Georgian Colors not only serves a crucial role in acquainting Westerners with the history of the Georgians, but it also makes a crucial, original contribution to the relatively small body of historiography devoted to Georgian socialism.


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This book contains three essays and a short introduction. The first essay by Irina Babich provides a survey of “The Major Stages of the Spread of Islam in Kabarda and Balkaria (11th to 20th centuries).” It is followed by the essay “Contemporary Islamic Movement in Kabardino-Balkariai” by the same author. The third essay, “Contemporary Islamic Movements in the Northern Caucasus: Common Tendencies and Differences” was contributed by Akhmet Yarlykapov. 

If the reader is looking for a précis of historical and ethnographical facts about the vicissitudes of Islamic religion in Kabarda and Balkaria, then his/her needs will be served by the first essay. Here the variegated material, carefully culled from a wide variety of sources (from 19th-century travelogues and memoirs of Russian colonial administrators to recent ethnographical and political science studies by, mostly, Russian or Soviet authors), is helpfully rubricated and arranged chronologically. This essay can thus serve as a quick reference for anyone who wants to form a general
idea of the evolution of Islam among the mountaineers of the north-western Caucasus and its interaction with local beliefs and customs. Although this material is presented in an indigested form, it is still of help to the beginner in the field of Caucasian history and ethnography. On the negative side, the essay is marred by the author’s poor knowledge of historical Islam and Middle Eastern history. Some egregious blunders on her part may undermine trust in the soundness of her overall judgment. In the first paragraph of the essay for example, the author confidently states that “Islam in the Northern Caucasus began to spread in the 11th and 12th centuries from the Safavid state [sic!].” One will be surprised to find out that already in 1630 a Circassian prince “performed a pilgrimage to Mecca, in order to pay homage to the tomb [sic!] of the prophet”! (p. 12) Minor factual mistakes are too numerous to be reproduced here (pp. 16, 17, 20, 38, etc.). The transliteration of Arabic names and book titles does not follow a standard (pp. 50-51).

The second essay by the same author is less problematic, although it, too, has a few errors, such as the author’s musing over why in contemporary Kabardino-Balkariia an Islamic community is called jama’at instead of mahalla, which, in her opinion, “is more current in Islamic society” (p. 67).

Babich’s narrative in the second essay is based on her field notes and exhibits her first-hand knowledge of how Islam was “revived” and practiced in the area in the 1990s. The author’s conclusions are rather alarming. She argues that a combination of the lack of freedom of expression, and the oppressive policies of the republican government — which fails to differentiate between the resurgence of interest in Islam among the younger generation and the Islamic militancy “imported” in part from the Middle East and in part from Chechnya and Dagestan — will inevitably result in the radicalization of Islamic resurgence in the republic, especially among the youth.

Similar conclusions are reached by the author of the third essay, Akhmet Yarlykapov (pp. 139-141), who argues that, despite the lip service paid by the Russian federal authorities to the principles of religious pluralism and the equality of all traditional denominations under the Russian constitution, in practice they are being constantly violated by republican authorities who use raw force and coercion to suppress any grass roots religious initiatives in the areas under their control. Since the members of the Muslim spiritual directorate of the republic are hand-picked by the authorities, they enjoy little prestige among the Muslims of Kabard and Balkaria. As a result, the area has witnessed the formation of alternative communities, which operate clandestinely or semi-clandestinely and which have become natural foci for radically minded Muslims disgusted by the corrupt and oppressive policies of their elites. Recent developments in the Northern Caucasus confirmed the dire predictions made by the authors, as the incipient conflicts outlined in the essays under review have eventually led to armed confrontations between a few radical jama’ats and federal security forces in Nal’chik and other parts of Kabardino-Balkaria.

In sum, the book under review provides a helpful introduction to the history and the current conditions of the Muslim societies of Kabardino-Balkaria by scholars with direct knowledge of the area and its peoples. Unfortunately, it is marred by factual mistakes that could have been easily eliminated at the editorial stage.


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Russians in Kazakhstan face unique and complex challenges in determining their roles and identities in the post-Soviet era, as this valuable contribution by Marlène Laruelle and Sébastien Peyrouse reveals. Constituting almost an equal proportion of the population as the titular nationality, and with deep roots in the country, the Kazakhstani Russian community nonetheless finds itself marginalized not only by an overwhelmingly Kazakh political class, but also by their own compatriots in Russia.
Peyrouse and Laruelle describe how, in the post-Soviet space, national issues intertwine with other facets of political life, such as methods and forms of rule and the relationship between state and society, to isolate ethnic minorities alongside other groups lacking connections to increasingly narrow circles of power.

Laruelle and Peyrouse argue that many of the changes that have produced widespread demoralization among Russians in Kazakhstan began decades before the collapse. One of the most interesting elements of this book is the authors’ bridging of the 1991 divide. “Kazakhization” of political life began in the 1970s, at the same time as the share of the Russian population, for the first time in decades, began to decline. First secretary-turned-president Nursultan Nazarbaev built upon networks of ethnic Kazakhs already in place to constitute a post-Soviet political elite that virtually excluded Russians. In the early 1990s, nonetheless, many Kazakhstani Russians approved of Nazarbaev’s approach to the national question. The president portrayed himself as a rampart against ethnic tension, beating back more radical demands of Kazakh nationalists and recognizing Soviet legacies, for example, by allowing Russian to continue as the official language of communication within government circles. The authors argue that Nazarbaev drew his national strategy from the Soviet era: officially, the Kazakh state praises its heritage as a peaceful home for dozens of national groups, from Germans and Ukrainians to Koreans and Mongolians. In reality, however, he allows these national groups only cultural rights, in what Laruelle and Peyrouse call the “folklorization” of the national issue. State authorities deny the existence of a heritage as a peaceful home for dozens of national groups, from Germans and Ukrainians to Koreans and Mongolians. In reality, however, he allows these national groups only cultural rights, in what Laruelle and Peyrouse call the “folklorization” of the national issue. State authorities deny the existence of a “Russian question,” submerging it as part of a larger issue of multiculturalism.

Russian and Cossack nationalist organizations, a principal focus of this book, decried Nazarbaev’s tightening hold on power in the late 1990s and his refusal to recognize any kind of special status for Russian or Slavic communities. Laruelle and Peyrouse deliver a harsh verdict on these nationalist groups. The authors admit that Nazarbaev has exploited the national issue; the president cites the potential of ethnic discord to deny Kazakhstani Russians rights enjoyed by far smaller national groups in the Russian Federation, for example. He focuses censorship on Russian-language publications and severely underrepresents Russians in the one official body—the Assembly of Peoples—with the mandate to discuss national issues. Yet Russian nationalist organizations have chosen to vociferously condemn Kazakh leaders and society. Their words and actions signal a complete lack of interest in constructive engagement. A revealing section on Russian nationalist views of Kazakhstan’s history demonstrates that Kazakhstani Russian writers believe that the only positive features of the country—cities, electricity, industry—in a word “civilization,” resulted from the efforts of pioneering Russians who brought them to Kazaks, a group that to this day maintains aspects of a backward, nomadic, clan-based, inward-looking society. Continual reassertions of their superiority over the titular nationality lead Laruelle and Peyrouse to view the Kazakhstani Russian nationalists almost as spoiled children. The authors seem to agree with Kazakh writers who argue that many Kazakhstani Russians still hold an “imperialist mentality.” One notable exception is the Russian Orthodox Church, whose leaders work closely and cooperatively with the state and with Islamic authorities.

Russian nationalist leaders’ intransigence, as well as petty personality squabbles, have isolated them from the Russian population, which is largely depoliticized and far more concerned with issues of everyday life than political or territorial rights. Yet Kazakhstani Russians as a whole have become frustrated over disinterest towards their plight among politicians and citizens in the “homeland.” Vladimir Putin, far more concerned with interstate relations, has made no concrete efforts either to welcome expatriate Russians home or (with the exception of the Baltics) to assert their rights in the “near abroad.” Kazakhstani Russians find it virtually impossible to gain Russian citizenship. Those who have migrated to Russia feel isolated by an unwelcoming host community. Such attitudes have effectively quashed desires of some Cossack hosts to reunite territories claimed by them with those held by fellow Cossacks in Russia. They have also complicated a search for identity among Cossacks and Russians, trapped between two worlds. The authors note some commonalities between the situation of Kazakhstani Russians and the French in Algeria, and propose an evolving “pied-rouge” identity among the former. From their case study of the Kazakhstani Cossack community, Laruelle and Peyrouse argue that identity can be seen as instrumental, evolving to fit particular goals and situations, rather than inalienable and unmalleable.

This book’s focus on small Cossack and Russian nationalist organizations that the authors
themselves argue are not representative of their populations misses vital aspects of the everyday encounters that shape the identities and goals of the Russians in Kazakhstan. I would also like to have seen the discussions of comparative imperial situations, which are mentioned almost as asides, properly theorized. But I was convinced by the authors’ main arguments, and believe as do they that, despite an unwelcome host society in Russia, “silent migration” of Russians from Kazakhstan will be the most commonly chosen solution by those living in a country they once saw, but no longer see, as their own.


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In their edited volume, Mehdi Parvizi Amineh and Henk Houweling bring together a diverse group of scholars to explore the political dynamics in contemporary Central Eurasia. In the post-Soviet era this region has seen profound social, economic, and political changes. Because of its geographic location it has become the site of intense competition among states, especially the United States, Russia, and China but also India, Turkey, and Iran, all interested in gaining a strategic foothold in the area and in access to oil and gas resources. Non-state actors, be they transnational Islamist movements; drug, weapons and human traffickers; or transnational NGOs have also become more visible. Finally, the region’s societies are in midst of a contentious process of state- and nation-building.

The contributions to this edited volume are of uneven quality and while some chapters offer interesting insights into the Eurasian political dynamics, those who follow the region closely will find little new information here. Some of the chapters will, however, be useful for those teaching introductory courses on regional politics.

The volume lacks an over-arching theoretical framework and the introductory chapter by the editors makes for unsatisfactory reading. Although they critique the extant International Relations literature, and liberal, Marxist and constructivist approaches, this critique is very general with few citations, rather than a carefully crafted exploration of relevant scholarship. The alternative critical geopolitics framework proposed by the authors is also undertheorized. Finally, except for chapter one, there are no references to critical geopolitics in this volume and there is no concluding chapter that shows how this theoretical lens helps us understand the empirical data provided in this book.

The rest of the volume is divided into four parts. Part One examines US foreign policy; Part Two looks at local dynamics; Part Three examines the interaction between outside forces and Central Eurasian states; and finally, Part Four analyzes a number of local conflicts.

Perhaps the most problematic is Part One. It contains a largely descriptive chapter by the editors outlining the oil and gas resources in the region. The other, very lengthy chapter, also by the editors, traces the evolution of US expansionist policies since colonial times and examines the importance of Manifest Destiny in shaping America’s relationship with the world. The authors are especially interested in relating these historical patterns to the US invasion of Iraq, which they argue was driven by the desire to control oil resources and price levels. The chapter seems an odd choice for this volume. The history of US foreign policy is recounted in great detail but adds little to our understanding of contemporary political dynamics. More peculiar is the authors’ focus on the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 in a volume that seeks to deepen our understanding of Central Eurasian dynamics. While the authors argue that “The Anglo-Saxon war against Iraq opens the door for the United States to create a long-term military presence in West- and [Central Eurasia],” it is not clear how, or through what mechanisms, military action in Iraq, or West Eurasia, to use the authors’ terminology, has shaped military expansion in Central Eurasia.
Much more satisfying is Part Two of the volume. Here Pinar Akcali, Shirin Akiner, Michael Kaser and Armine Ishkanian explore the challenges that the Central Asian republics have faced following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. These challenges were many. The new states had to undertake the difficult task of state-building as well as nation-building, initiate economic and political reforms, and construct new foreign relationships all in the context of economic crisis, internal political tensions and a volatile situation in neighboring Afghanistan. Additionally, three great powers, Russia, China, and the United States, were all keenly interested in augmenting their influence in this region. As Shirin Akiner points out, a decade on it is clear that the challenges were even greater and the results of the reforms even less satisfactory than many originally anticipated. As many recent scholars of political transitions in other regions have noted, these authors also find that changes in Central Eurasia have resulted not in the establishment of democracy but rather in the construction of new political regime forms, ones that have some formal features of democracy but lack democratic substance. Furthermore, since September 11, 2001, ensuring stability and security, and halting the spread of radical Islamist movements have become more important policy issues, thus marginalizing concern for gender equality, human rights and political participation.

Part Three of the volume provides an overview of how different states have sought to influence and shape policies in the region. Kurt Radtke explores the involvement of China and India in Central Asia; Amineh and Houwelling analyze the different levels of US and European Union engagement in the region; and Eva Rakel discusses Iranian foreign policies. Part Four consists of well-crafted case studies of conflicts in the Caspian Sea region, Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus by Hooman Peimani, Ayça Ergun and Robert M. Cutler, respectively. Max Spoor and Anatoly Krutov examine how increasing demand for water and lack of institutional mechanisms for water management in the region are contributing to growing tensions in the area.

Most chapters of this edited volume provide a satisfying overview of regional Central Eurasian dynamics. Perhaps inevitably, current events have to some extent made the volume already a bit dated. In particular, since its publication a new government has been elected in Iran, in 2005 in Uzbekistan clashes between anti-government protesters and security forces were the most deadly since independence, in the same year in neighboring Kyrgyzstan a popular uprising led to the president’s ouster, and the United States seems increasingly bogged down in Iraq. Despite these shortcomings, the volume’s chapters will prove useful in introductory courses on regional politics.


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The goal of this book is to apply the structure of a business model to understand everything from the collapse of the Soviet empire, to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, to globalization. The author highlights the relevance of structure over substance: “Scholars of empire and hierarchy, much like policymakers, often place excessive emphasis on the ideology or identity of a particular polity and ignore the common organizational issues and dilemmas that confront all hierarchical polities” (p. 2).

Cooley uses a simple model of firm structure built on Alfred Chandler’s landmark business study in the late 1960s, which examined the differences in growth and business success between Ford Motor Company and General Motors (Chandler 1962, 1977). Chandler argued that the primary differences were the firms’ corporate structures. Cooley presents two hierarchal structures, “unitary form (U-form) or a multidivisional form (M-form)” (p. 5). For Cooley, the question is to understand how a central power influences the periphery. In the U-form, the periphery is organized along functional lines, i.e. finance, accounting, marketing, etc. The M-form is organized by territory and allows a fair amount of autonomy for the periphery. The U-forms “generally incur higher governance costs than M-forms”
Yet the M-forms are “characterized by acute agency problems” as the leaders “pursue their own interests as opposed to those at the center” (p. 14). The first three chapters of the book flesh out the differences between the hierarchies and their implementation in governance.

In chapter 4, the author moves into the case study of Central Asia. He argues that in Central Asia, both U-forms and M-forms existed simultaneously. The security services and large-scale industries were organized along U-forms. They were directly overseen by their respective ministries and agencies in Moscow and very little local discretion was allowed. In contrast, the agriculture sector and the police force were M-forms. They were locally controlled and built on a patronage system highly invested in maintaining local autonomy. Cooley’s question is, what happens when the center drops the periphery? As is logical from his structure, the U-form institutions collapse and wither unless they are taken under management by a third-party or by the new local government. The M-form institutions see significantly less change since they are heavily entrenched in the local system of government and the loss of the old external power has little influence on the local power structure.

Cooley’s explanation provides some analytical traction for understanding governance issues of the post-Soviet era. There are significant differences between the way the army was structured and the way agriculture was structured; those structures have left long-term legacies in all of the former Soviet states. However, the structural argument is only able to explain initial conditions and does little to explain the current paths of the five Central Asian states. If the structural hierarchy drives outcomes, as Cooley argues throughout the book, then it would seem that the structural argument should provide an understanding for the diverging outcomes of the countries. The agriculture sector is a good example.

In table 5.2 Cooley shows that as of 1999, the only two countries that exceeded 1991 agriculture production (M-form) were Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (p. 16). Yet these are also the countries that are racing Tajikistan for the worst economic performance in the region. In 2002 neither Kyrgyzstan nor Tajikistan’s per capita gross domestic product in purchasing power parity (PPP) exceeded their level in 1992 (UNDP 2005). The issue is not that agriculture was structured in M-form, but these countries had almost no other natural resources or industry, and thus they relied entirely upon the agriculture sector. The fact that M-form increases patronage and cronism, and may have helped destabilize the agriculture sector, does little to explain why the different countries have achieved very different results.

A key issue that determines the present condition of Central Asian states is revealed through examining the amount of transfer that the countries received from the USSR’s central governmental budget. Table 4.1 shows that Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan all received between 35.5% and 42.9% of their revenues from Moscow, compared to 23.1% for Kazakhstan and 5.9% for Ukraine (p. 68). The sudden loss of these revenues had a devastating impact on the economic structure of the poorest Central Asian countries (UNDP 2005). While those transfers were embedded within the broader structural hierarchy of the center to the periphery, it was not the type of structure that implied the outcome, rather the amount of dependence and other resources that the countries had. This section on Central Asia provides some insight into the legacies of different components of the state, i.e. security services versus police. But the model fails to explain how these difference lead to different outcomes.

In its final chapters, the book moves to apply the model to other international events such as the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Japan’s occupation of Korea, and the US reconstruction effort in Iraq. The section on Iraq and the chapter on issues of globalization are the weakest analytically in the book. The structural argument provides an interesting analysis of a mechanistic explanation. However, the argument ignores the realities of the context within which the structure or hierarchy operates. It is not simply the shifting from the M-form to the U-form or the collapse of either; it is the change that went on in that collapse, with ideologies, ethnicities, and history intertwined. For several examples, it is not at all clear that the failures outlined had anything to do with the issue of U- or M-form.

In conclusion, the idea of using a simple model that can apply to a wide range of international political structures is both refreshing and needed. The simplest models are often the best to provide broad insight into different and diverse problems. The model should be applied as a frame to a painting: it is necessary for structure, it provides aesthetic and intellectual boundaries, it enhances the understanding of the problem, but it does not work as an end unto itself. As with any analytic tool, it can
only provide a framework for understanding the dynamics of other political, social, and economic issues.

References

Chandler, Alfred


United Nations Development Program (UNDP)


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The guide to resources in Washington D.C. contains some 270 entries in 17 categories, including academic programs, archives and cultural holdings, libraries, museums, think-tanks; professional, corporate, development, religious, and scientific organizations; and both US and foreign government agencies. It is exclusively institutional, listing offices but seldom experts (though in some cases relevant desk officers appear, as do specialist librarians at the Library of Congress). The overall collection emphasizes contemporary official and political interests, rather than humanistic ones. The introduction promises that “this handbook is intended for . . . scholars, journalists, officials and business men and women,” but insofar as it is for scholars, it is primarily for scholars with policy-related interests like those of S. Frederick Starr, who wrote the introduction and who directs the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute that produced the volume.

A lot of research has gone into this guide, and the compilers have tried hard to include any institution in the D.C. area that might have anything to do with Central Eurasia. Sometimes the inclusion of a given entry seems inspired more by a desire for inclusiveness than by whether a particular organization would be of much use to scholars or not. For example, we get the front-desk numbers of *The Washington Post, The Washington Times*, and *US News and World Report*, none of which are special resources for Central Asian studies, though of course they have published related articles. Under the “Corporations” heading we find addresses for the D.C. headquarters of five major oil companies and Intelsat. (Are there no other corporations with Central Asian interests?) From the long entry for the CIA one learns that the Agency’s phone number is (703) 482-1100 and that it maintains a huge collection of maps, databases, archives and analysts, none of which, of course, are open to researchers. However, “CIA Russian and Central Eurasian specialists . . . [are] extraordinary resources for any researcher who can gain access to them.” So one would hope. Here the guide gives away the inside-the-Beltway secret: the real resources are human, be they government, corporate, think-tank, academic or media employees. This guide will not purvey that kind of local knowledge.

A good deal of the content of most entries consists of general information that would come up on the first page of a website: addresses, phone numbers, director’s name, mission statements. Some entries offer less than would a quick Google search. Other listings, however, especially those for archives, museums, and map and audio-visual media collections, generally go some way toward listing specific collections of particular interest to scholars of Central Asia, though more along that line would have been desirable. (One major lacuna: I could find no entry for the National Archives and only a brief one for the Office of the Federal Register, which
falls under the National Archives’ administration. For historians, the National Archives is a resource on a par with the Library of Congress, and some indication of its holdings relevant to Central Asia would have been very welcome.)

If this book is ever updated, one improvement would be a more intelligent index. At present, the index is little more than an alphabetical reordering of the listed organizations themselves, without headings for personal names, subjects, or parental institutions. For example Fiona Hill, maps and the Smithsonian Institution appear in the guide, but cannot be found through the index. Nor is information regarding particular Central Asian countries captured under a single index entry.

What is this guide most useful for? A scholar planning a research trip to Washington would not be able to decide what libraries and archives to visit or write a funding proposal solely on the basis of this guide, though he or she would get an idea of where to start, and would find out who to contact at a given institution to obtain additional information. Most useful for this type of scholar, in fact, would be browsing through the guide as a way of learning of resources he might not have considered before. The very assemblage in one place of Central Asia-related resources thus makes the guide useful, even if much of the information itself is available on-line, and even if many of the specifics (opening and closing times, photocopy prices, phone numbers) have a limited shelf-life.

Perhaps the book’s title is a misnomer, however. Its greatest beneficiaries may well be directors, staffers, researchers and interns in Washington’s great policy demimonde, who will pull this volume off their shelves to quickly look up ChevronTexaco, the American-Uzbekistan Chamber of Commerce, or the Jamestown Foundation, at least until their own rolodexes are replete with the personal numbers of the capital’s real go-to guys.
This small but interesting workshop was funded by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung and the Martin Luther University. Out of the originally invited academics, including some doctoral students, a dozen scholars with interests in health, illness and healing in Islamic societies showed up, coming from Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, the United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, and the United States. The workshop’s sessions were also attended by doctoral students and post-doctoral fellows based in Germany from Berlin, the Martin Luther University in Halle-Wittenberg, and the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle.

The workshop had a pronounced exploratory character. To our knowledge it was the first attempt to bring together scholars working on this topic in two large regions, the Middle East and North/West Africa on the one hand and Central Asia on the other. Interdisciplinary cooperation was emphasized throughout, and social/cultural anthropologists were joined by scholars representing Islamic and Oriental Studies, demography and history. Dr. Mona Schrempf from the Humboldt University in Berlin was invited to chair the Central Asian panels and act as discussant. Schrempf, a medical anthropologist of Tibet, was the only participant with a research interest outside the Islamic world; her fresh insights made valuable contributions to the discussion. All speakers contributed to the lively and amicable discussions.

The choice of two core regions connected through Islam worked out very well: in the discussion of all papers, comments and questions came from researchers of both areas. And as the organizers had hoped, a real dialogue developed both among researchers of different regions and among representatives of the various disciplines. Among the first speakers was Sara Randall from University College London, who presented the results of her demographic research in Senegal, arguing that Wolof women’s fertility decisions are embedded in discourses on health. Ekaterina Rodionova from Saint Petersburg State University gave a historical account based mostly on travelogues of traditional ways of caring for the newborn and new mothers in Iran. Anne Regourd from the Sorbonne talked about wet-cupping and the representation of blood in Yemen. Marja Tilikainen from the University of Helsinki presented ethnographic materials about witch and spirit beliefs in Somalia. A similar perspective was pursued by Sylvia Önder from Georgetown University, who was looking at modern manifestations of the evil eye in a Turkish village by the Black Sea. Önder’s paper was nicely complemented by Gerda Sengers’ account of Zar ceremonies which she had observed in the slums of Cairo.

Spiritual healing was also addressed by a number of scholars working in Central Asia. Habiba Fathi based at the French Research Institute in Tashkent looked at traditional curative practices among Muslim women in Central Asia, while Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi from the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology focused on women healers in post-socialist Uzbekistan. Mathijs Pelkmans, also from the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, analyzed how healers establish their credibility in contemporary Kyrgyzstan, while Annette Krämer from the Humboldt University addressed the issue of medical pluralism in contemporary Central Asia and pointed out new directions for research. Also working on Central Asia, Danuta Penkala Gawecka from the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan considered the diversity of complementary medicine in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan. While most of the Central Asian papers
addressed the contemporary and post-communist situation, Paula Michaels from the University of Iowa gave an account of the state of Soviet biomedicine and Kazakh ethnomedicine under Stalin, thus providing a historical depth to the presentations.

In the workshop’s final discussion, Dr. Schrempf summarized a number of important points which emerged during the earlier debates. Indeed, the workshop identified a significant research gap: in the core regions, attitudes and practices related to illness and health, healing and cures have so far been seriously understudied. Several participants displayed an interest in comparison. It was decided that if further collaborative research on the same or similar themes were to emerge, it is essential that the basic terminology of the field be clarified. The necessity to focus on everyday practices of health and healing while taking into account state policy, religious and political contexts as well as the impact of diverse medical traditions was also an emphasis of some of the participants. Further suggestions for future directions and themes of collaborative research included: local discourses on health; modernity vs. tradition; patient/client-centred approaches; domestic medicine/family medicine; and encounters between patient and healer (or extending the unit of analysis from a patient-centred one to include the role of informal networks, family, kin, neighbors, etc., in giving advice and providing care). Participants also suggested that a comparative project could have a major focus different from Islam, even though Islam continues to provide an important backdrop to such research.

Most of the workshop participants were women, which may be a reflection of the gender imbalance characteristic of this field of research, and this was also, to some extent, reflected in the materials presented. To redress the balance, it was suggested that in future gatherings, the gender question should be explicitly addressed and equal attention be paid to women and men.

The papers delivered at the workshop will be published in the Orientwissenschaftliche Hefte [Oriental Studies Papers], the publication series of the Orientwissenschaftliches Zentrum [Center for Oriental Studies] in Halle. For such a volume, the organizers are also planning to ask for contributions from those researchers who were unable to participate in the Workshop, but who have expressed an interest in future cooperation. Responses by non-participating scholars as well as the lively and stimulating discussions during the workshop confirmed the need for such a publication and for future cooperation of researchers who are doing pioneering work on the general theme of illness and healing in Islamic societies, but so far have worked in relative isolation.

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International Conference on Problems and Success Factors in Business: Perspectives from Emerging Markets and Transition Economies III

International Atatürk Alatoo University, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, September 21, 2006

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The International Atatürk Alatoo University in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, hosted the third annual conference titled: Problems and Success Factors in Business: Perspectives from Emerging Markets and Transition Economies. Throughout its existence, the conference has aimed at establishing an international platform to discuss management issues in the post-Communist world in general and in Kyrgyzstan in particular.

In the opening session of this year’s event, dedicated to Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), Professor Mustafa Altintaş of Gazi University in Turkey presented his research project “Foreign Capital Investments in Transitional Economies and Economic Growth Relationship.” He evaluated ten years of economic data (1994-2004) on Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, utilizing econometrics for determining various economic relationships. Among other things, Altintaş concluded that there was a negative correlation between FDI in transitional economies and economic growth in all the above countries excluding Azerbaijan. In addition, Dr. Aftab Kazi of
the American University in Kyrgyzstan and the Johns Hopkins University presented his study on “International Politics of a New Geopolitics in Central Asia.” His paper explored the problems and prospects of physical transit routes which could improve the regional integration and regional and cross-continental trade through Central and Southwest Asia.

Dr. Erol Gurun of IPI Polimer Co. and the Kyrgyz-Turkish Businessmen Association presented on the general theme of investment climate in Kyrgyzstan, and emphasized the importance and need for free economic zones in Kyrgyzstan for regional markets. And László Vasa of the Szent István University, Hungary, made a presentation called “Possible Competitiveness Strategies for Transition Economies: The Importance of FDI.” Vasa discussed conditions which are essential while searching for investment opportunities. His paper analyzed the relationship between competitiveness and development, globalization and development strategies, and the role of exports in economic competitiveness strategies of transition economies. Through his case study, Vasa referred to export tendencies in Hungary. According to Vasa, while recent FDI in industrial countries has been mainly driven by cross-border mergers and acquisitions, the surge of FDI in emerging markets has been largely caused by privatization deals, joint-ventures and other business network arrangements in the infrastructure and manufacturing sectors.

The remaining papers of the one-day Conference can be classified into three groups: regional managerial studies, managerial studies related to emerging markets, and general managerial studies. Umida Mirkhanova of International Westminster University in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, presented a research study entitled, “Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and its Development in Uzbekistan.” Mirkhanova discussed the evolution and development of CSR in the United States and in Uzbekistan. She examined how CSR has been supported by legislation, how it has been perceived by companies and society, and what companies have done in the two states, respectively, to promote social responsibility, and finally, how the concept of CSR has contributed to the development of human capital, both internally (within companies) and externally (in the society at large).

Ladislas Maurice of the Kyrgyz National University in Bishkek presented a paper called “Management in Transitional Post-Soviet Armenia.” Maurice conducted a study of foreign and Armenian managers in order to assess the difficulties in detecting and acknowledging the limits of their management style within Armenia. As part of the study, seventy international managers, both from private and public sectors, were interviewed by graduate Business Administration students of the American University of Armenia. Their findings and recommendations were as follows: first, Armenian managers should focus on their main strengths of marketing, strategic management, human resources and finance. Second, the main business problems in Armenia are non-observed deadlines, employees not following orders, employees coming late to work, and in general taking advantage of their positions. Third, businesses have a significant lack of communication and do not apply the principle of delegation. Fourth, informal groups influence the decision-making process (e.g. friends and family work in the same company). Fifth, employees and managers seldom discuss business strategy. And sixth, the attitudes of managers vary, but generally speaking Armenian managers have authoritarian tendencies. However, Armenian managers are also regarded as hardworking, intelligent, and sociable, maintaining friendly relationships with their cohorts.

Mahanbet Rysaliev from the Economic and Social Reforms Center, Ministry of Finance in Kyrgyzstan offered a presentation entitled, “A New Approach to Designing Requirement on the Minimal Authorized Capital of Banks.” Rysaliev was able to use extraction data and calculation of recommended minimal capital, due to the fact that the banking system of the country has passed various points of inflection on profit.

Dr. Vilmur Auken of Süleyman Demirel University in Kazakhstan presented a paper titled, “Current Economic Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan.” Auken talked about oil- and gas-rich Kazakhstan’s goal to become a major economic force in the region and its strategy to drive economic growth through regional cooperation. Financial experts present at the conference were bullish on Kazakhstan’s future, with one analyst noting that the current rate of growth will likely double the country’s gross domestic product in the next seven years. Besides its strong energy sector, Kazakhstan is seeking to diversify its economy in other ways. A regional network, which could include a free-trade zone, would probably enhance Kazakhstan’s geopolitical and economic roles in Central Asia. According to Auken, the Kazakh government pursues a policy of cooperation with neighbors both
near and far, and seeks to form and strengthen its own middle class; however any regional upheaval would disrupt Kazakhstan's ambitious economic strategy.

Serdar Yavuz of Kyrgyzstan-Turkey Manas University in Bishkek contributed with his presentation titled “Strategic Organizational Leadership: Evidence from Kyrgyz Organizations.” Yavuz interviewed middle managers of three different companies in Kyrgyzstan to find out their strategic management and leadership styles. And Dmitrii Arkhipov of the Kazakhstan Entrepreneur Forum outlined the relationship between public relations and human resource and marketing and discussed those concepts on Kazakh companies as Texakabank, K’cell, ATF Bank and V-Ratio. In general, the conference was not only productive in the sense of scientific communication but also for networking and creating friendships on an international scale.
About the

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The CENTRAL EURASIAN STUDIES SOCIETY (CESS) is a private, non-political, non-profit, North America-based organization of scholars who are interested in the study of Central Eurasia, and its history, languages, cultures, and modern states and societies. We define the Central Eurasian region broadly to include Turkic, Mongolian, Iranian, Caucasian, Tibetan and other peoples. Geographically, Central Eurasia extends from the Black Sea region, the Crimea, and the Caucasus in the west, through the Middle Volga region, Central Asia and Afghanistan, and on to Siberia, Mongolia and Tibet in the east.

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