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This book provides a detailed and informative analysis of Russian policy toward Central Asia from Putin’s rise to power in 1999 through 2004. Written by an accomplished scholar, it represents an impressive piece of research and provides useful information for those interested in the international politics of the region.

After an introductory chapter, Chapter Two recounts the history of Russia’s nineteenth-century conquest of Central Asia. Chapter Three reviews Yeltsin-era policy toward the region. Entitled ‘Central Asia Lost,’ it documents the steady deterioration of Russian influence in these states, especially Uzbekistan. The next two chapters constitute the book’s substantive core. Chapter Four introduces the first of two “policy changes” around which the entire book revolves: Putin’s decision in August 1999 “to make the issue of anti-terrorism the top priority in Russia’s relations with the Central Asian states and to make it a platform for the development of military and security cooperation” (p. 63). According to Jonson, Russia’s efforts to enhance military cooperation with the Central Asians met with some success. Another of the chapter’s central theses is that from 1999 to 2001 Moscow maintained a firm determination to prevent outside powers, including the United States, from gaining any kind of strategic foothold in Central Asia.

Chapter Five, the longest chapter in the book, analyzes the second of Putin’s policy changes: his decision to cooperate with the US war against the Taliban even to the point of accepting an American military presence in Central Asia. In Jonson’s schema, “By his September 2001 policy turn, Putin inverted his 1999 anti-terrorist agenda by extending it to include Western states as partners in Central Asia” (p. 86). On the other hand, Jonson also argues that Moscow simultaneously increased its level of diplomatic and military activity in the region in order to counter US influence. The chapter also surveys the participation in the Afghan war by Russia and each of the Central Asian states and traces the evolution of both Russia’s and America’s military cooperation with the latter through 2004. Chapter Six presents an interesting discussion of several sets of domestic factors that contributed to the formulation of Russia’s foreign policy under Putin. Chapter Seven examines domestic politics and state-society relations in Central Asia, including the role played by Islamic fundamentalism. The concluding chapter assesses explanations of Russia’s policy changes of 1999 and 2001 derived from three bodies of international relations theory: realism, bureaucratic politics, and constructivism.

Although each of these chapters contains useful information, this book is not without shortcomings. For instance, it is not always documented as thoroughly as one would wish. In particular, Jonson too often attributes views and motives to Russian policy-makers without providing supporting evidence. Second, the reader should be advised that Russian policy toward Kazakhstan is not analyzed in this book, only that toward Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The third and most significant shortcoming is that even though “Vladimir Putin” is in the title of this book, the reader gains little insight into the man and what makes him tick. This shortcoming is most apparent in Chapter Six, where Jonson demonstrates that Putin made the choice to cooperate with the United States notwithstanding overwhelming opposition from Russia’s foreign policy establishment. However, the chapter sheds little or no light on the thinking and calculations behind Putin’s decision or why he was such an iconoclast on this issue. In this regard, only four of the chapter’s 93 footnotes refer to speeches or writings by Putin himself.
Although this shortcoming might have been corrected in the final chapter, where Jonson attempts to explain Russian policy, the analyses there only compound the problem. Jonson largely dismisses explanations based in bureaucratic politics or constructivism and instead finds most support for realist explanations drawn from Robert Gilpin’s classic *War and Change in World Politics*: namely, that Russian policy resulted from the country’s weakness vis-à-vis the United States and its need to reduce international commitments (such as preventing opposing great powers from establishing a presence in former Soviet territory). The structure of the international system, both in Central Asia and globally, “gave Putin no choice” but to pursue “a policy of appeasement” toward rising American power (pp. 173-4). However, two serious problems with such a conclusion stand out. First, demonstration of this thesis would require a substantive discussion of power indices and the military capabilities of these states — especially capabilities deployable in Central Asia — yet Jonson fails to provide it. Second, explanations drawn from realism are not consistent with the fact that the bulk of the Russian foreign policy elite strongly disagreed with Putin’s decision of 2001 — disagreement to which Jonson herself returns in this very chapter. They should have understood the implications of Russian weakness equally as well as the President, yet in fact they did not agree that Russia’s interest in cooperation with the United States and the defeat of the Taliban outweighed its interest in keeping the US out of a nearby area of vital interest. In short, some kind of domestic- or individual-level explanation is clearly needed here, yet Jonson fails to provide it.

Nevertheless, even though this book fails to provide a convincing explanation of Russia’s “turn to the West,” as many have called it, its strengths greatly outweigh its weaknesses overall. It pays great attention to detail, it is highly informative, and its descriptive analyses are, as far as this reviewer can detect, completely accurate. Although it will not be particularly useful to either theorists of international relations or those interested in President Putin as a leader, it should be read by both scholars and policy-makers working on either Russian foreign policy or the foreign policies of the Central Asian states.

Reference

Gilpin, Robert
1981 *War and Change in World Politics*.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


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The toppling of Kyrgyzstan’s President Askar Akaev in March 2005 and the May 2005 unrest in Andijon, Uzbekistan, raise many questions about the viability of the current Central Asian regimes and the paths of transition that they will follow. It could not be predicted that President Akaev would be the first of the post-independence Soviet leaders to fall, nor was it certain that he would be unseated the way he was and with such little bloodshed. Many policymakers were caught off guard and must now be further concerned about the viability of the regional leadership.

In light of recent events in Central Asia, one thing that policymakers and observers of the region need is a thorough analysis of the region’s leaders, including descriptions of how the leaders came to and maintain power, and a typology of the regimes that enables analysis of the attributes of their hold on power and what the nature of a future transition might be. *Power and Change in Central Asia* offers valuable insights as it aims to answer some of these questions in a comparative fashion, with separate chapters on the presidentialism of each of the five regimes. However, the book was published in 2002, and the chapters appear to have been written before the events of September 11, 2001. Therefore, through no fault of the authors, some of the information is dated.

In her introduction, Cummings explains that the book will emphasize process or agency — where leaders have many choices about how to operate even with some limitations, rather than structure — where all the leader’s actions are beholden to the environment. Cummings makes the point that the
weakest of the presidents is Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov, partly due to the level of infighting among the regime’s elites. However, by this standard, Rakhmonov should have fallen first. If Cummings is right about Rakhmonov’s standing, he could be the next to go, especially since there are presidential elections in Tajikistan next year. Cummings’ observation about the relative unity of Kyrgyzstan — that it should lead to a smoother transfer of power — seems to have held true in the aftermath of Akaev’s overthrow. One can say that though much property was destroyed, few lives were lost and the main violence lasted only for a few days. This stands in contrast to Uzbekistan, where the bloody Andijon events may represent the precursor to an eventual violent transition in that country.

In his chapter on empire’s aftermath, Dominic Lieven argues that the prevailing world system is the most important factor in determining the fate of former colonies, rather than the ruling imperial power or the manner in which power was ceded. Taking this logic further, he claims that Russia is no threat to the international system or to the independence of the Central Asian states. Moscow does not have the resources or the willpower to create empire again, and in any case, the prevailing world system of interlinked economies and globalization neither legitimizes empire politically nor allows it to prosper economically.

Lieven then posits that, unlike the vassal states of some other empires, the eventual countries of Central Asia received some political preparation for self-rule. At the end of the chapter, Lieven notes that Russia and China desire stability in the region, but that the current corrupt regimes may lead to further Islamic extremism. This would seem to beg the question of whether supporting the regimes actually leads to stability and whether Russia and China should rethink their strategy.

John Ishiyama, writing on transitional institutions and the prospects for democratization, employs the idea of neopatrimonial authoritarian states (as opposed to other types of authoritarian states) where the leader relies on personal patronage for power. He categorizes the Central Asian regimes into four types, depending on two factors: 1) how mobilized/participatory the president’s support is; and 2) how competitive/plural are the political entities within the government. Ishiyama also includes a graph chart that allows the reader see the spatial positioning of the various types of Central Asian neopatrimonial regimes. On the basis of these factors, he predicts that Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, falling into the type of competitive one-party states, stand the best chance for democracy, while oligarchic Tajikistan’s best chance for change comes from the top.

The Kyrgyzstan call has turned out to be correct, but Ishimay’s claim that Karimov in Uzbekistan would call out to the opposition to participate in the government in a time of crisis has been proven wrong so far. Most worriedly, he predicts that change in Turkmenistan can only come from outside forces.

In her chapter on Kazakhstan, Cummings points out that while Nazarbaev has built his power base, he has not legitimized authority because of the multiethnic population, among other reasons. His legitimacy, therefore, derives from the ability to parcel out riches. While the regime is heavily based on patronage, Nazarbaev has also brought technocrats into managerial positions in the hope that this would improve the economy and legitimate his rule. By doing so, Nazarbaev has done more than other regional leaders to give Kazakhstan an elite in which outsiders have had a chance to become rich. A tension has resulted between the technocratic/business elite, which acquired riches from privatization and other ventures, and the political elites, who are increasingly narrowly defined and dominated by family members. It would seem, however, that in Kazakhstan there is no threat of a color revolution anytime soon as the country is relatively prosperous and the oil wealth allows potential opponents to be bought off.

In his chapter on Kyrgyzstan, Eugene Huskey describes the traditionally deferential attitudes toward political and social authority in Kyrgyzstan, although one could argue these have changed with the overthrow of Akaev. It will be interesting to see how deferential the populace will be to new leader Kurmanbek Bakiev. Huskey also notes that in the 1995 presidential elections, Akaev was helped to victory by the support of ethnic Uzbeks and Russians from the south, who perhaps feared southern Kyrgyz power. Therefore, with regard to the current regional tensions in Kyrgyzstan, one should not assume that the south is uniform in opinion and wholly automatically supports the southerner Bakiev.

Muriel Atkin’s article on Rakhmonov describes how the Tajik president came to power as a compromise candidate because of elite infighting,
and has remained in power only with the military and moral support of the Russians. She calls him the most ineffectual leader in Central Asia. These points are all valid; however, one could argue that the situation in Tajikistan contributes to the stability of his regime and strengthens his hand. Alone among Central Asians, the people of Tajikistan have seen the darkness of civil war and appear to prefer the current peace to conflict. There will be presidential elections in Tajikistan in 2006 and it will be interesting to see if that argument plays out or if the population finds it easy to rebel as in Kyrgyzstan.

Cummings and Michael Ochs, in their chapter on Turkmenistan, point out that Niyazov introduced his cult of personality as a way of overcoming the tribalism of Turkmen society and creating a new, patriotic ideology. However, societies such as Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan faced similar problems, but did not travel that road. In partial answer to the above question about leadership, it would seem that this kind of rule was not predestined for Turkmenistan, but that Niyazov happened to obtain power and happened to have such a personality. Like Ishiyama, Ochs and Cummings feel that change from below is very unlikely and in fact that change would have to be forced from outside. Because it seems that moves from outside will not be forthcoming anytime soon, if Niyazov’s health holds up he may still have a long reign.

In his review of the situation in Uzbekistan, Roger Kangas remarks that practically all changes of power in the area currently constituting Uzbekistan in both the Soviet and pre-Soviet eras were due to battles among the elite, perhaps owing to regionally-based clan lethabilities. One can infer from this that the struggle to succeed Karimov will be also be waged among the elite and reflect regional alliances. But the recent Andijon events and other protests suggest that the population might be intent on having a greater say in who their next leader is, regardless of elite opinion.

A larger question is which type of leadership matters and which is most important? One school of thought says that President Akaev actually had little power and the country was largely run by a group of elites. Therefore, it can be argued that the study of the collective elite may be even more important than that of just the President when looking at leadership. Another important question is what type of regimes would have existed in each country had they had different presidents and would the regimes still have fit the same typologies? Cummings would claim that as process is more important, someone like Turkmenbashi was not preordained for Turkmenistan. An even stronger question is whether Central Asian culture is responsible for these regime types? Would Central Asia have had these regime types had they not experienced Russian and Soviet rule? While the various authors have different opinions on this topic of cultural relativism and determinism, it seems safe to say that, judging by neighboring countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, the regimes might not be so different.

The inclusion of voices from the region itself would have added another perspective to these issues. Also, the book is a little too technical for the general public. Otherwise, though there is a danger in using this book solely for predictive purposes, this is a book that will have great utility as the themes presented are all still relevant. Policymakers and students of the region would do well to read this for clues to the region’s future. After reading the book, one will be very familiar with the similarities and differences among the leadership styles of the five regimes.


Reviewed by: Adrienne Edgar, Associate Professor, Department of History, University of California, Santa Barbara, Calif., USA, edgar@history.ucsb.edu

The borders of the Soviet Central Asian republics have long fascinated historians and social scientists studying questions of national identity and state formation. The Soviet “national delimitation” of Central Asia in 1924 was a prime example of nation-formation by state fiat. National territories with clearly defined borders were created virtually overnight in a region whose inhabitants did not historically link ethnicity with statehood or culture with territory. As Anita Sengupta points out, the indefinite frontiers of the premodern era were
replaced by the sharply defined borders characteristic of the modern state.

*Frontiers into Borders* is an investigation into how the creation of borders and national territories transformed — and simultaneously failed to transform — identities in the region. The first two chapters are primarily historical, dealing with pre-Soviet identities in the region and the Soviet “national delimitation” of Central Asia. The last two chapters are more contemporary, dealing with the consolidation and politicization of national identities, regional integration, and ethnic conflict in post-Soviet Central Asia. The author focuses primarily on Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, with occasional references to the other republics.

Sengupta stresses the fluidity and complexity of identities in Central Asia prior to the Soviet intervention and the ways in which premodern identities were affected by the creation of national territories. She argues that the delimitation was problematic because “people actually lacked any significant awareness of themselves as culturally distinct groups” (p. 16). Focusing primarily on the divide between future Tajiks and Uzbeks, she notes that there was a tremendous amount of cultural and linguistic mixing as well as intermarriage between these two ostensibly distinct ethnicities. Moreover, she argues, both the Tajik and Uzbek “nations” were made up of many diverse components that lacked common origins or a common sense of destiny. Sengupta also argues that the relationship between identity and territory in Central Asia was not as straightforward as Soviet authorities liked to believe. Ethnic groups did not occupy clearly defined territories, nor did people conceive of a territory as constituting a “homeland” for a specific “national culture.” Since “homelands and identities were shared and overlapping” (p. 45), the drawing of ethnographic borders and the creation of national territories posed numerous difficulties.

Sengupta goes on to examine the changes wrought by the Soviet system of borders and territories. In general, she notes, Central Asians have accepted the Soviet system of ethnic classification and the association between territory and culture. Today, each state in the region is seeking to carve out its own distinctive historical legacy, while nationalist scholars seek to establish continuities between the ancient inhabitants of the “homeland” and those who live there today. Yet these efforts are often stymied by the overlapping and shared nature of pre-Soviet history. Sengupta describes conflicts between post-Soviet Central Asian nations over who “owns” a certain aspect of the past, such as the dispute between Tajiks and Uzbeks over which group has the right to claim the Samanid heritage. She also examines the marginalization of ethnic minorities, such as Bukharan Jews, Russians, and Tajiks in Uzbekistan, who now find themselves living within a homogenizing nation-state that is not their own. Finally, Sengupta argues that local and regional identities continue to have great importance, although these identities were in many cases transformed by Soviet rule.

This book makes a number of important and valid points about identity in Central Asia. One can hardly fault the author’s fundamental argument that it is problematic to impose the nation-state on a region with complex and overlapping identities. Much of what she says about the fluidity of identities in Central Asia is generally accepted among scholars of the region. Sengupta covers a great deal of ground, touching on subjects as diverse as the relationship between identity and territory, the current historiography of Central Asia, prospects for regional and extra-regional economic integration, the roots of the civil war in Tajikistan, and the status of ethnic minorities within each state. Yet her wide-ranging and nuanced discussion does not quite cohere into an overarching argument or a distinctive, original contribution. Moreover, for a work that seeks to examine the impact of the Soviet creation of borders, there is not enough consideration of the broader context of Soviet nationality policy or indeed the whole Soviet period in Central Asia. Finally, there is a tension in Sengupta’s analysis between her focus on the complexity and artificiality of identities and her tendency in practice to speak of them as organically existing groups. For example, after discussing the difficulty distinguishing Tajiks from Uzbeks in the pre-Soviet era because of high rates of bilingualism and cultural mixing, she argues that the Tajik republic was “more artificial” than the Uzbek republic because Tajikistan failed to include some of the important “Tajik cultural centers.” To be fair, this is not a problem unique to Sengupta; all scholars of Central Asia must struggle to avoid imposing present-day national categories on earlier periods. The aura of inevitability that surrounds today’s nation-states is perhaps the most striking result of the transformation from frontiers into borders.

Reviewed by: Zohreh Ghaavamshahidi, Professor, Political Science and Women’s Studies, University of Wisconsin-Whitewater, Wis., USA, ghavamsz@uwu.edu

This book answers some of the most important questions regarding post-Soviet economic and social reforms: what is the role of the new states in shaping women’s roles and status in public life? What are the cultural changes in family, education and religion? How do women acquire self-identity and redefine their role in the midst of economic transition? What are the main socio-economic and cultural consequences of globalization? Do women benefit from it?

In the short introduction, the editors, Feride Acar and Ayşe Gümüş-Ayata, discuss the book’s theoretical and methodological foundations. Here two important points stand out. First, they create linkages between global socio-economic issues and the local issues, such as culture, family structure and the position of women. They explain the relevance of understanding how changes in economics and politics affect social stratification and culture in general and women’s position in particular in Central Asia, the Caucasus and Turkey. Second, they emphasize the importance of interdisciplinary work and the application of diverse methodologies in answering the above questions. This is demonstrated in their choice of contributors. The rest of the book consists of four sections and a concluding chapter.

The first section focuses on economic transition and the development of the global market and their impact on gender issues in the former Soviet Union and Turkey. The three authors, Lourdes Beneria, Valentine Moghadam and Meltem Dayıoğlu, argue that economic transition within the context of the global market in this region has increased inequality and mal-distribution of wealth, with a more severe impact on women than men. The comparative analysis of classical theory of market economy and the current trend of economic transition is a central part of their arguments. This comparison shows that female participation in the labor force is motivated by need rather than by profit, a marker of market rationality in classical theory. The authors suggest alternative ways of organizing the socio-economic and political spheres, based on non-hegemonic theories of market rationality. Market and economic activities must be subordinated to the needs of communities. In Turkey inadequate schooling for women is the main reason for low labor participation in urban areas. Promotion of schooling and providing child care for working women as long- and short-term policy goals may increase their labor participation.

In the second section Nuran Hortaçoğlu, Sharon Baştuğ, and Olcay İnanoğlu discuss the impact of socio-cultural changes on the private sphere. The notion that industrialization and the associated value of individualism satisfies individual needs within the conjugal family is challenged by the results of a survey from Ashgabat, Baku and Ankara. The survey shows that predominant cultural values, and not the level of industrialization, define the variations in family function, types of family, the position of women, and marital relationships within families. A second study of Turkmenistan shows that patrilineal decent and patrilocal residence determine family structure where women are greatly valued as wives and mothers and devalued as daughters and sisters. Brideprice, indirect dowry, and the wedding as a rite of passage for women, are central to the cultural reproduction of this system. The Turkish marriage study of 456 families from three socioeconomic classes shows that socioeconomic development, higher level of education, and age of marriage play a role in the emergence of modern marriages, where couples seem to be more satisfied than in arranged marriages.

In section three, Azade-Ayşe Rorlich, Nükhet Sirman and Farideh Heyat analyze how discourse can play a dynamic role in changing gender roles and relations, and transform family structure. The contextual analysis of women’s journals in the Russian empire reveals the recognition by Muslim reformist (Jadid) writers of the importance of women’s emancipation and the dynamic role women play in national identity construction. This recognition challenged the images, constructed in Russian colonial literature, of Muslim women as submissive and passive. Contextual analysis of oppositional discourses in the early Ottoman empire revealed unequal relations of power among men, and
constructed new models of masculinity and femininity. Middle class men and women, through novelistic discourse, set the stage for the transformation of family from large and complex households to a nuclear family structure, and defined a new model of masculinity and femininity linked to love for fatherland and the nationalist project.

In the last section, Colette Harris, Ayşe Saktanber, Aslı Özataş-Baykal, Nayereh Tohidi, Dilarom Alimova, Nodira Azimova, and Seteney Shami discuss gender and the construction of national identity. Women in post-Soviet Tajikistan have three different kinds of identities. First, a public identity which was born out of the Soviet modernization agenda. Second, a private “ideal” feminine identity of “good” women which requires women’s submission to men and to parental domination. The third is their “real identity” where women use maneuvers for resistance at home and outside the home. In Uzbekistan, gender plays a central role in nation-state building. Women are very active in mahallas (neighborhood communities), however there is a rigid sexual division of labor. Characteristics expected of Uzbek women, such as modesty, chastity, tenderness, sacrifice, orderliness, cleanliness and hard work, are expressed in mahalla discourse and the activities supported by the media and paternalistic state policies. The new definition of femininity which provides the bases for national identity and new national Uzbek women is constructed through Islamic training and education. In post-Soviet Azerbaijan, the role of women in society is one of the targets of predominantly nationalist and male elite who are attempting to redefine the ethno-cultural and national identity of Azerbaijan. They emphasize women as custodians of national codes of conduct and traditions. The relation of domination and subordination among women in the North Caucasus is the focus of the last chapter. The author argues that memories are transmitted and tradition is constructed by domestic performances of rituals reinforcing domestic and kinship hierarchies. The older women (in-laws and grandmothers) hold power over daughters, daughter-in-laws and other younger female. This is how their identity is asserted.

This volume presents valuable information about the region and introduces diverse methodologies and approaches to the study of women’s issues. The empirical research in this book supports the argument that the Soviet Union and Turkey took major initiatives to shape women’s role in public life as strategy of modernization. The policies prioritized women’s education, and encouraged their integration into socio-economic and political spheres. However these secular policies did not eradicate gender discriminatory culture at home, which led to women’s double burden.

As the editor themselves agree, an overview and analysis of political dimensions from women who live in these countries is lacking in the present volume. I enjoyed this book, yet a couple of criticisms can be made. First, there is overlapping information about Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. This can create confusion among non-scholarly readers. Second, an additional approach is needed by the editors in order to foster a dialogue with activists and policy makers in these countries in addition to scholars. Although I may not agree with some of the polemical positions made in this book, I appreciate the suggestive introduction to the social and political and cultural consequences of global capitalism in this region. This book also invokes more empirical research for the understanding of gender-specific impact of global capitalism. I recommend this book as supplementary readings for Area Studies and Women Studies faculty and students.


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This attractively produced and written study effectively negotiates the territory between personal memoir and ethnographic monograph. Van Deusen is a performing storyteller, whose interest in performance and in the cultural practices and ideologies supporting the various kinds of narrative performances she encountered on several short research trips to in Turkic Siberia (Tuva and Khakassia) over a period of years, leads her to a
mode of investigation and presentation which is both ethnographically systematic and experientially positioned. The book can be read with profit by those with ethnographic interest in post-Soviet cultural recovery processes in Turkic Siberia, in shamanic religious and healing practices in general, and in socially contextualized studies of oral narrative performance. It is also very interesting as an example of reflexively positioned ethnographic writing.

The book begins with a personal vignette of illness and recovery from sunstroke, a healing mediated by a visit to a sacred site in the company of a Khakassian shaman colleague. This experience is recounted with a vivid sense of place, a wry sense of humor and minimal hype. All the individual shamans and storytellers appearing in the book are carefully profiled, with considerable samples of their personal experience narratives or family and professional history included. Their personal histories are effectively woven into the distinctive histories of the cultural pressure on Tuva and Khakassia during the Soviet period. This pressure had a more profound dampening effect on shamanic practice in Khakassia than in Tuva, for historical reasons recounted in the book. The alternation between general histories of the two republics and personal histories of living individuals presented, of their families and other practitioners, gives a human face to the cultural history. A major theme of the book is the assessment of shamanism as a set of healing procedures both for individuals and for the participating community in general. While talking about cultural recovery in the form of revitalization of shamanic practices in these small and culturally endangered populations, however, Van Deusen does not delve into the more general question of population scale and the problematic politics of cultural nationalism.

The narratives presented, generically speaking, are a combination of personal experience narratives, oral history, folktales, legend and anecdote. These renderings in English are clear, if somewhat low-key in style. Part of the stylistic flatness of the narratives may have to do with the translation process, which as the author explains, mainly involved working through Russian, even as the author worked to acquire some competence in the relevant Turkic languages. She does not discuss the stylistics of performance in normal social contexts, but relies on the rich implications of story content to convey a sense of the storytelling process.

One could wish for more analysis of performance styles from an author who is herself a performer, but the narrative content is itself very intriguing, and usually thoroughly explicated. Spiritual geography is outlined with appropriate narrative illustrations. There are also examples in English, with commentary, of algysht (traditional sung shamanic prayers, in verse), including a prayer for a new drum, and a "Shaman's Prayer to the Mountain." While musical notation is not provided, one chapter discusses at some length "the Power of Sound," the means by which music provides entry to the spiritual world. This process is illuminated with recounted legends. One gets a sense of the teaching of shamanic beliefs and practices through stories told, as a traditional method of instruction, though it is also clear that Van Deusen and her shaman and storyteller colleagues shared analytic discussions as well. The physical tools of shamans are well illustrated with photographs, supported by discussion of where tools come from, how they are used in practice, and where they go after the shaman's death or retirement from practice. The shaman's drum, as a living presence connected with the shaman's own life, is of central interest. The relationships between shamanic experience and its narratives, and the inspirational and performance processes of storytellers, which likewise may involve dangerous interactions with the spiritual world, are explored and illustrated with further narratives. Van Deusen notes the high social status accorded storytellers in general and epic singers in particular in the Turkic cultures of Central Asia. Her bibliography cites about 100 sources in Russian and English, one recording and several websites, and is offered as a guide for further reading.

In all, this is a satisfying and reader-friendly account, adding a carefully constructed, non-self-aggrandizing experiential dimension to the large research literature on shamanism. It is rich in quotations of performed texts. Though the translations generally do not convey the vibrancy of oral performance, this is an occupational hazard in the written presentation of verbal art. The author's own presence in the account is handled with discretion and always offered to the reader as a resource for understanding both what is observed and the limits of such understanding for an outsider. The book will interest general readers as well as those with more exposure to the topics of shamanism, story performance, and/or Soviet and post-Soviet cultural history.

Reviewed by: Tolga Koker, Visiting Assistant Professor of Economics, Hamilton College, Clinton, N.Y., USA, tkoker@hamilton.edu

This book, by Feroz Ahmad, a long time scholar of Turkey whose contributions to Turkish studies are considerable, compiles Ahmad’s vast knowledge of Turkey into a short history. Most recent books on Turkey, both academic and journalistic, focus topically on “Islamism” or “the Kurdish issue,” and conceptually on “civil society” and “identity.”

These books generally repeat the same “factual” developments, but are marred by weak theoretical frameworks. Unfortunately, Ahmad’s book has the same problems. Following the current trend, the book is misleadingly subtitled “The Quest for Identity.” Almost nowhere in the book except in the Preface (a couple of pages) is the question of identity discussed, let alone presented within a theoretical framework. Like other books in its publication series, a more proper subtitle would have been “A Short History.”

The book consists of seven chapters; the first three are on the Ottoman period and the remaining four on the post 1919 era. In the first three chapters, approximately one third of the book, Ahmad summarizes Ottoman history first from its establishment (around 1300) to the beginning of the westernizing reforms (1789); then the reform period until the constitutional revolution of 1908; and finally, the next 11 critical years (1908-1919) in the formation of contemporary Turkey. Without falling into the trap of orientalism, these chapters, rich in detail, cite the “important” events one after another in a very colorful way with some minor material mistakes. For example, Ahmed writes: “The opening of the Lycée of Galatasaray in 1868 ... was followed by other foreign religious institutions, such as Robert College” (p. 35). In fact, Robert College was chartered four years before, in 1864.

Aside from these trivial points, my major concern about the book is this: neither in these background chapters nor elsewhere in the book do we find a sustained, unified theoretical framework. Ahmad’s usually very short, partial explanations are always functionalist in essence, and he offers no mechanism that explains the rise and/or fall of the empire, let alone present Turkey. For this reason, the sub-text of some explanations reads as mere justifications. The text focuses on “what happened,” at the “top” level, and for Ahmad the object of history is the state/society (mainly state) without a state/social theory, and the people are just mere subjects. He rightly spends a chapter on the second constitutionalist period (1908-1918) to lay a strong background for the later chapters on the Republican years. Yet, he misses some good opportunities to make an argument about turning multiple identities into one seemingly “Turkish” national identity.

The four chapters on the Republican era are divided in a very traditional way: “Kemalist era (1919-1938)”; “Towards multi-party politics and democracy (1938-1960)”; “Military guardians (1960-1980)”; “The military, the parties and globalization (1980-2003).” Favoring the second constitutional period, Ahmad discounts the role of Kemalist reforms in the making of new Turkey. The last three chapters are very rich in describing the political panorama in the country. He elegantly incorporates many saws of the day such as “Pasha factor,” “the cunning fox” (the nicknames for President İnönü); *ortaderek* or central pillar (referring to middle class); “got things done” (President Özal’s motto for economic liberalization), etc. These chapters also absorb the main popular (usually leftist leaning) explanations from the literature in Turkish on post-war Turkey. He does not question their contextual origins, however. This blinds him in many ways. The chapter on “Military guardians (1960-1980)” reads, for example, as if the first military coup in 1960 was “progressive” for Turkey while the later two (1971 and 1980) were somehow “regressive.” For Ahmad, the conservative parties, first the DP and later the others, “exploited religion for political ends.” He even claims that the voters overwhelmingly (91.37%) approved the 1982 Constitution without liking it, just to end the military

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2 Exceptional books that present a specific theoretical framework in discussing Turkey include White (2002), Navaro-Yashin (2002) and Yavuz (2003).
regime and restore civilian rule. Such claims are debatable at best.

Ahmad’s explanations of economic conditions lack expertise. Even though he accurately describes the economic developments, as a non-economist he makes some crucial mistakes. He argues that the devaluations during the Second World War resulted in inflation (p. 103). This is quite impossible in a relatively closed economy even with some new liberal measures. The real reasons for the inflation between 1938 and 1946 were rationing and production bottlenecks due to increasing input costs. He literally translates so-called *hayali ihracats* of the 1980s (i.e., illegal refunds on the value-added taxes from exported commodities) as “phantom exports.” In the literature, they are commonly referred as “fictitious exports.” He also writes: “the lira sank to 1,700,000 liras. [sic]” The “per USD” is missing. And so on.

A couple of words on Ahmad’s style are in order. He prefers not to use any references or bibliography. There are only a few suggested (but unannotated) readings at the end of each chapter. All these prevent the enterprising reader from following up factual references and checking on sources. The book also has no heading for the cover picture. (It looks like Sultanahmet Mosque in Istanbul.) Aside from these trivial things, Ahmad exemplifies professional authorship.

The book is quite limited in terms of audience. It only provides good background information for undergraduate classes on the Middle East. In graduate classes, it may serve as a good starting point to criticize the existing classical literature on Turkey before covering the new theoretical perspectives about the region. For a scholar of Turkey, however, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity* does not go beyond nicely compiling factual developments. Staying within its course in presenting a short history, it has (perhaps intentionally) made no new contribution to the literature on Turkey. It does, however, reflect the labor and professionalism that Feroz Ahmad has long invested in studying Turkey, and, all in all, it celebrates the intellectual labor of his era.

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In the year 1254, Hülegü, grandson of Chinggis Khan (d. 1227) and brother of Möngke Qa’an (r. 1251-59), led a sizeable Mongol force southward from the Eurasian steppe toward Persia. Hülegü and his troops traveled at a leisurely pace, crossed the Amu Darya in January of 1256, and then, through alliance and conquest, rapidly established the foundations of the Il-Khanate, the Mongol state in the Middle East. Received wisdom characterizes the early decades of the Il-Khanid era as a tumultuous continuation of the earlier Mongol conquests, essentially defined by Hülegü’s sack of Baghdad and execution of the final ‘Abbasid Caliph, al-Musta’sim
Muslim peoples are presumed to have suffered under “heathen” Mongol rule until they finally found reprieve under Ghazan Khan (r. 1295-1304), the first of the Il-Khans to embrace Islam.

In this volume, George Lane exposes this scholarly tradition as a fiction at least partly based upon uncritical readings of the self-interested propaganda of Rashid al-Din, Ghazan Khan’s own Grand Vizier and author of several important historical works. Lane forcefully argues for a dramatic reinterpretation of the early decades of Il-Khanid rule, and his volume’s nine chapters address various aspects of the political and cultural history of Il-Khanid Persia during the reigns of the first two Il-Khans, Hulegu (1256-65) and his son Abuqa (1265-82). Almost from Hulegu’s arrival, the peoples of Persia — Muslim and non-Muslim alike — began to enjoy a period of stability, peace and prosperity that Lane labels “a Persian renaissance.”

Lane has accessed an impressive array of historical literature to support his thesis. His sources include: both official and unofficial histories from within the region and beyond, some well-thumbed and others more obscure; a wide variety of later sources that provide valuable information drawn from earlier works now lost to us; and an impressive corpus of poetry and Sufi literature. Lane has taken great care to scour these sources in search of corroboration, to detect and weigh biases, and to compensate for these biases whenever possible by balancing semi-reliable accounts of “sycophantic insiders” with the likes of Juzjani, who wrote his rather hostile history of the Mongol conquests while living in exile in the Delhi Sultanate.

Lane’s first order of business is to demonstrate that Hulegu arrived in Persia not as a conqueror bent on destruction but as a much anticipated ruler intent upon building a state. Persia had been under Jochid authority since the early Mongol conquests, although it served as little more than winter grazing grounds for Golden Horde troops. As the Jochid rulers of the Golden Horde focused their attention elsewhere, Mongol governance over the lands to the south faltered and the population suffered the lawless exploitation of parasitic governors. Lane’s evidence suggests that it was, indeed, Persians who first requested that Mongke Qa’an solidify Mongol control over Persia by building “a bridge of justice” (p. 16) across the Amu Darya so that they too might enjoy the peace and security of the Mongol Empire. The full circumstances surrounding Mongke Qa’an’s decision to dispatch his brother to Persia — and Hulegu’s decision to stay on permanently — remain uncertain, but it is reasonably sure that it was at least partly based on a rivalry between the sons of Tolui (Mongke, Hulegu and Qubilai) on the one hand and the Jochid rulers of the Golden Horde on the other. In any event, Lane argues that Hulegu arrived in Persia determined to eliminate the Isma’ili threat and to “restore justice, stability and prosperity, to claim his inheritance and to found a dynasty” (p. 18). By establishing his first capital at Maragheh, in Jochid Azerbaijan, Hulegu made clear his intention to do this at the expense of the Golden Horde (p. 41).

An especially important aspect of Lane’s discussion is his lengthy and detailed comparative analysis of three Il-Khanate provinces: Kirman, Herat and Shiraz. Here the reader finds valuable local histories as well as fascinating case studies of how the Il-Khans governed through largely autonomous local powers, and why some local areas flourished under Mongol rule while others floundered. The Qutlugh Khansids of Kirman and the Kart dynasty of Herat both recognized the opportunities afforded by embracing Hulegu’s authority. They proved their loyalty and enforced the rule of law, and their provinces grew strong and prosperous in the secure and predictable environment of the early Il-Khanate. At roughly the same time, the celebrated Persian poet Sa’di, who earlier had fled Shiraz, heard of Hulegu’s arrival and returned to his beloved homeland in anticipation of the peace and security that would result. The Turkmen Salghurid rulers (1148-1287) of Shiraz had also early on declared their loyalty to Hulegu and earned his patronage, but the dynasty quickly descended into a “culture of corruption” (p. 124). The Salghurids’ short-sighted and oppressive policies effectively undermined the rule of law, and Sa’di’s hopes met only with disappointment. While Mongol rule in Persia brought prosperity to most, their inability to govern effectively through the Salghurids illustrates both the limits of Mongol leadership at the local level and the limits of Lane’s “renaissance.”

The second half of the volume focuses attention on several ways in which state patronage encouraged the cultural efflorescence and religious dynamism characteristic of early Il-Khanid Persia. The first of these is a fascinating study of the Juwayni brothers, two members of an influential and powerful Persian family who used their position in the Mongols’ service to fund artistic creativity and myriad public institutions, including mosques, madrasas and Sufi khanaqahs [hostels], as well as
hospitals, pharmacies and insane asylums (p. 197). No individual personifies this golden age more than the celebrated scholar Khwaja Nasir al-Din Tusi (1201-1274), a highly regarded, if controversial, astronomer who flourished under his Mongol patrons. Next, Lane's study surveys the literary life of the Il-Khanate and describes the fertile cultural climate that produced such figures as Jalal al-Din Rumi, Rashid al-Din, 'Ata Malik Juwayni, Sa'di, and Safi al-Din Ishaq, the founder of the Safavid Sufi order. Of particular interest here is Lane's criticism of the widely accepted belief that the rise in popularity of Sufi orders in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was the direct result of a corresponding rise in spirituality caused by the overwhelming trauma associated with Mongol rule and the end of the Caliphate. Contrary to this, Lane argues that, Muslim scholars under Mongol rule were freed from the constraints of a corrupt and spiritually bankrupt Caliphate, and therefore enjoyed the liberty to approach their theological pursuits with increased vigor and without political interference (p. 254). Sufi orders were quite vibrant even prior to the Mongol conquests and Sufi khanqahs did indeed spread across Il-Khanate Persia, but this had more to do with an increase in patronage and mobility than any presumed spiritual crisis.

Lane's study is well researched and convincing, but the author's profound admiration and respect for his subject has occasionally led him to overcompensate in his effort to set the record straight. Thus, his assertions that, after suffering some 150 years of "anarchy" following the decline of Seljuk authority, Hulegu's "effectively secular" administration ushered in a "Persian renaissance" may be taken as literary hyperbole (p. 254-55). An effort to ground such generalizations more firmly in the appropriate historical contexts would have strengthened his discussion. It might also be observed that, while Lane clearly sets out to focus on the Il-Khanate, he has perhaps missed an opportunity to explore the obvious and potentially fruitful comparison between the Il-Khanate under Hulegu and Abaqa, and the coterminal establishment of the Mongol state in China under Hulegu's brother, Qublai.

But these are minor criticisms. In addition to illuminating an important and understudied period in the history of the Mongol Empire, George Lane effectively establishes that Perso-Islamic society flourished in the early years of the Il-Khanate; it is long since time that the labeling of Hulegu as "the scourge of Islam" be dismissed. Scholars and students with an interest in the history of the Mongol Empire, medieval Persia and the Middle East, and more generally the political and social history of the Islamic world will benefit from reading this important work.


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This "Ethnic Atlas of Uzbekistan" is not really an atlas, although it does have some good maps. Instead it is a curious but useful reference guide to the many ethnic groups living in contemporary Uzbekistan. The twenty-member authorial team, working under the auspices of Soros's Open Society Institute, aimed to produce a book that would interest both scholarly and general readers. Accordingly, the guide combines detailed essays on the ethnographic history of the Uzbeks with personal portraits, stories, full-color photos and essays on ethnic cultural centers and cemeteries. For those who read Russian the guide fulfills most of its goals, although academics may find the lack of consistency and full scholarly apparatus frustrating.

The book is divided into three sections: a dictionary of ethnic minorities in Uzbekistan, a comprehensive study of the origins of the Uzbeks themselves, and a miscellany of articles, photo essays and maps. The most interesting section for scholars is the long (84 pages) essay on the Uzbeks written by Alisher Ilhamov, with an appendix on the game ulak or ko'pkari (polo with a dead goat) by Salimjon Iuldashiev. Ilhamov combines historical, anthropological, and linguistic approaches to describe the development of Uzbeks as a nation, from Uzbek Khan in the fourteenth century to the post-Soviet period. This is an impressive synthesis of Russian (Imperial and Soviet) and Western scholarship, which draws from a wide range of work.
and is not overly constrained by ideology. In contrast to the Soviet and post-Soviet ethnogenesis tradition, which teaches that the Uzbek nation has existed in one form or another from ancient times, Ilkhamov writes: “It would be naive to represent the formation of the Uzbek nation as an ‘objective’ natural-historical process” (p. 288). He charts the many tribes from Turkic and Mongol origins that have contributed to the Uzbeks, and adds detailed prose descriptions of the most influential tribes. He uses some demographic data from 1989 and 2000, but most of his data come from ethnographic studies of the 1920s and earlier. His discussions of the history of the category “Sart,” the development of the modern Uzbek language and dialects and the creation of the Uzbek republic are detailed and balanced. For Western scholars there is nothing really new here, and his bibliography is not as comprehensive as one would like, but it is marvelous to have all of this material in one place.

Ilkhamov’s Uzbek colleagues, however, have angrily challenged his analysis on the basis of a fundamental difference over theoretical foundations. This debate can be followed in recent issues of Etnograficheskoe obozrenie, (2005: 1) and Ab Imperio (2005: 3; and 2005: 4).

The dictionary of ethnic minorities is fascinating to browse, but quirkily inconsistent. There are over 70 entries, from Austrian to Japanese (in Cyrillic alphabetical order). Each entry begins with a definition of the group, including self-designation, linguistic category, and religion. Population statistics are provided from two to six census data sets from 1897 to 2000, apparently chosen on a random basis. While not all groups have been present in Uzbekistan throughout the twentieth century, that does not account for all of the data gaps. Data from the 1939 census surface only a few times: they are used for the Kyrgyz and Karakalpaks, but not the Kazakhs or Turkmen. Data from 1937 are not used at all, even though they have been available since the late 1980s. The texts also vary widely. The entry on Americans consists of biographies of the 1920s boxing entrepreneur Sidney Jackson and the African-American cotton farmer John Golden. There is no attempt to look at the African-American refugees as a group, and nothing on the new cohort of Americans, mostly Peace Corps volunteers, that has settled in Uzbekistan since 1992. Whether the tiny American (or Belgian or Japanese) populations should even be considered as “ethnic groups” of Uzbekistan is a question the editors do not raise. The long entry on Jews is a systematic survey of six different Jewish subgroups, including the Karaites (population 55 as of 1989). Some entries include photographs and copies of personal letters, while others are very dry. Several are little more than lists of famous individuals from the given population. Each entry ends with a bibliography but, disappointingly, the citations are virtually all for Russian-language works. Even entries on the Ukrainians, Tatars and Tajiks refer to no works in those languages or in Western languages.

The reader will find maps in the final section of this atlas, 15 pages of full-color maps that show the geographic distribution of Uzbeks and the most important minority groups within the country. This section also includes a breakdown of the entire population based on the 1979 and 1989 censuses and many color photographs of ethnic cemeteries and groups.

While this “ethnic atlas” is an odd-ball compilation of material, it does provide much useful information and some insight into the state of independent Uzbek scholarship in these difficult times. Despite the fact that the Uzbek government forced the Open Society Institute to close in April 2004, one hopes that the Soros Foundation will continue to make this book available.