Reviews and Abstracts


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Serious, historically-grounded research on the regions where Muslim civilization has intersected with Russian and Soviet power finds some of its best representatives today in German scholarship, unburdened by the gross imbalance regrettably imposed on Central Asian or “Central Eurasian” studies in the United States by the preponderance of support for (and hence the production of) scholarly work that is supposedly relevant for policymakers (with deleterious results for both scholarship and policy). German scholarship has yielded both impressive monographic studies and significant cooperative projects enlisting the work of some of the finest scholars from the former Soviet world. The volume under review is the final offering in a series of three collections of articles on previously under-explored aspects of Muslim culture in imperial Russia and Central Asia. The first two were published in 1996 and 1998, and focused more narrowly on the 18th to early 20th centuries. The third, like its predecessors, marks an important and substantial contribution to scholarship, and the three volumes together have opened up a host of new perspectives on the foundations of current developments in the Muslim regions of the former Soviet Union.

This volume includes ten contributions (eight in German, one in Russian, and one in English), of widely varying lengths, by an outstanding international group of scholars with a deep and direct knowledge of the Islamic manuscript traditions of Central Asia, the Volga-Ural region, and the North Caucasus. Most involve both the translation and edition (or facsimile publication), with extensive annotation and commentary, of previously unpublished and largely unstudied texts, in Arabic, Persian, and Turkic, and most have been brought to scholarly attention for the first time through this volume. The focus on manuscript sources is particularly important in view of the overwhelming concentration of much previous scholarship on “Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia” upon printed material. The use of printing was in general more attractive to the least traditional elements in Muslim societies, who were often the most unrepresentative of the interests, tastes, and aspirations of their communities (even if they claimed to be their spokesmen), and Western scholarship’s emphasis on those who presented their Western-influenced ideas in Western-influenced media has inevitably yielded a skewed understanding of the real concerns of most Muslims under Russian rule, with unfortunate consequences that persist today. It may be said, indeed, that the neglect of the enormous body of material produced and surviving in manuscript form, from the Volga-Ural region, the Caucasus, and Central Asia lies at the heart of fundamental misunderstandings about Islam in those regions, both during the Soviet era and more recently, that have bedeviled the many “Sovietological” treatments of Islam in the Russian, Soviet, and post-Soviet environments.

The bulk of the volume is devoted to Central Asia, which is the focus of the first seven contributions, with the sixth presenting, in effect, a Volga-Ural perspective on Central Asia. In the first article, Jürgen Paul (Halle) edits and translates a brief discussion of the legitimacy of the vocal zikr, an issue central to Sufi practice and communal identity since the 13th century, with important political and social ramifications as well, composed by the eminent “theorist” of the Naqshbandi order, Khoja Muhammad Parsa (d. 822/1420). Next, Oleg F. Akimushkin (St. Petersburg) edits and translates a brief Persian treatise, by a 16th-century shaykh from a Central Asian Kubravi lineage, on the principles of mystical practice. Florian Schwarz (Bochum) presents a Persian poem on the Kubravi silsila, or
"chain" of mystical transmission, by another 16th-century master, the son of Husayn Khwarazmi, the most important Kubravi shaykh of Central Asia in that era. These two contributions mark the first significant publications of texts produced within the Kubravi Sufi tradition in 16th-century Central Asia, and thus offer essential material for the larger project of understanding the religious history, and hence the religious present, of Central Asia.

The fourth contribution, by Baxtiyar M. Babažanov [Babajanov] (Tashkent), provides a well-annotated Russian translation of a remarkable Sufi treatise, in Chaghatai Turkic, written early in the 19th century in Khorezm. The only complete manuscript copy of the work, copied in 1925 and preserved in Tashkent, is reproduced in facsimile. Entitled Khalvat-i sufiha, the anonymous work was prompted by a ritual gathering of Sufis in Khiva in 1813 convened by Qutluq Murad Biy, the powerful amir and elder brother of Eltuzer (the first khan of the Khorezmian Qongrat dynasty). The work offers unparalleled insights into the history of Sufi communities in Khorezm (on which considerable misinformation is still in circulation in Sovietological works).

Next, in the volume's longest contribution, Anke von Kügelgen (Bern) analyzes a series of letters written by an important Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi shaykh, Miyan Faiq Ahmad, to the Manghit ruler of Bukhara, Amir Haydar (r. 1800-1825), on a wide range of religious issues; the contents are summarized, with some texts presented partly in paraphrase and partly in translations. Both the material itself and von Kügelgen's exemplary analysis will be invaluable for tracing the various "reformist" currents, and their political implications, that took shape in the Central Asian khanates well before the Western-inspired Jadidist movement made its appearance under Russian tutelage. A different perspective on the religious situation in the Khanate of Bukhara during the early 19th century is presented in the contribution of Michael Kemper (Bochum), which offers an edition and translation of an early Arabic work by the famous Volga-Ural Muslim scholar, Shihab ad-Din Marjani (d. 1889), focused on the religious disputes of the latter's compatriot, Abu Nasr al-Qursavi (d. 1812), with the ulama of Bukhara. This article adds to Kemper's earlier studies of Marjani's religious writings, which, taken together, have offered important correctives to our understanding of this figure's life and works, beyond the often one-dimensional presentations embedded in nationalist appropriations of his legacy.

In the seventh piece, Agirbek K. Muninov (Tashkent) edits and translates one of the many genealogical texts (nasab-nama) he and his colleagues have uncovered in recent years outlining the "sacred history" and familial traditions of the Khoja groups among the Qazaqs [Kazakhs] of the Syr Darya basin. The Khoja phenomenon is an important aspect of social and religious life throughout Central Asia, but remains poorly understood, and the term is still often the subject of a ludicrous confusion with hajji in the Sovietological literature. The version presented here is in Persian, and is preceded by an invaluable discussion of the corpus of such genealogical texts collected so far. Muninov's extensive notes to his translation likewise help make accessible the data from many other versions of these texts. The Volga-Ural region is represented in the contribution, in English, of Allen J. Frank (Maryland), who presents, in edition and translation, a substantial excerpt from an extraordinary work of "local history" preserved in a unique manuscript in Kazan. The work, entitled Tavarikh-i Alti Ata, was completed in 1910 by Muhammad-Fatih b. Ayyub al-Ilmin, and outlines a geographical and historical vision of a small part of the Volga-Ural Islamic community. Frank has also published a detailed study of this work's contents in his Muslim Religious Institutions in Imperial Russia, but this article is valuable for its presentation of extended portions of the text itself. The work represents the outlook, on the eve of the revolutionary changes in imperial Russia, of an educated Muslim who was neither unaffected by or resistant to the changes of that era, nor enamored of the responses to them shaped by Russian education and culture — for example, he writes of a Jadid school in his area closing for lack of interest (p. 462) — and whose understanding of his own community was self-confident enough to be self-critical. As such, it offers an excellent example of the kind of literary production that will be missed by those who assume that only printed material could be representative of significant written culture in this period, and of the kind of thought and worldview that is so often missed because of the inordinate attention in Sovietological and post-Soviet nationalist circles devoted to the handful of Jadidist reformers active in the same era.

Finally, two much shorter contributions represent the North Caucasus. First, Rukiya Sharafutdinova (St. Petersburg) edits and translates
two Arabic letters (the first by the famous "Imam Shamil") from the 1830s; the letters reflect not only the struggles of this era between Russian troops and the local Muslim population, but internal tensions within the Muslim community as well. The final piece is a facsimile publication and translation by Aleksandra N. Kozlova (Makhachkala) of a 16th-century Persian document reflecting Safavid control over the principalities of southern Daghestan; it may serve as a reminder that Iranian interests in the regions of the "Russian borderlands" are not merely the product of the post-Soviet era.

The contributions are all of the highest scholarly quality, and the editors have done an excellent job of standardizing transliterations and references. The facsimiles are clear and legible, and both the printed Arabic-script texts and the Russian, German, and English texts are well produced, with relatively few typographical errors. It is worth underscoring here, finally, the value of the material presented in this volume for illuminating the vast world of Muslim culture as affected by Russian and Soviet rule, that remains hidden to readers more familiar with Soviet, Sovietological, nationalist, or policy-dominated studies of the relevant regions. It is hoped that such readers, instead of dismissing the volume's focus on manuscript sources as hopelessly arcane or being put off by its Arabic-script text and facsimiles, or ignoring it because it fails to deliver the concise platitudes on Islam that fill much existing work on the subject, will recognize that manuscript sources such as those explored in this volume are in fact the key repository of the traditions of Muslims in the regions in question and often provide the only possible link between what came before the Soviet era's impact on Islam, and what has come to the fore since the end of Soviet antireligious campaigns. A dramatic improvement of our understanding of Islam in Central Asia and elsewhere in the former Soviet world is now especially urgent. The steady stream of superficial works on Islam in the Soviet and post-Soviet environments shows all too clearly that such improvement will not come from within the circles that have produced and consumed those works for several decades, but must come instead from the sort of work represented by the three fine volumes of Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia.

References

Frank, Allen J.


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This is a story about the failure of one colonial endeavor, namely the attempt by Tsarist Russia to incorporate its remote Asiatic colony, Turkestan, within its imperial structures. This story is framed by a second story dealing with the 1916 Revolt in Central Asia, which serves as both evidence and outcome of this failure. Russian Turkestan, the annexation of which began with the conquest of Tashkent in 1865 by General Cherniaev, was to become Russia's ambitious colonial project. Russian Turkestan covered the territory of the present Central Asian states (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan), as well as the southern part of Kazakhstan. First considered in terms of colonial expansion and domination, Turkestan was later to contribute to the creation of Russia's civilizing image, which would put Russia on a par with the Western colonial states. As an attractive immigration destination for Slavic land-hungry peasants and a successful cotton-growing colony, Turkestan also promised to facilitate the solution for Russia's domestic problems.

Brower traces the history of the creation of colonial Turkestan, which unfolds as he discusses the debates between central and local authorities that lasted until the end of the empire in 1917. He builds his narrative on a thorough analysis of archival material he collected at the Uzbek Central State Archives (Tashkent), the Military Historical Archives of the Russian Federation (Moscow) and the Russian State Historical Archives (St. Petersburg). Many of these valuable and until
recently unknown documents demonstrate among other things the different legal statuses that the empire had assigned to its two Asiatic colonial bodies, Turkestan and the Steppe Territories (meaning most of present-day Kazakhstan). In this regard, the identification of Russian Turkestan with "Central Asia" confuses the terminology. For the latter term did not figure in this sense in Russia's imperial historiography, but has often been used in Western historiography to denote the territories of five former Soviet Republics: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan.

As Brower presents it, the crux of the aforementioned debates centered on the organization of Turkestan's colonial administration. Those who based their arguments on the region's uniqueness, conditioned by the strong Islamic influence, advocated an authoritarian approach. Their opponents believed in the civilizing role of reforms and so favored an active interference into native structures, aimed at remodeling them along imperial lines. The hard-liners in the end prevailed, or in the words of Brower, "authoritarian rule was permitted to take precedence over colonial reform" (p. 174), and Turkestan remained under military rule up to 1917. This debate had also another dimension: was Turkestan to be granted a special colonial status analogous with those overseas colonies of Britain and France, or was it to become a part of the Russian state? It was in this context that the reformers proposed the notion of *grazhdanstvennost* (citizenship) as reflecting their vision of integration. Under the influence of Enlightenment ideas, colonial terminology had evolved from *obrashenie* (Russianization), meaning the imposition of Russian structures, toward the ideas of paternalism, progress and "the ideal of a shared citizenship for all subjects of the state, who were to enjoy rights and to fulfill certain obligations" (p. 174). The subsequent evolution of *grazhdanstvennost* into *gosudarstvennost* (statehood) under the Stolypin government (1906-1911) led to the mass immigration and settlement of Central Asia by Slavic peasants, which in the end provoked the outburst of the 1916 Revolt.

Here one can argue that the interference with native structures envisioned by the reformists like Oirs, a member of the 1867 Steppe Commission, can also be regarded as authoritarian, for it stipulated their destruction. Moreover, the "integration through ethnic collaboration" advocated by another reform-minded official, Count Konstantin von Pahlen, had from the very outset an obviously utopian character, for these principles proved unrealizable in Russia itself. Hence, one remains puzzled over how the reformists intended to put their ideas into practice. A related question is, did all these debates and the ensuing legislation have any effect on the natives and their structures or did they remain only a colonial discourse "in the corridors of power" (p. xi)? Similarly, in the light of other data, the conquest of Turkestan seems to have been a doubtful rather than a straightforward colonial project dictated by central authoritarian rule. General Cherniaev's military campaign irritated even some higher government officials and left them puzzling over its possible implications (Geyer 1987, Kuleshov et al. 1997).

A closer examination of words in their relation to reality is more important as one takes into consideration that colonial policies were often conducted in Central Asia by administrative means and without any basis in law. This was particularly true for the resettlement policies, including the regulation of immigration, which had affected the nomads especially badly. These nomads would later be the main actors and victims of the 1916 Revolt. In the end they found themselves facing an unsolvable dilemma: either to settle on their own or lose their best grazing lands to settlers (pp. 126-151). Yet while the Central Asian nomads were deprived of their pasture lands by the 1868, 1886 and 1891 Tsarist statutes, Turkestan's native sedentary populations, contrary to Brower's assertions (p. 61), were granted their tilled lands by the 1886 Turkestan Statute. Only wild forests and the so-called "free" lands were to be considered the state's property. However, the natives could claim their right only after an approval by their local authorities based on a preliminary survey of their plots (Masevich 1960). It was precisely the execution of these land surveys (which also were to be carried out in nomadic areas to determine the amount of "excessive" lands) that became the tricky point of the whole issue. They were either never conducted, or when conducted their results proved useless or were not considered by local resettlement bureaucrats.

If the nomads and peasants were left to operate at their own discretion while settling their land conflicts, the Cossacks were granted legislative privileges, including financial and educational independence. They not only owned large portions of land in Semirechye (Zhoti Su), which became a hotbed of the 1916 Revolt, they also actively participated in the revolt's suppression. These
Cossacks also were involved in the conquest of other Central Asian territories, such as Khiva, Kokand, Merke, Pishpek, and Shimkent. However, Brower barely mentions the Semirechye Cossacks and their land conflicts with the natives, peasants and central authorities.

Brower’s portrayal of the important colonial figures, including N. A. Kryzhanovskii, Petr Semenov (Tian-Shanskii), Aleksei Kupratkin, Nil Lykoshin, and, especially the first Governor-General of Turkestan Konstantin von Kaufman, accompanied by the elucidation of their ideas, is the most valuable contribution of the book. The charismatic personality of Kaufman occupies a particular place in the confrontation between the conservatives and the reformists. Although in theory he adhered to reforms, as a governing official he saw clearly that insistence on Russian ways might provoke native protests. Instead he favored a policy of non-interference, because of the strong influence Islam wielded in Turkestan. Kaufman’s emphasis on ethnographic knowledge to provide the necessary tools for a more active approach to Islamic cultural structures in the future formed therefore an indispensable part of his policy of ignoring Islam. Hence, his stance toward Islam should be regarded first of all as pragmatic, like that of Catherine II, who promoted religious toleration. In contrast to Kaufman, however, the Empress regarded the establishment of control over Islam by means of its bureaucratization as the most effective way to govern her Muslim subordinates. Elsewhere she initiated the establishment of state-controlled Islamic institutions, with their clergy paid by the state and fully subordinated to it. Thanks to his authority, Kaufman was able to realize his religious policies in Turkestan, while the religious policies of Catherine II were considerably revised in other Islamic regions of the empire.

Kaufman’s policies of disregarding Islam did not disturb one “private domain of Islamic piety” (p. 33), namely the pilgrimage to Mecca. The section “Resurgent Popular Islam” (pp. 114-125) describing the pilgrimage’s history, constitutes one of the most informative and interesting parts of the book. Yet, the impact of Kaufman’s policies on other aspects of Islamic life, especially the Islamic leadership, remains somewhat vague. As the description of the 1898 Andijan Revolt led by the Sufi leader Madali Ishan hints, Kaufman’s restrictive measures against the urban Islamic clergy seem to have reactivated their rural colleagues represented by the Sufis. For their part, the clergy reemerged in the form of the powerful conservative Islamic organization Shura-i-Ulama which played an important role in the political events between the two 1917 revolutions in Turkestan. As this suggests, a closer investigation than Brower provides of the participation of both groups of Islamic leadership in the 1916 Revolt could lead to a better understanding of the impact of imperial policies. One impact was that Central Asian Muslims repeatedly expressed a desire to have separate religious boards for Turkestan and the steppe provinces, noting this in petitions sent to central authorities in the period following the 1905 Revolution. Although vacillating at times, the government’s position, under the alleged threat of pan-Islamic propaganda, finally shifted from reluctant to restrictive modes.

Brower also neglects the impact of imperial policies on the emergence of another group of native leaders, the Russian/Western-oriented non-Jadid intelligentsia. He limits himself to mentioning only one of them, the Kazakh engineer, Mukhamejtjan Tynshbaev, the future first president of the Turkestan (Kokand) Autonomous State. Apart from Tynshbaev, we learn about one native businessman and a merchant who unsuccessfully tried to adopt Russian ways, but unfortunately nothing about Mustafa Shooqai [Chokhaev], Turar Risqulov [Ryskulov], Sanjar Aspaniatar, Sultanbek Kojanov, Sherali Lapin, and other distinctive natives, whose participation in the political events preceding the establishment of Bolshevik power in Central Asia was in many ways determined by their colonial educational background. One small inaccuracy in the chapter dealing with educational reform needs also be pointed to, namely the fact that not the Kazakh, but the Tatar language, was used by colonial bureaucrats in Kazakh business correspondence (p. 71). These critical remarks, however, are not intended to diminish the value of Brower’s book. They rather prove that an original study always prompts not only diverse opinion but also fresh ideas that might inspire new investigations.

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This work is a study of institution-building in post-Soviet Central Asia. Specifically, Jones Luong presents a detailed and neatly-formulated frame through which electoral systems in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were negotiated and adopted. The author focuses on the disparities among the electoral systems of the three countries and formulates her research question as “Why did three states with similar cultural, historical and structural legacies establish such different electoral systems?” (p. 25).

Jones Luong’s answer to this question is an innovative synthesis of two broad schools of thought in the study of regime change and political transitions, namely what Herbert Kitschelt once called process (or agent) oriented “transitions” literature and the preconditions school of regime change (Kitschelt 1992). Agent-oriented or voluntarist studies focus on the transition process itself and place more emphasis on the transformative capacity of human agency, while the preconditions school, in its various versions, associates particular historical configurations of structural or cultural variables with variation among regimes. Jones Luong combines theoretical insights from Historical Institutionalism (HI) and Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI), using HI to identify the structural/historical background which determines the initial conditions, such as who are the relevant actors, their preferences and the preexisting power asymmetries (pp. 38-39). In the transitional context, Jones Luong relies on RCI to account for the “the degree to and direction in which the initial parameters shift or change ... in response to new opportunities or constraints presented by the situation” (p. 26). She develops what she calls a “transitional bargaining game (TBG) in which the dynamic interaction between the structural-historical context and the immediate strategic context directly shapes actors’ perceptions of shifts in their relative power as the game proceeds, and hence, their bargaining strategies” (p. 25). Institutions, the author argues, are created by actors who seek distributional advantages under conditions of asymmetrical power distribution. According to her model, Soviet institutions molded regionalism as the overarching identity and thus provided the actors (regional and central leaders) with clear preferences: to maintain or increase their power in relation to others. To the degree that the transitional context deals an exogenous shock to the system, antecedent conditions change, and so do actors’ perceptions of power distribution in the system and their bargaining strategies.

In Chapter 3, Jones Luong engages in lengthy discussions to prove that the Soviet Union left identical historical legacies in these three Central Asian states - which she needs as evidence for the Historical Institutionalist component of her study that regionalism, and only regionalism, shapes the parameters of politics in the region. In what will surely become her most controversial claim, she asserts that “Soviet policies and institutions in Central Asia created, transformed and institutionalized regional political identities, while at the same time eliminating tribal, religious, and national identities, weakening them, or confining them to the social and cultural spheres” (p. 52). Regionalism in her usage corresponds to the Soviet administrative-territorial units. She employs a highly functionalist view of identities when she argues that identities serve to connect institutional legacies to actors’ preferences; “identities which I characterize as an investment that individuals make in response
to structural incentives, will persist as long as they continue to yield the benefits for which they were initially adopted" (p. 48). Accordingly, in Central Asia, Soviet policies and institutions transformed pre-Soviet identities with a complex set of incentives and disincentives so that individuals’ primary source of identification has become their region (p. 53).

As the structural-historical background delineated the predominant fault lines in the region, the ongoing transitions opened a window of opportunity for renegotiation and change. That is what the author details in Chapter 4. Transitions bring uncertainty into the environment, alter the existing power distribution and thus feed the desire for change. With the post-Soviet transitions, according to Jones Luong, Central Asian republics started to differ from each other. Relatively comprehensive, rapid reformation in Kyrgyzstan altered the perception of power distribution in favor of regional leaders, while centralized, modest political and economic reforms in Uzbekistan enhanced the power of central leaders. Kazakhstan transitions, representing a case somewhere in between the other two, boosted the perceptions of increasing power among both regional and central leaders (p. 103).

In Chapters 5 through 7, Jones Luong applies her theory to her empirical data in order to explain the variation in the electoral outcomes induced by the perceptions of shifts in relative power. In Kyrgyzstan, because of a relatively rapid and comprehensive reform process, regional leaders exerted the greatest impact on election outcomes. Uzbekistan represented the exact opposite, as the central leaders almost unilaterally imposed the terms of the new electoral system. In Kazakhstan, the "mixed" case, the irregularity of the reform process gave similar signals to both central and regional leaders that power was increasing in comparison with the other side. As a result, the first and defunct electoral law of December 1993 was followed by a constitutional crisis, and a new law was adopted in September 1995 after a second round of negotiations (p. 215). Unlike the first law, which was a victory for the central leaders, the 1995 law incorporated interests of the regional actors. The Kazakh case was also different in that in addition to regionalism, ethnicity played a crucial role in the preference formation process. Jones Luong’s discussion of the cases reveals that the preferences of the actors were not uniform across cases. To give an example, central leaders in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan wanted the registered parties to nominate candidates, while regional leaders completely opposed this proposal and favored the Soviet era practice, in which local workers’ collectives and residential committees had the right of nomination (pp. 167, 200). In contrast, in Kazakhstan both central and regional leaders resisted party nomination; central leaders preferred self-nomination, the Supreme Soviet favored the Soviet era practice, and regional leaders wanted the right to be granted to regional akims (p. 228).

In the last chapter, Jones Luong situates her research in the larger context of debates over political transitions and institutional change. Institutional residues of the ancient regime, according to Jones Luong, were expected to be substantive because of what is called "pacted-stability," where established elites survived to the new era and preserved the existing institutional setting which endowed them with significant power (p. 278). Unlike other Central Asian countries, Tajikistan, she argues, failed to resolve "political battles" "through balancing regional and central interests" because of the emergence of a strong alternative elite who failed to come to terms with the "regional power-sharing system institutionalized under Soviet rule" (p. 274).

The scope of Pauline Jones Luong’s book goes far beyond her three cases. She not only methodically brings the “transitology” literature into Central Asian studies, but also carries Central Asian cases to the larger comparativist community. In so doing, she aims to overcome the widely-discussed poverty of transitology literature by applying theoretical insights from other disciplines. In general, comparativists have become too dismissive of a thorough area expertise, while “area specialists” tend to be too focused to engage with the larger world (Bates 1997). Jones Luong’s study demonstrates how rewarding, and arduous, it can be to strike a balance between them.

Yet Jones Luong’s reduction of Soviet legacies into unidimensional and highly functionalist regionalism obscures much of what exists on the ground, regardless of comparativists' concern for abstract modeling. She overstates her case when she asserts that regionalism “emerged as the most salient socio-political cleavage in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan” (p. 63). She treats identities as structured, hierarchized and stable categories, some of which inhabit the privileged sphere of politics, and some of which do not. Identities are not such neatly demarcated and exclusionary categories in the minds of those who hold them. Our subjects are not
trained comparativists and they have every right to be nonconformist. Jones Luong herself concedes that “similar to press accounts, interviewees often used the word tribalism to convey regionalism” (p. 179, n 53). Identities are highly contextual; there are many instances in which tribe, ethnicity, or religion become politically as significant as regional identity. There is little reason to think that the Soviet-endowed oblast’ [province] identity made the struggle between Dulats and Kongrats of Shimkent politically less relevant. A Dulat representative negotiates the new electoral law not only in terms of its implications for the Shimkent Province, but also in terms of its impact on the existing power configuration between Kongrat and Dulat voters in the region. We now have ample evidence that the Soviet state itself institutionalized tribal identities, informally integrating them into its governing structures at every level. The infamous “tribal map” of Kazakhstan lying unfolded on the desk of the second secretary of Communist Party of Kazakhstan was an open secret in Almaty.

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This is the third in a series of books on the Central Asian states since independence, edited primarily by Boris Rumer of Harvard University’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. Either by accident or design, this collection of eight essays on the economies of the region is suffused with an explicit pessimism that stems from the monumental difficulties each country faces by having to “go it alone.” Chief among the difficulties are: the legacy of the Soviet command economy, which has left the new states’ governing elites unprepared for globalization and unwilling to loosen the reins of power; the region’s geographical isolation, which creates serious obstacles to trade; and the impoverishment of much of the rapidly growing population, which makes unlikely a recovery driven by domestic consumer demand.

Collectively, the eight cogent, clearly-written essays argue that it will be extremely difficult for the Central Asian states to even recapture the level of economic development they had before independence. The dismantling of the command economy at independence led to a catastrophic collapse in per capita GDP among all the new states, yet a new model for sustainable development has not come into being. Stanislav Zhukov, a senior research associate of the Russian Academy of Sciences and contributor of four of the essays, correctly emphasizes that aside from Kazakhstan the Central Asian economies are primarily agrarian. None of the Central Asian states has, however, paid more than lip service towards observing what Zhukov terms “the iron laws of development,” which hold that balanced growth in an economy overall must be based on growth in productivity in the agrarian sector, preferably driven by private farms.

Instead, Zhukov sees “controlled degradation” as the most appropriate characterization of the region’s economic prospects over the medium term. In such a scenario one can imagine Central Asia in the aggregate resembling Algeria: the state controls the exploitation of commodity resources and may apply the revenues to subsidize economic activity and forestall social unrest; the economy remains vulnerable to changes in world commodity prices; agriculture remains underdeveloped and private enterprise is of minimal importance to economic growth. Among Central Asian economies, Kazakhstan alone has posted robust GDP growth (9.5% in 2002) without submitting to the “iron laws”; unsurprisingly, this growth is driven mainly by its hydrocarbon exports.

If balanced growth based on the heavy promotion of an independent private agrarian sector is not on the agenda in Central Asia, then growth will have to come from massive promotion of raw
material exports. In their essays on the development of trade and markets, Eskender and Eshref Trushin, research economists in Uzbekistan, note the importance of prioritizing structural reforms for agricultural exports, especially in those countries that cannot rely on the exporting of minerals. They maintain, however, that “not a single country of Central Asia has yet made export orientation the strategic basis for development” (p. 139). This holds true for most of the region, but less so for Kazakhstan, which has actively pushed development of its hydrocarbon exports.

Oksana Reznikova, like Zhukov a senior researcher at the Russian Academy of Sciences, offers perhaps the sole note of optimism in the book. She postulates a new “Silk Route” for the 21st century, feasible only if each of the Central Asian nations succeeds in developing its comparative advantage in trade with China and the rest of the Asian-Pacific region. The problem is that a comparative advantage can be maintained only if exporters are efficient enough to adapt to price changes in markets with freely convertible currencies. Such production efficiencies will be hard to achieve in agriculture without massive investment and privatization.

In sum, Central Asia and the New Global Economy offers a sobering look at the prospects for sustained and equitable development of the region’s economies. The reader is left to ponder: how can these nations possibly dig themselves out of their economic morass? One would do well to remember that nowadays no economy is completely immune to the consequences of exogenous trends. To a degree not foreseen when the book went to press, the underlying themes of the book — the commodity-based structure of the Central Asian economies and the growing restlessness of the region’s populations — will continue to attract the world’s attention because of two extremely important developments in world politics and economics.

First among these developments is the emerging counterterrorism strategy of the United States, which seeks to reduce dependence on the Middle East as a source of energy, and to provide preemptive economic and political support to states deemed to be in danger of collapse and vulnerable to terrorist infiltration. Such support would most likely take the form of financial aid, supplied on very generous terms by agencies affiliated with or heavily influenced by the US government, such as USEXIM, USAID and the IMF. This is analogous to the politically-driven generosity of the United States towards nearly-bankrupt Pakistan in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks on US soil. The United States rescheduled its portion of $12.5 billion of loans made by the Paris Club of donors to Pakistan, wrote off $1 billion of its $3 billion in bilateral official debt with that nation and early in 2004 resolved to cancel another $460 million. Because of political expediency the United States has deemed Pakistan “too important to default.” In the event a strategically important Central Asian state finds itself in serious financial distress, such US financial largesse may be its reward if its leaders play their political cards right.

The second development is the emergence of China as one of the world’s leading economic powers and consumers of raw materials. As it grows it is likely to turn more towards commodity-producing Central Asia, whose commerce with China may come to dwarf its trade with any other of its export markets.

It is indeed possible that a decade from now the region’s economies will still be characterized by “controlled degradation.” Nevertheless, the book’s gloomier, more dramatic predictions, such as mass starvation (p. 273), may be proven wrong by both these geopolitical and economic sea changes, which may yet turn out to be Central Asia’s economic salvation.


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This text, which predates the events of September 11, 2001, was prepared, as the introduction notes, as a tool for “opinion leaders” and other users (as opposed to producers) of information. It is the result of a conference in Bishkek in 1999, and as such may be of greatest interest to those who wish to learn
how Islam was construed at that moment in time. For this purpose the text is very useful.

For anyone who has tried to present Islam in Central Eurasia to high school students and undergraduates, the dearth of English-language materials giving students access to primary sources about contemporary Central Eurasians’ experience of Islam does not need to be explained. Only a few works like those of the Shirket Gah collective (Tokhtakhodjaeva and Turgumbekova 1996) compile a number of voices and perspectives from Central Eurasians themselves. This is not to say that Western scholars’ work is not important, but that giving our students direct access to alternative voices is a first step in helping them understand the diversity that is Islam.

The articles here voice quite well the variations of understanding across the Central Eurasian republics. Most of them begin with a context for their remarks, and the authors usually provide a history of Islam in their region or republic. The book consists of several major sections. The first, “Central Asia and Islam from Within,” includes an overview article by Roald Sagdeev and articles on Islam in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan by Anara Tabyshaltieva, Abdumannob Polat, Sacdot Olimova and Roustem Safronov, respectively. The section “Russia and Central Asia: the Interconnections,” features articles by Archbishop Vladimir of the Orthodox Diocese of Bishkek and All Central Asia concerning “similarities” between Islam and Christianity, Marat Murtazin on Muslims in Russia, and Victor Panin on the North Caucasus. The final section, “Central Asia and Outside Influences,” presents chapters by Aleksei Malashenko on Russian relations with Central Asia, Shireen T. Hunter on Iran and the post-independence communications flow concerning Islam in Central Asia, M. Hakan Yavuz on Turkey’s political relationships with Central Asia, and Ahmed Rashid on Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s relations with Central Asia concerning Islam.

The two most successful articles are those of Hunter and Rashid. Hunter discusses the influence and non-influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its Shi‘ism; balanced and careful, she does not fall into the label-ridden polemical tactics found in many of the other articles. Rashid, by placing in context the political influences on Central Asia from Afghanistan and Pakistan, likewise presents a political sphere full of complications; he points out some of the instances in which governments have manipulated the image of Islam while discussing government support of militarized radicalism. These articles would surely provide a solid base for those whose policy decisions one might want to inform.

Policy might have been informed as well by contrasting different authors’ ideas. For example, Yavuz, whose article describes the various attitudes the Turkish government has struck vis-à-vis the governments of the Central Asian republics, presents Islam as an “ethnocultural” force to be utilized as Turkey attempts to move beyond its “big brother” political aspirations toward “normalization.” This contrasts sharply with Panin’s vision of Islam reinvigorated in the Caucasus by outside forces, including some from Turkey in Chechnya. An index would have made an enormous difference in the imagined end users’ ability to compare and contrast these kinds of ideas. Is Turkey acting as a secular state in promoting a certain kind of Islam?

Someone looking to compile “facts” about earlier Islamic history in Central Eurasia will find little of interest here. Unfortunately, the “facts,” most often presented without any discussion, sometimes include errors: “[The] Yesiviyye became the intellectual origins of the Naksibendiyye [sic] and Bektasyya [sic] ... Thus Yesevi and his vernacularized understanding of Islam has been the dominant form of Islam in the Turkic world,” (Yavuz, pp. 204-205). Naqshbandis in almost any era would find this a wrong-headed statement, given Yasavi’s subsidiary role in the order and the two groups’ apparent competition during the Naqshbandiya’s formative stages in Central Eurasia. At the same time, this emphasis on Yasavi is an indicator of a pattern of thought that is prominent in circles where there is a desire to emphasize the Turkic over the Persianate (Schubel 1999). This is but one of many interpretive quandaries that an “objective” reader might have with the text. Sufism in general is stereotyped nearly as much as “Wahhabis” are, although there are cautionary notes in two separate articles (Hunter, p. 175; Rashid, p. 220). While there are many scholars with far more complicated understandings of these issues, their voices are not heard here.

There is a great deal of useful information to be gleaned from this text. Abdumannob Polat, who has published elsewhere in English about dissent in Uzbekistan, gives us more data concerning the interactions between the government and dissenting voices in Uzbekistan which aids understanding of the motivations and complexities of dissent in
Central Eurasia. The many “histories” at the beginning of articles allow us to see Islam through the lens of those trained largely during the Soviet era, as in the contribution by Roustem Safronov. Both Polat’s and Safronov’s successes lie in their descriptions of Uzbekistan’s and Turkmenistan’s manipulation of Islamicate images (and imaginings) to the benefit of those in government.

Archbishop Vladimir’s nationalist agenda is clear when he links Great Russian nationalism with Orthodoxy in the same way he sees Islam linked to the titular nationalities’ nationalisms in Central Asia. His claim that “Islam has much more Christianity to it than many other denominations that claim to be Christian” (p. 98) will probably come as a surprise to many a Christian and Muslim; that it honors a “let’s get along” program is commendable. Yet a tendentious mindset is visible in many articles, such as that of Archbishop Vladimir, who apparently does not view any “Slavs” as being “native” to Central Eurasia (p. 97). Marat Murtazin, whose article attempts to cover Muslims in Russia from the ninth century onward, presents his own impressions of life in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and cites no sources. He also blames what might be termed “activism” in southern Russia and Tajikistan on “Islamic missionaries” (p. 128) and their literature, from which he argues for government protection, although to his credit, he mentions that “not all foreign Islamic organizations are responsible for subversive activity” (p. 129). Only after two pages of trying to show a “history” of “Wahhabism” does he mention that “Wahhabi” is used to “denounce any Islamic leader — or any Muslim” (p. 130). He stereotypes Russians as unable to think for themselves (p. 131), and as people who view “anyone who professes Islam” automatically as an enemy, while on the same page he says that “Muslims in Russia should be satisfied with the present state of religious freedom,” a statement that unwittingly echoes certain American statements about African-Americans during struggles over civil rights. Yet the utility of statements like these in the classroom can be immense.

One can only hope that the “opinion leaders” towards whom this text is directed will find more complex images of Islam, Sufism and “Wahhabis” than they might find here. Given the lack of an index, or even page numbers in the Table of Contents, however, they would need to read the entire work to find the breadth of the discussion. Old saws about “survivals” from non-Islamic religions, “popular Islam,” and Sufism’s opposition to and by “religious scholars” are reflexively called upon as tropes. For correctives, DeWeese presents complex views of “survivals,” (DeWeese 2000), as do Knysh on Wahhabis (Knysh 2002, 2004) and Gross on “popular” Islam (Gross 1999). DeWeese’s work also explores how Soviet constructions of Islam have shaped even Western scholarship (DeWeese 2002). Thus, while this text is probably not useful for the readers that its editors had in mind, it is not completely without utility. We all need the flow of information to and from Central Eurasia to increase, and this text’s facilitation of that flow must, in the end, be applauded.

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The division of the world into regions is a matter of custom, but in order to become imprinted on popular geographical imaginations, regions must be identifiable in the abstraction of cartographic representation. Central Asia has not consistently been considered as a single region. In many historical atlases, Central Asia is, literally, at the margin of maps focused on Russia, China, Europe, South Asia, or the Middle East, or is portrayed as an ephemeral space over which trade, migrations and invasions pass between genuinely important places. It is this gap that Bregel seeks to fill in publishing his *Historical Atlas of Central Asia*. The atlas' core concern is the portrayal of the historical political geography of Central Asia — the territory and ethnicity of nomadic and sedentary polities and their boundaries, along with significant military campaigns and battles.

The atlas consists of 49 maps on high-quality, large format color plates. “Central Asia” is defined as that area from the Caspian Sea in the west to Lake Lop-Nor in the east, and from the Hindu-Kush mountains in the south to the limits of the Steppe Belt in the north. The majority of the maps are projected onto this same template. The first map having set the scene with a useful depiction of the physical geography, the remaining maps illustrate the unfolding political history from the time of Alexander to the present day, with approximately one quarter of the maps covering the last two centuries. There are also maps showing archaeological sites, Islamic monuments, and city plans. Most maps have up to one page of corresponding explanatory text, providing a narrative of the period and flagging significant areas of scholarly disagreement.

The use of a consistent template allows the reader to turn the atlas on its side and, concentrating on one area, to flip across the centuries and see under whose rule it came. Taken with the text, this book gives both an admirably concise overview of Central Asian history and a good impression of the complexity and fluidity of political control. This is aided by the beautiful presentation throughout. Each map is well referenced, and the addition of a comprehensive index makes it an extremely useful reference source. Bregel both achieves and surpasses his stated aim.

In his landmark study of the genre, Black argues convincingly that historical atlases do more than present objective, historical facts: they are subjective visions of history, revealing what historians consider important to include or omit (Black 1997). In the light of this work, four comments can be made on Bregel’s atlas.

Firstly, an explicit goal of this book is to construct a specific vision of what “Central Asia” is, historically and geographically. The region is not seen as marginal to European or other Asian empires and interests, but as an entity in its own right: the setting of maps in a double-bounded frame further serves to emphasize this. Recentering this history is vital to the processes of scholarly and political decolonization, but the reader is left wondering how Central Asia was located in wider continental and global developments; the use of larger-scale inset maps would have been of assistance here. The atlas impinges upon debates about both naming and delimiting the legitimate area of study, and may prove controversial to those who prefer to conceive of a wider geographical field such as “Central Eurasia,” “Inner Asia,” or “Central Asia and the Caucasus.”

Secondly, the relevance of the traditional agenda of historical atlases — clearly demarcated territorial control — is questionable for Central Asian pre-colonial history. Indeed, as Bregel’s text would suggest, the personal authority of the ruler or
the ability to enforce tributary payment may be more useful indicators of power. Standard maps depicting bounded territorial units differentiated in bold colors, suggesting universal and stable control over all the territory, can therefore be misleading. Bregel wrestles with these questions, laboring to resist the Eurocentric temptation to over-emphasize powerful states at the expense of the complex and varied political nature of Central Asian history, for example, by using dotted lines to depict frontiers and by eschewing the use of shading until the late nineteenth century. Nonetheless, the atlas leaves many unanswered questions about the imposition of modern cartographic notions of power and spatiality on historical Central Asian conceptions of space.

Thirdly, the choice of topics in the atlas reveals little sensitivity to what Black (Chapter 9) identified as the post-1945 “New Agenda” of historical atlases, that of balancing the depiction of political geographic history with cultural, social and other histories. While a handful of maps present overviews of archaeological sites, tribal distributions, trade routes and town plans, the logic of the atlas remains overwhelmingly political-geographic, narrating the history of Central Asia as the territorial struggles of powerful males and their armies. This is a missed opportunity. The growing literature on Central Asia surely provides ample material to map alternative histories, including women’s incorporation into the Soviet state, cotton and agricultural production, wealth and poverty, literacy, and environmental change.

Finally, Bregel concludes with a map of Central Asia in the year 2000, highlighting the five former Soviet states with bold colors and firmly drawn boundaries — the only map in the collection that employs this dramatic cartographic technique. This implies that the dynamism of tribal and regional identities and of complicated competing rivalries within polities has finally been overcome in independence, and that boundaries between nations can at last be drawn unambiguously and unproblematically. This is far from the case, and it is a pity that Bregel belatedly draws on this paradigm when so many other examples of mapping contemporary political complexity and dynamism in other parts of the world are available.

These concerns should not detract from Bregel’s achievement. The Atlas is an elegantly crafted work that breaks new ground in the study of the historical political geography of Central Asia. It is to be recommended to the general reader and the specialist alike.

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Black, Jeremy


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Vagabond Life makes available for the first time George F. Kennan’s journal of his 1870 trip across Daghestan, Chechnya, Ossetia, and Georgia. Kennan’s terse and for the most part unenlightening comments are supplemented with extracts from his letters, manuscripts, and four of his magazine and journal articles on the Caucasus.

The journal entries themselves are maddening to read, since Kennan rarely wrote in complete sentences. Aside from the occasional interesting observation about local dress, food, customs, or customary law, much of his writing focuses on landscapes, buildings, and the challenges of travel.

One also has to wonder, as the editor does in her introduction, how much Kennan really understood. He knew no Caucasian languages and had to rely mostly on his Russian, which seems to have been sketchy. As he admitted in his unpublished autobiography, “The knowledge that I had of it when I returned from Siberia was very imperfect and inadequate, and had been gained, almost wholly, by listening to the talk of Cossack and Kalmchadal dog-drivers by the camp-fire... I did not even know the Russian alphabet, and it was weeks after my arrival in St. Petersburg before I could find a word in a dictionary or give more than a guess at the proper way to spell it” (pp. 21-22).
Luckily for Kennan, he joined up with a travel companion, Prince G. D. Jorjadze, who served as a translator and cultural interpreter for much of his journey. Once Kennan departed from him, the journal entries became revealingly brief and descriptive until he picked up another guide and interpreter, an Avar by the name of Akhmet. For example, the only thing he wrote about Tbilisi, after parting ways with the prince but before working with Akhmet, was his fight there with officials to secure horses for the next stage of his journey. The fact that Kennan wrote so little about Tbilisi and Grozny and nothing about Vladikavkaz reflects his predictable romantic and orientalist leanings — better to describe an exotic hat, a colorful blood feud, or a supposed relic of the Crusaders than a town center where he presumably would have been able to find ample help translating and explaining.

For whom was this book published? There is really nothing of interest here to scholars, and the awkwardness of the format will put off general readers. The most interesting parts are Kennan’s articles, which are cut up and interspersed throughout the book, and the editor’s introduction, which provides a useful sketch (for the general reader) of Kennan’s life and career and the history of the Caucasus. Indeed one gets the sense that the editor needed to supplement the journal to provide a rationale for publication. Remove the extra materials and the parts of the journal before and after Kennan arrives in the Caucasus and we are left with no more than 71 pages of journal. But the journal entries cast doubt on the veracity of the articles — either he had a photographic memory or he elaborated, sometimes to the point of fabrication. At the end, the reader feels like Kennan after a hard day’s journey up and down the mountain slopes — weary and (although he rarely admitted it) a bit confused.