

told him that I was a Turkish citizen, he began to speak in a fluent Anatolian Turkish.

"Are you a Turk from Ahiska?" I asked.

"No, I am a Kurd."

"How come you speak such a pure Anatolian Turkish?"

"I worked for a Turkish businessman in Almatī."

"Do you know Kurdish?"

"No, I know Russian."

Apparently, in the midst of the Kurdish insurgency in Anatolia, he became subject to a rather successful personal assimilation project implemented by a nationalist Turk.

Borderlines are also gray zones witnessing micro-level cohabitation of incoherent and fragmented identities. On the one hand, there are nationalizing states trying to erect borders and impose border restrictions; on the other hand, there is an enormous amount of micro-level variation defying the *raison d'être* and legitimacy of these formal procedures. While there is an observable trend that movement from South to North is becoming harder and harder as time goes on, still, the reality of borders poses a puzzling problem for an outsider. The Uzbek-Kazakh border and the

accompanying practices surrounding it constitute a silent reenactment of a belief from the colonial past that modernity moves North to South and traditionalism, vice-versa. For many Kazakh intellectuals, Kazakhstan is qualitatively different from other Central Asian states in that Russian modernization left a deeper imprint on the social fabric of the country. In that sense, the magnificent gate between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is meant to celebrate the demarcation of these two realms. The border contains the traditionalism of the South. At the micro-level, however, there is much room for negotiation and compromise. A lively trade route from Tashkent to Shīmkent and Almatī presents a wide gray area open to different interpretations. On one hand it is a denial of the borders and their impermeability, on the other it owes its existence to those borders and disparate economic spaces contained within them. For the foot soldiers of this dynamic trade zone, borders and regulations are a matter of beseeching the goodwill of the enforcement officials along the 14-hour trip. Crossing back and forth is a daily activity, a matter of sharing some portion of their profits with the police on checkpoints. Boundaries are not sites of exclusion yet; they represent one of those moments when local people encounter the ordering principles of states, which they subtly evade by various strategies of co-optation and compromise.

Shifting Social Networks in Post-Socialist Kazan

Helen Faller, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich., USA,
hmfaller@umich.edu

While inculcating in Soviet people of all nationalities the notion that they have the right to education in their "own" language and the blossoming of their particular national culture, Soviet nationalities ideologies also put pressure on them to russify, both linguistically and culturally, by punishing and provincializing people who wanted to remain national. The tensions between russification pressures, on the one hand, and the rights of national cadres to local, albeit limited rule, on the other, contributed to both the civil wars and small-scale inter-ethnic violence that occurred during the Soviet Union's demise. These have not, however, happened

in Tatarstan, where there has been almost no hostility based on ethnicity. Peace in Tatarstan is no accident, as my research reveals, but rather the result of linguistic negotiations between Tatars, Russians, and others at the level of both policy and practice. Indeed, Tatarstan's political, social, and relative economic stability may perhaps provide a model for the kind of federalism that may sustain Russia.

This report represents a summary of some preliminary findings from my dissertation research. The research was conducted mostly in Kazan, Tatarstan between September 1999 and July 2001. It concerned the social effects of Tatarstan's political

movement for sovereignty focusing locationally on language politics in the implementation of bilingual education in Tatarstan's schools. However, because participant observation means that anthropologists do research in all the domains through which they move, ideationally the findings presented here have almost nothing to do with schooling. Instead, they address the relations between linguistic knowledge and larger processes of social differentiation in Tatarstan through the differentiation of symbolic worlds based on language community, and through the link between group affiliation and language choice.

Tatarstan society is developing into something different from what surrounds it in Russia. In effect, a new Tatarstan nation is being formed as the result of the relative prosperity Tatarstan sovereignty has brought the region, the official promotion of bilingualism, and a consequent pride of place. Society within Tatarstan is diversifying such that divisions between communities are occurring primarily along linguistic lines. That is, people who live only in Russian language and bilinguals (usually in Russian and Tatar) inhabit different symbolic worlds. Linguistic, and implied cultural, differentiation from a russophone world is the most salient barometer of social change in Tatarstan.

In my dissertation I demonstrate how bilingual Tatar-Russian speakers' lived worlds are different from those inhabited by people who live their lives solely in Russian. I provide evidence of difference from various sources, including observations of quotidian interactions, purportedly equivalent television programs in each language, and letters to the editor published in each of Tatarstan's two Communist Party newspapers between 1990-1993. Letters to the editor reveal the non-equivalence of the worlds inhabited by Russian and Tatar-writers, as well as how peace is maintained in Tatarstan. Differences in how writers make their cases in letters to the editor in each language arise in the devices used to legitimate their opinions as somehow representative of other people; in how they imagine homeland and its relationship to the polity in which they live; and in whether they use alarmist tactics or selective memory to represent their concerns.

While letters printed in different languages depict sometimes irreconcilably different worlds, those published in the Russian-language newspaper seem to accept the terms of a single debate, no matter what the ascribed nationality of their writers. Indeed, the claim can be made that by maintaining

an inter-national dialogue, the letters to the editor printed in the Russian-language *Respublika Tatarstan* encourage peaceful social relations in Tatarstan. For, even if readers disagree with letter-writers' ideas, the government sees to it that they are made aware of them: those ideas thus have been made part of the public sphere. Moreover, the anti-Soviet and anti-Russian opinions expressed in *Respublika Tatarstan* are more mild than some of those printed in the Tatar-language *Vatanım Tatarstan*; they do not exist outside of an ideological framework recognizable to Russians. Moreover, although many of the letters published by *Vatanım Tatarstan* represent an extreme departure from received political institutions, Russians do not have the linguistic ability or desire to read them. Additionally, people trained in Tatar linguistic practices are trained not to give in to expressions of anger, but rather to keep the peace through persuasion. Thus, I would argue that, while the maintenance of a dialogue in the Russian-language newspaper encourages feelings of inclusive nationalism among Tatarstan's inhabitants, the pressure to use persuasion, as opposed to alarmism, among Tatarstan's Tatar-speakers helps the monophone Russian population to feel included in and rewarded for participating in nation-building processes.

Another result of the social differentiation occurring in Tatarstan is that people view the recent war in Chechnya differently, depending upon the language in which they primarily live. Apparently reproducing opinions expressed by their parents, Russian-speaking children say that the war is a just struggle against terrorists and any criticism of Russian troops, including articles in the foreign press that are critical of Russia's actions, is an insult to the young men who are losing their lives in Chechnya. Tatar-speakers in Tatarstan, by contrast, express no surprise that Russian soldiers should be committing acts that violate decency; these adolescents, like their parents, consider the war in Chechnya and general discrimination against Chechens to be acts of violence by Russia against its own people. However, not only linguistic ability, but also contexts and patterns of language use, influence people's attitudes. For example, Tatar-speakers I talked to in Moscow and St. Petersburg, who do not share Tatarstan Tatars' fear of military invasion, express little sympathy for the plight of Chechens. Their statements fundamentally differ from those of one Tatarstan intellectual I know who explained: "Before we felt like one Soviet people; now

Chechnya has made us realize that we are different. We continue to live with Russians not because we want to, but because we have to."

The other thread of my research traces the ways in which post-Soviet linguistic, ethnic, and religious communities are diversifying according to changing identity markers and with respect to different internal and external political-economic forces. If, for example, knowledge of languages other than Russian during the Soviet period was potentially dangerous, now knowledge of other languages has become essential to economic survival. As a result of the ways particular individuals are seeking affiliation with alternate organizations and ideologies, social relations between members of strengthened or newly emergent communities are being reconfigured. Indeed, as post-socialist space becomes increasingly exposed to divergent political economic forces, the potential subject positions people can occupy are multiplied in unexpected and seemingly incompatible ways.

For example, although a great many people seek out opportunities to acquire foreign languages, as well as the freedom to travel, different affiliatory inclinations mean that their efforts take different concrete forms. So, religious Tatars may want to acquire Arabic so they can read the Quran, or study

in the Middle East, or travel to Mecca for the *Hajj*. People of Volga German ancestry, by contrast, need to acquire German in order to qualify for immigration to Germany, while knowledge of Hebrew is not required for Jews to emigrate to Israel. In the latter case, being able to demonstrate Jewish ancestry is key. All the types of people listed above, and others who may not feel especially strong ethnic or religious affiliations, may nonetheless be inclined to want to learn English, especially if they engage in any kind of business; hope to travel abroad for pleasure or schooling; listen to Britney Spears' songs; or want to surf the internet. Because of Tatarstan's close business, cultural, and linguistic ties with the Republic of Turkey, a lot of people, including Russians, are likewise interested in studying Turkish language; in this regard, Tatars have a definite advantage, but Russian students nevertheless make a valiant effort to train themselves to work as translators. Although processes of language acquisition related to fundamental shifts in people's positionality are occurring all across post-Soviet space, Tatarstan's official bilingualism creates a situation that encourages people to inhabit lived worlds in more than one language. This model presents intriguing possibilities for other potential problems of Russian federalism.

Brief

Network Community Creation in Kazakhstan

Elena G. Gayevskaya, Internet Access and Training Program (IATP) Coordinator for Kazakhstan, Almatı, Kazakhstan, iatpkzcc@freenet.kz

The internet is a social phenomenon. Research on a social aspect of the internet known as Network Communities is one of the newest trends in Western sociology. Though the CIS countries have yet to enter the era of widespread internet use, this research brief gives preliminary evidence of interest in Network Communities development in Kazakhstan. During an internship in the USA in 2000, I put together a presentation on "Distance Learning in Kazakhstan" (<<http://www.elenag.freenet.kz/>>). My professional activities are now closely connected with the creation and development of Network Communities in Kazakhstan as Coordinator of Internet Access and Training Program (IATP) in Kazakhstan.

As part of the research on distance learning, IATP organized educational events for school

students (Summer Internet Camp) and alumni of the US government programs (First Kazakhstani Virtual Conference). One example of an IATP project related to Network Communities is the "Girls Leading Our World" (GLOW) Camp in the city of Qaraghandı (known as Karaganda in Russian). The camp endeavored to teach the girls many different life skills, with internet skills being among those emphasized. After receiving training from IATP, the campers created their own website (<<http://www.geocities.com/glowcamp>>) which highlighted Camp GLOW's activities. If you are interested in information about IATP Community activities, please find it at the following addresses: <<http://www.iatp.kz>> and <<http://www.freenet.kz>>